FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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JULY 1956

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The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE ABROAD

By Henry M. Wriston

THERE is a general impression that the Secretary of State travels too much. During three and a half years in office Mr. Dulles has gone a distance about equal to 11 times around the earth at the equator. He has visited 38 countries, several of them more than once.

Most of the comments about these relatively well-known facts tend to treat the travels of the Secretary as unique, something of a personal idiosyncrasy. Nothing could be further from the facts. It is indubitable that the Secretary likes his job, including the travel. Perhaps one should say especially the travel. Yet, despite his overpublicized totals he has not been absent as large a percentage of the time as some of his predecessors. James F. Byrnes was away from his desk about 62 percent of his year and a half in office; George C. Marshall had an "acting secretary" in his stead over 47 percent of his two-year tenure. Dean Acheson's record was close to 25 percent; Hull's was over 22 percent and Stettinius's was over 67 percent. Mr. Dulles has been represented by a substitute approximately 36 percent of his time as Secretary. It is clear from these figures that a new pattern of Secretarial conduct emerged before the present incumbent took office. The development is sufficiently important to warrant an inquiry into the underlying reasons and an evaluation of the consequences.[1]

Until this century the Secretary was absent only when ill or vacationing. If he engaged in negotiations abroad, he resigned, as John W. Foster did when he went to Paris to present the case of the United States in the Bering Sea controversy and as James

[1] The statistics are not comparable in all respects. In some instances the total represents chiefly long international meetings during a short term of office (as Secretary Stettinius's service at Yalta and San Francisco); in others the dominant pattern has been frequent brief trips.

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R. Day did early in the McKinley administration to head the delegation in Paris to make peace with Spain.

The Pan American conferences were the first influence tending to a different pattern. James G. Blaine convened the first such meeting in Washington in 1889. Latin nations often sent their foreign ministers; it seemed desirable, in courtesy, for the Secretary of State to attend when the conferences were held outside this country. Nevertheless, it was not until 1906 that a Secretary of State did so. Elihu Root delivered an address to the third conference in Rio, but did not participate in negotiations. The conference in Montevideo in 1933 was, according to Cordell Hull's "Memoirs," "the first time that an American Secretary of State had ever headed a delegation to a Pan American Conference," and he was active in negotiations; at Rio in December 1936 Hull proposed his "Eight Pillars of Peace." He also took a leading rôle at Lima in 1938 and at Havana in 1940.

The Pan American conferences also stimulated "good will" trips. Secretary Root initiated this practice as well. To visit the American Republics he left the Department at the end of June and did not return until October 1906. Philander C. Knox made a "good will" tour of the Caribbean. Charles E. Hughes attended the centennial celebration of Brazilian independence, and Bainbridge Colby went to Brazil and Uruguay in December 1920.

War meetings were the second type of conference to draw Secretaries of State abroad. Robert Lansing went with President Wilson to Paris but did not resign as Secretary despite the length of his stay. Secretaries Hull, Stettinius and Byrnes all accompanied the President abroad. Secretary Hull also attended the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in 1943, and Mr. Byrnes was in Paris for a meeting of foreign ministers when the famous Wallace speech was delivered.

Wilson had ushered in an era of personal diplomacy. The pattern was suspended during the Harding and Coolidge administrations, but there was a partial return by President Hoover. On the initiative of Secretary Stimson, Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald came to confer with President Hoover on the limitation of naval armaments. This was, perhaps, the first peacetime negotiation between heads of state in which a President participated. The practice is now so fully accepted as normal that there was impatience, especially abroad, with the obvious reluctance of President Eisenhower to meet "at the summit," and even more

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at the strict limitations which he set upon the subject matter and the time he was willing to devote to the meeting.

Mr. Stimson attended the London Conference on Naval Limitation in 1930, and returned to Europe the following year to explore the possibilities of a reduction of land armaments, visiting Rome, Paris, Berlin and London. At a subsequent conference in which Hugh Gibson was head of the delegation, Secretary Stimson went in person to stimulate action when matters did not progress to his satisfaction. Cordell Hull went to the London Economic Conference as "head" of our delegation, but found Assistant Secretary Moley in easier and more frequent communication with the President. Mr. Roosevelt's habit of bypassing the heads of departments kept Hull from going abroad with him upon some occasions, the most conspicuous instance being the second Quebec Conference, in 1944, when the President was accompanied by Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury. Nevertheless, by the time Hull resigned late in 1944, the pattern of Secretarial diplomacy was fairly well set.

Four other factors considerably broadened early precedents. The liquidation of peace conference business after the First World War was left in the hands of a Council of Ambassadors; by contrast, in 1945 matters were referred to a Council of Foreign Ministers. It was hoped that this would involve fewer delays, since it is not desirable for any nation to have its foreign minister absent for long periods at a time, whereas ambassadors live abroad and there is less pressure to act expeditiously. It was hoped, also, that negotiations might prove more flexible, since foreign ministers have wider discretion than ambassadors.

The establishment of the United Nations at San Francisco in 1945 was a second factor. The idea had long been discussed; a major effort was necessary to crystallize it into an institution. The President lent the prestige of his presence and the Secretary of State headed the American delegation. The foreign ministers of most of the founding nations were there. From this precedent arose the practice of having the chief diplomatic officer of each great nation attend some of the sessions of the General Assembly each year. While they are usually held in New York, they take the Secretary away from his desk; when they are held abroad, his absence is that much longer.

A third factor subsequently added other occasions for absence. For the first time the United States entered upon peacetime alli-

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ances. NATO holds a vital place in the diplomatic as well as the military structure of the West. The Secretary of State is a member of its Council and obligated to attend. SEATO, in like manner, requires his personal attention. Multi-national negotiations, which the sessions arising from these alliances typify, are a temptation to make the Secretary the negotiator. Norman H. Davis, as Special Ambassador in the Hoover administration and as our first Ambassador-at-Large in the Roosevelt administration, performed the function of negotiator in multilateral meetings very acceptably. Nevertheless, the practice of diplomacy by conference has united with increasing speed and comfort of air travel to induce more and more participation by the Secretary.

Soviet tactics supplied still other occasions for Secretarial negotiation. Ambassadors from the Soviets have not had wide discretion; they seem to have been treated, for the most part, as diplomatic errand boys. There has been an almost equal tendency for the top officials of the Kremlin to see foreign ambassadors only sparingly; even when they were admitted, there was marked reluctance to discuss important matters. The Soviet rulers prefer to deal directly with the President, bypassing even the Secretary of State and their own Foreign Minister. World public opinion clearly demands every sacrifice to mitigate tensions. This was dramatized by the demand for a conference "at the summit" and by Churchill's obvious distress that it was so long deferred. Finally, the President yielded, but attached stringent conditions governing length of time, procedures and topics, and made plain that he would refuse to engage in negotiations personally.

The Secretary of State cannot be so firm in setting limits of that sort. This subjects him to the Soviet habit of protracting "negotiations" interminably, while making repeated propaganda speeches. Such tactics are tolerated because there is always a chance that the forms of patience and the reality of persistence will produce a desirable result. One instance was the sudden Soviet reversal from obstructing an Austrian peace treaty to haste in signing one. The unexpected revision of position on the "package deal" regarding enlarged membership in the United Nations was another. A series of such episodes during the cold war could be mentioned; they explain why patience hopefully waits its reward. Apparently the Soviet Foreign Minister has no such exalted status in the policy-determining hierarchy that his frequent and long absences are as inconvenient as those of the Secretary of State.

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Such are a few of the principal reasons for the extraordinary percentage of the time recent Secretaries of State have been away from Washington. Before assessing the benefits and disadvantages it is essential to emphasize that peripatetic diplomacy on the part of foreign ministers is not unique with the United States.

Since the phenomenon is not confined to the United States, much less to the present Secretary, there must be a more fundamental reason than any so far mentioned. The underlying cause is to be found in the drastic change in the political structure of the current world, and an even more profound change in the political climate. In the nineteenth century there were many fewer nations, and their order of precedence in international matters was reasonably well established.

The United States was not one of the Great Powers. That we did not so regard ourselves was strikingly symbolized by the fact that, though the Constitution spoke of "ambassadors," Congress did not authorize that grade until 1893. When we started to change our legations to embassies, only four were selected, London, Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburg—all capitals of recognized Great Powers. Within the memory of men still active in British public life, Britain had only eight diplomats of ambassadorial rank. That supplies us with a rough estimate of the number of "Great Powers" which made world policy. Britain, for example, still had a vast empire; the dominions had no ministers of external affairs. All that is now changed. Since 1900, 47 new nations have been recognized and eight have passed from the scene. Eighteen of the new nations have appeared since the Second World War.

The political climate has altered even more. It used to be no disgrace to be one of the lesser Powers. The United States could have sent ambassadors earlier; we did not choose to. Until last year Switzerland sent ministers, and was content. But now every nation wants to be treated as a first-class Power and send and receive ambassadors. This is a symptom of acute sensitiveness about status; states are insisting upon equality so far as dignity is concerned. True, the "Great Powers," arbitrarily defined, have a permanent seat and a veto in the Security Council of the United Nations. But the leadership of the Great Powers is no longer meekly accepted. There is a vigorous assertiveness on the part of the smallest and weakest which must be handled with great sensitiveness and consideration. Each has one vote in the United Na-

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tions Assembly; more important, voices never heard, or long muted, now speak—sometimes in strident tones—in that world forum.

These circumstances have led to a fundamental decentralization of diplomacy, and the habit of making visits is firmly engrafted upon current practice. The peregrinations of Khrushchev and Bulganin are well known and conspicuous. A colleague of the Canadian Minister of External Affairs spoke of him, kindly, as "ubiquitous." It is said that during his first two years as Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles met Mr. Eden, then Foreign Secretary, no less than 17 times. During his brief tenure at the Foreign Office, Mr. Harold Macmillan was abroad much of the time. While our Secretary of State was at the SEATO meetings, it transpired that the percentage of time spent away from London by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, the present Foreign Secretary, was almost identical to the absentee percentage of Mr. Dulles.

Many high-ranking foreign officials come to the United States; a casual inspection of the guest book at the Council on Foreign Relations shows visits from a large number of prime ministers and foreign ministers in a single year. It may be thought that this is not surprising since the United States is so dominant a power in world affairs. New Delhi, on the other hand, is the capital of a nation newly independent, with no great military or economic strength though an important strategic position. Yet in the course of less than two years it has been visited by heads of state or foreign ministers of 19 nations, including all that have any claim to be called Great Powers. And the Secretary-General of the United Nations also went to India. No further evidence need be adduced to show how gross is the error in supposing that travel is characteristic of the American Secretary of State alone. The practice of concentrating an extraordinary amount of negotiation in the hands of the foreign minister is endemic.

There are some favorable consequences of this acquired habit. When it succeeds there are unquestioned economies of time and effort. The fewer minds a policy formulation passes through on the way toward action, the less chance there is of distortion, misunderstanding and consequent confusion. Historically, peacetime alliances have been held together more by external pressure than by bonds of common interest. Whenever the immediate threat is relieved, or even appears to be, the difficulties of concerted action increase. These circumstances accentuate the ad-

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vantages of high-level contact. The fabrication of concerted policy proceeds more expeditiously (a relative term, in diplomacy) when meetings are at the highest practicable level. Former Secretary James F. Byrnes remarked that "dividends from personal contacts between leaders flow in long after" the conference ends. After his trip to Asia in March, Mr. Dulles spoke of the importance of talking "intimately with the leaders of each of these ten countries" and asserted that "talking face to face is the best way yet invented for enabling men to understand each other." The same theme appeared in the Anglo-Soviet communiqué as Khrushchev and Bulganin left London: "one of the important factors in strengthening international confidence consists in personal contacts between leading statesmen, which have produced positive results." This point of view has been universally accepted; instances of its expression could be multiplied indefinitely.

Sometimes, however, there are what used to be known in business as "Irish dividends"—deficits. High-level contacts may accentuate difficulties arising not so much from substantial difference in national interest as from personal vanities, irritability and a whole host of like negative factors. Those who have attended such meetings know there are personal frictions as well as personal friendships. The issues are national, not personal; the tendency to personalize them obscures to some degree their national character. It makes a change from one Secretary to another more serious than it ought to be in the light of the continuing nature of the national interest and the broadly nonpartisan character of foreign policy. To focus the spotlight on one individual rather than upon the State Department and the Foreign Service as a continuing organization tends to make the political standing or the ambition of the Secretary assume a larger share of public attention than is wise. Personal idiosyncrasies should play as small a rôle in the pursuit of national policy as possible. At best it will not be inconsiderable, but to make policy and negotiation appear to be a one-man affair tends to dislocate public opinion.

Among the basic reasons for a professional foreign service and for great emphasis upon the somewhat archaic ritualism of international communication is precisely the need to dissociate the public interest from personal qualities, so far as is practical. The resort to personal diplomacy in our time has produced many instances where the clash of personalities retarded the accommodation of international issues.

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There are certain characteristics of the American Government, moreover, which make protracted absence by the Secretary disadvantageous—even if the total is composed of brief, frequent dashes to and from the corners of the earth.

In the first place, the Secretary of State is the principal adviser to the President on foreign affairs. Many issues, however, do not readily yield to simple classification as "foreign" or "domestic;" indeed, as time goes on the distinction becomes ever more difficult to maintain. For these and other reasons there has always been competition for influence among the President's advisers, official and personal. Inevitably that rivalry has been intensified since the United States became a World Power with many complex interests everywhere.

The Secretary of the Treasury, for example, has often been exceedingly influential. The competition between Hamilton and Jefferson in Washington's administration is historic. Cordell Hull's "Memoirs" are eloquent on the point; the Secretary of the Treasury, he said, "often acted as if he were clothed with authority to project himself into the field of foreign affairs and inaugurate efforts to shape the course of foreign policy in given instances." He showed a "persistent inclination to try to function as a second Secretary of State." This came to a climax in the "Morgenthau plan" for postwar Germany, embodied in a memorandum initialed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at Quebec, and markedly at variance with Hull's ideas. He was much less sensitive to interpositions by Secretary of War Stimson, a former Secretary of State, with whose views he was in close agreement. In preparing his own ideas regarding the treatment of postwar Germany he had kept in touch with Stimson on the ground that the War Department had a vital interest in the matter. When the "Morgenthau plan" was approved, Stimson was even more angry than Hull and had more influence in convincing Roosevelt of the basic error.

It is no secret that the present Secretary of the Treasury takes a "very, very active rôle" in the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, and by his attitude on foreign aid exerts great influence. There is not the same friction with the Secretary of State, or intrusion upon his functions, but there is, nevertheless, a feeling in some sections of the Department of State that the views of the Treasury are often decisive. Other cabinet officers have sought to influence the President. Hull complained that Vice President

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Wallace, as head of the Board of Economic Warfare, "sought to appropriate the chief economic war functions of the State Department." During the Truman administration, as Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Wallace got specific presidential approval for a speech on foreign policy that brought Secretary of State Byrnes to the point of threatening to resign.

The vast multiplication of agencies during the war, many of them dealing with situations abroad, also multiplied the occasions in which the President was influenced in vital matters of foreign policy by advisers other than the Secretary of State, who said his work was "bedeviled" by them. The continuation of such separate agencies since the war has perpetuated dangers of confusion in giving advice to the President. Such diffusion of powers and responsibilities makes it the more essential for the Secretary to remain at home and maintain constant contact with the members of the Cabinet and with every agency by which he can keep in touch with the views of others and take them into account in advising the President. One new development emphasizes this point. The National Security Council has been made the principal forum for the discussion and determination of basic policy. It now meets regularly and frequently, with the President himself in the chair. When the Secretary of State is absent no substitute can bring to these critical meetings the weight and authority that go with his office.

There have been many well-known instances where persons holding no office exercised a large influence upon foreign policy through direct contact with the President. The most famous was Colonel House, during the administration of President Wilson; indeed, he often seemed to act as an *alter ego*. At first Raymond Moley, and later Sumner Welles, had great influence with President Roosevelt, to the irritation of their superior officer. Harry Hopkins, with no State Department appointment, was also a powerful influence; it was Hopkins who inserted what Hull called the "isolationist plank" in the Democratic platform of 1940. Nevertheless, despite that episode, Hull said he "never had any friction, much less clashes, with him."

Clearly, when the Secretary is absent for very considerable periods all the various competing influences have much freer play. Secretary Acheson seems to have been aware of this. He revived the post of ambassador-at-large, which had lapsed after the retirement of Norman Davis; when Philip Jessup was appointed it was

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stated that he would represent the President and Secretary of State in United Nations meetings and in other multilateral negotiations such as the Council of Foreign Ministers. The principal reason for reviving the post was to enable the Secretary of State to stay close by the President and serve more continuously as his adviser on foreign affairs than had some of his predecessors. Not all these hopes were fulfilled, for foreign ministers of other nations were reluctant to accept any substitute for the Secretary. Nevertheless, the appointment may well account for the fact that Mr. Acheson's percentage of absences was lower than the postwar norm. His influence with the President in matters of foreign policy suffered no such challenge or diminution as had been evident with some of his predecessors.

When the Secretary is away the Under Secretary cannot exercise this central function of advice to the President with the authority of the Secretary himself. This is the more true since, in contrast with early precedents, the Secretary takes with him a very large section of the high-level officers of the Department. In the meeting of Foreign Ministers at Geneva last fall, the following were in attendance in addition to the Secretary: The Counsellor of the Department, the Assistant Secretary for Policy Planning, the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, the Assistant Secretary for Public Information, the chief legal officer, the chief cultural officer, as well as the President's Special Assistant on Disarmament Problems. Of course, each of these officers took some of his chief aides. One ambassador was in attendance through the entire meeting, another part of the time. This serious drain on the Department is now virtually standard practice.

Several results flow from such a departmental exodus. The Acting Secretary is in the position of a substitute quarterback with a third string team to direct. Further, the "ordinary" work of each absent officer's section of the Department is to some extent hampered or crippled; taken as a whole this amounts to a serious dislocation of departmental work. Moreover, advice to the President, under these circumstances, will inevitably hew closer to precedent; it will certainly lack the imaginative initiation of new tactical approaches which is often vital to success.

After his status as adviser to the President, the second principal function of the Secretary is to keep under continuous over-all review every phase of our world-wide responsibilities and opportunities. In the present state of world affairs this alone is a back-

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breaking task. Over-concentration upon one area seriously impairs the balance; and when so many principal officers are also over-concentrating upon the same phase, the effect in producing imbalance is multiplied.

Indeed, it is fair to say that the greater the Secretary's capacity as a negotiator, the more serious is the distraction from his broader task. For negotiation is not just a gift; it requires intense preparation and absorption in the immediate matter, mastery of details as well as broad outlines. This can be acquired only by neglecting, for the time being, other phases of our foreign relations, all of which are constantly changing in perspective. Inevitably he loses touch with things done in his absence and may miss the significance of events in other areas. But for one such absence, it seems inconceivable that identical notes would have been sent to Greece and Turkey last September after Turkish riots in Istanbul and Izmir had done so much violence to Greek sensibilities. Under less tense circumstances, the haste and consequent inadvertence which occasioned such an error might not have had damaging results. In the delicate balance of forces presently operative in that area, however, any dislocation of relationship produces serious consequences. The repercussions of that error have not yet been fully realized. In somewhat the same category is the mysterious Goa statement; any benefit to our relations with Portugal was greatly outweighed by its disastrous effect in India.

So swift is the movement of events that even brief absences can seriously dislocate policy formation. The crisis over Cyprus reached an acute stage with the exile of Archbishop Makarios, the orientation of Jordan was put in doubt with the dismissal of General Glubb, the conference of Colonel Nasser with the heads of Syria and Saudi Arabia still further heightened tension between Israel and the Arab nations—all while the Secretary of State and the British and French Foreign Ministers were absent in other parts of Asia. Essential and urgent political and military joint planning had to take place without them. So far as the United States was concerned it had to go forward in the absence, also, of the Assistant Secretaries of State in charge of policy planning and of the interests of this country in that explosive area. The result was not only delay in reaching conclusions until their return; it required that joint policy be designed while the principal architects were elsewhere.

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A third disadvantage of absence from Washington is its effect upon our own ambassadors abroad. They are responsible for keeping the Secretary informed. One remarked that he had learned to time his most important dispatches to catch the Secretary (and his area Assistant Secretary) in Washington. Another used baseball terms to give vent to his feelings: I feel I am in there pitching with no one catching.

Sometimes it seems to be forgotten that while it is easy to fly the Secretary to a foreign country, it is just as easy to fly an ambassador back to Washington for consultation and instructions. When our foreign relations were relatively simple their conduct was decentralized. Now that they are manifold and complex they tend to be more and more concentrated in one man. This is inherently wrong because it impairs the Secretary's opportunity for balanced review and supervision; it fails to take advantage of better means of communication.

When the post of ambassador-at-large was discontinued, it was said to be in consequence of a policy decision to rely more on regular ambassadors, even in special situations, and to use fewer special ambassadors. Events have shown that the policy was not deeply imbedded. Not only has the Secretary often gone abroad, but the Under Secretary, the Deputy Under Secretary and several Assistant Secretaries have also traveled a good deal; and there have been a number of special envoys with the rank of ambassador.

It might be possible so to manage visits of the Secretary as to increase the prestige of ambassadors. That this has not been the usual result is evidenced by their continued unhappiness at being temporarily superseded as the President's personal representative. There is no novelty in this feeling. Regular ambassadors have always resented "intrusion" into the area for which they have responsibility. The bitterness of Charles Francis Adams during the Civil War is classic. Modern diplomats share his feeling that special visits make the ambassador appear inadequate and reduce his prestige. It has an effect, too, upon the foreign offices with which we deal; some in critical areas have shown a marked tendency to hold out rather than conclude an arrangement with the ambassador, in the hope (too often fulfilled) that someone will come out from Washington bringing larger concessions. Instances of this tactic are not difficult to find.

Moreover, one trip breeds another. This has been particularly

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true in the case of Secretary Dulles. In a press conference on February 28 of this year he spoke of the imminence of a trip "to South Asia and the Far East that will take me to ten countries, *two of which I have never visited before.*" This statement highlights one very significant difference between the travels of the present Secretary and the journeys of his predecessors. Mr. Dulles has visited more United States missions abroad than any other Secretary, probably more than all his predecessors added together. He seems to feel some sort of obligation to "touch base" at all of them during his tenure of office. The airplane has become more than a convenience; it is a temptation.

Despite the speed of modern travel, each individual call is very brief. So far as the nation visited is concerned, there is hardly sufficient time for important diplomatic exchanges. It is doubtful that such stopovers reflect enough thoughtful consideration to be considered properly even as courtesy calls; their pace is quite out of keeping with the ceremonial tempo of Asian hospitality, for example. The timing and length of stay are often very sensitive matters which a hurried schedule cannot fully take into account; a shorter stay in New Delhi than in Karachi is a case in point. These hasty stops contrast sharply with the conduct of the representatives of the Soviet. Khrushchev and Bulganin took two weeks to see India; they traveled widely, they not only saw officials but gave attention to the intellectuals and, even more, assiduously cultivated people in the mass. They spoke innumerable times and always in appreciative terms regarding the culture and attainments of the Indian nation. They did not give the appearance of wanting anything but friendship; they asked no guarantees and no alliances.

There is room for good-will visits and for sending special embassies to participate in national celebrations and ceremonies. Nevertheless, the growing habit of reducing the resident ambassador to a social symbol and transmitter of communications denigrates his legal status as the personal representative of the head of the state and makes it needlessly difficult for him to fulfil his important and wide-ranging duties.

Frequent and protracted absences of the Secretary of State from the Department limit his contact with the ambassadors of other nations accredited to this Government. Of course, much of the business with the Department is carried on by embassy and departmental officers; not even every occasion for an ambassador

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to visit the Department requires the presence of the Secretary. In some instances, however, it is important. When, late last year, the ambassadors of Egypt and Israel were "summoned" to the Department, the purpose was to give a stern warning and dramatize the interest of the United States in the preservation of peace in an explosive area. When they were met by an Assistant Secretary, no amount of skill on his part could substitute for the authority and prestige of the Secretary himself. Certain purposes can never be served by a deputy; when such tasks are committed to others the effect is to treat foreign ambassadors as a good deal less than the personal representatives of the heads of their states.

Even more serious is the break in essential contacts with the Congress. There is an Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations; he performs many useful functions. But there are other relationships, in a bipartisan policy, which the Secretary himself must establish and maintain. The tension between the Executive and Legislative branches is historic. Washington presided over the Constitutional Convention, and was extremely cautious in setting precedents; yet he sought to attend the Senate to discuss a proposed Indian treaty—to get its "advice" as a prelude to its "consent." He was rudely treated; when a second visit failed he never returned, nor has any President since. This breach has made the Senate, if anything, even more sensitive to its prerogative in foreign affairs. The House, as early as Jay's Treaty, tried to use the power of the purse to gain an influence upon foreign policy, and was rebuffed by a slender margin. Ever since the effort has been renewed from time to time and in diverse ways.

Members of both houses want to be briefed by the Secretary. In his three years in office, Mr. Dulles met with committees or subcommittees of Congress 120 times. It is, perhaps, significant that there were 70 such meetings in his first ten months as Secretary, and only 50 in the more than two years since.

Moreover, numbers of appearances do not fully compensate for absence at strategic times. Last November, for example, the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report held six days of hearings. The statement of the chairman in opening the hearings contains the following words:

> I need not repeat how important we feel these hearings are to the strengthening of our foreign economic policy. It was for this reason, hoping for a strong policy statement at the highest level, that we invited the Secretary

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of State to appear to deliver an opening address. We are all aware that he is away. . . . We suggested that the new Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs might come. But the Department felt that Mr. Prochnow is too new in his job to be familiar with the entire range of matters which might come up.

We suggested alternatively the name of Mr. Thurston B. Morton, Assistant Secretary, who is very well known and respected here on the Hill. He is in Geneva, too.

. . . Senator Flanders aided us by requesting the appearance of Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., the Under Secretary. Mr. Hoover was unable to come.

Such passages are, to put it mildly, unfortunate.

In any event, formal appearances are not enough; there is need for personal and social contact as well, a process that requires time and fails when it is hurried. The maintenance of a reasonable degree of bipartisanship makes frequent and free communication with influential Senators and Representatives absolutely vital. Fruitful contacts for this purpose cannot occur in either public or "closed" sessions of committees; they can be effective only when nothing has to be done for effect. This needs private conversation with no object save enlightenment, which should be mutual. A Secretary can profit by what he hears as well as win support by what he says. It is no accident that the period during which successive Secretaries have been away so much has been one of great difficulty in maintaining this contact. The effort to do so, in addition to all other things which demand his personal attention, adds to an already crushing load. Of course, even with the Secretary in Washington, relations may become strained. Mr. Acheson as Assistant Secretary was popular with the Congress; after he became Secretary his relations with it deteriorated.

Absentee Secretaries cannot give the help essential to departmental officers in dealing with the Bureau of the Budget and appropriations committees of the Congress. Historically, the Department of State is starved. By ill-luck, when it became a vital instrument, at the time of both world wars, neither President Wilson nor President Roosevelt gave it strong support; both were too much inclined to personal diplomacy to appreciate the importance of the continuous, professional organization.

There is, therefore, a desperate need for the Secretary to pull a laboring oar, as do the heads of other departments who are seldom absent. The Secretary cannot make the departmental budget, but he can fight for decent salaries and proper allowances, for adequate manpower, for a building appropriate to the task and efficient in operation. No Deputy Under Secretary, however

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able, can substitute for the personal interest, attention and effort of the Secretary himself. There is a direct relationship between the fiscally adverse position of the Department and Foreign Service and the long absences of recent Secretaries. So tenuous, indeed, had become the relation of the Secretary to the operations of the Department since the war that it was even suggested that his office should be moved back to the old State Department building—bringing him into closer contact with the President, but separating him even more from his own organization.

Any separation from his own department is very serious indeed. There are significant energies and valuable talents in the professional staff of the Department of State. Sometimes they seem to be buried there. Secretaries of State have been known to go outside the Department for advice and assistance, just because they did not know where to find them in the Department, or, in any event, how to get free, informal access to them. It has always been difficult for such staff talents to be fully exploited by the Secretary, because the thoughts and works of his staff come to him through so many bureaucratic filters that sometimes the substance is all but gone. Nevertheless, some Secretaries have been able to identify able officers and bring them and their ideas to the surface. It cannot be done in absentia.

Finally, the itinerant Secretary does not, in practice, improve flexibility in negotiation. It may be true, indeed, that making the Secretary the principal negotiator actually impairs flexibility. An ambassador can alter his position more readily; it is a hoary device to put forward a position, under instructions, "on his own responsibility," and when that position proves untenable he may have "new instructions." Ambassadors, moreover, can work outside the glare of publicity. They can work in secrecy, which always makes for more flexible negotiation. A prime example was the settlement of the thorny Trieste problem by agreement in October 1954, after eight months of confidential diplomatic interchange. It should remind us that the business of advancing the interests of the United States can sometimes be accomplished in quiet, in confidence—even in "secret," though that has become an odious word. The Secretary, on the contrary, moves abroad in a blinding glare of publicity. It is "open diplomacy" with a vengeance. In the conference of foreign ministers at Geneva last fall, *The New York Times* alone had five topflight correspondents on hand. Other papers made similar efforts. The "brief-

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ing" after each session, the calculated leaks by different delegations and the assiduity of seasoned news gatherers made nearly every word spoken in the conference room publicly available. Under such circumstances, every slight alteration of position is a "defeat," any lack of tangible progress is a "failure." If there is no "hard news" the public reads a dispatch saying the Secretary looked cheerful, accompanied by extended speculation as to the sources of his inexplicable optimism; or he looked gloomy, with equal ruminations about possible causes—very soft news indeed.

Over-dramatizing negotiation creates an expectation of tangible results. One of Secretary Hull's wisest remarks was, "There are no real triumphs in diplomacy." Ambassador Merchant, while Assistant Secretary, enlarged upon this theme. "Diplomatic victory," he said, "is something of a contradiction in terms, since a successful diplomatic effort usually involves an accommodation of interests with other countries, and its fruits may be dissipated by the claim that one country or another has achieved a 'victory.'" International issues of such magnitude as to draw the Secretary into negotiation are complex, and have long, stubborn histories. Rapid "progress" is likely to be a superficial evasion of reality. Often the most important result of a negotiation is clarification, an improved estimate of the situation. What appears in short perspective as a "failure" may well prove a step toward a better approach.

Putting the spotlight upon every step in a long process, moreover, tends to overstress the "initiative." The initiative is valuable, but not always essential. In football many a team with the most first downs and yards gained has nevertheless lost the game. There are times in negotiation when it is desirable to adopt tactics equivalent to a punt in football. Letting the other side carry the ball—that is, assume the initiative—may be a profitable manœuvre. It becomes almost impossible when immediately there are loud cries of "failure" and "defeat."

Negotiation in the spotlight by the Secretary inevitably invites propaganda by the Soviets. It is almost impossible not to respond with counterpropaganda. It seems an anomaly to banish the U.S.I.A. from the Department of State because its function is propaganda, and then put the Secretary in a position where he is forced to make propaganda. Yet that is one result of current practices.

No one who has followed events closely since the outbreak of

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the First World War can expect to eliminate the attendance of the Secretary of State at all international conferences. The practice is not unique with this nation, and cannot be discontinued unilaterally. Some relief might, however, be achieved by joint action. At one of their frequent meetings the foreign ministers could talk over the dilemma in which they all find themselves and set informal limitations upon excessive travel. For example, they might agree that all foreign ministers would attend the early weeks of each United Nations Assembly. This would facilitate mutual acquaintance and provide opportunity for private and personal discussions of a very wide range of common concerns. Secretary Hull used the Pan American conferences to develop such personal contacts with the Latin American foreign ministers, and Secretary Marshall followed much the same practice when attending the United Nations Assembly.

It is particularly important that our Secretary of State take the initiative in such a curtailment, for absenteeism has gone further in the United States than in any other Great Power. Moreover, it is less to our interest to perpetuate it upon the present scale than to the interest of other nations. The practice can and should be curbed, in the interest of more continuity in advice to the President, a better chance for the Secretary to maintain over-all perspective, a more reasonable share in government cost for the department of the government which must "wage peace," better contacts with Congress in maintaining bipartisanship, more fruitful relations with ambassadors accredited to the United States and better relations between the Department and members of our own Foreign Service scattered about the world.

The vital requisites for the effective discharge of the duties of the Secretary of State are perspective and wisdom. Those qualities find their most effective employment when there is at least a modicum of leisure for quiet reflection. Such qualities are not always accompanied by the rugged constitution and physical endurance required for perpetual motion. There should be such review and reform as to make it possible for men of normal strength hereafter to carry the load.

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SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY: NEW GOALS OR NEW MANNERS?

By Philip E. Mosely

WILL the dismantling of the Stalin myth, the most startling result of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, be followed by the modification or abandonment of the basic goals of Stalin's foreign policy? Or merely by a change in Soviet manners and methods? Nikita Khrushchev's bitter attack on Stalin, delivered to a secret session of the Congress on February 25, has now been published in America, at least in part, in what appears to be an authentic version.[1] It gives evidence of substantial changes in the "style" in which the post-Stalin Party Presidium proposes to exercise its dictatorial power at home, while pursuing the same basic goals of building heavy industry and military power. But it gives no evidence of doubt as to the correctness of Stalin's basic foreign policy.

True, Khrushchev attacked Stalin bitterly for his blind faith in Hitler's word and for his refusal to believe Churchill's warnings against the impending German attack on the Soviet Union. The available extracts depict Stalin as a bullheaded and uninformed meddler in military strategy and, by implication, enhance the military stature of both Khrushchev and the army command. Stalin is also accused of "an incorrect position with respect to the nationality question." "He undertook a whole series of reprisals against several nationalities and national minorities." Most striking is the downgrading of the "Short Biography" of Stalin. "The short Stalin biography, which appeared in 1948, is an expression of that uncontrolled self-praise, an attempt by Stalin to show himself as 'an infallible genius'."

The Khrushchev speech condemns Stalin (but no others) for his stubborn efforts to "break" Tito "with his little finger." (This passage was not included in the version published in the Belgrade *Borba* on March 20.) Since then the Jugoslav Communists have received a double satisfaction, through the disbanding of the Cominform in April and the resignation of Molotov as Foreign

[1] A large number of details concerning the Khrushchev speech were given by the Moscow correspondent of the Belgrade *Borba*, March 20, 1956, p. 1, 3. For the fuller but still probably incomplete version see *The New York Times*, June 5, 1956.

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Minister on May 31. Apart from the obeisance to Tito, the Khrushchev speech does not question a single one of Stalin's foreign policies, his methods or his achievements. So far as foreign policy is concerned, the key to the current changes in tactics may be concealed rather than revealed in Khrushchev's reference to "the tremendous damage which Stalin caused to the Soviet Union and the international working-class movement."

True to their ingrained Stalinist discipline, the non-Soviet Communist Parties have hastened to repudiate their previous grovelling obeisances to Stalin's leadership and nervously promise to return, like the Soviet Party, to "true Leninist principles." In Bulgaria, Chervenkov has been demoted, at least outwardly, while in Hungary Rakosi continues in control of the Communist Party. Changes in the Polish Party have been more far-reaching than in the Czechoslovak Party.

These and other manœuvres provide the basis for a wide range of speculation. The retention of Rakosi in Hungary may be due to the relative scarcity of Moscow-trained Communists. Or perhaps the Bulgarian and Polish Communist Parties were much more closely affected by the Stalin purges of the late 1930's, and therefore the reaction against "Stalin's methods" of "the crudest physical pressure" may have made it necessary to rearrange the "pecking order" within the satellite leaderships.[2]

Only a Soviet leadership supremely confident of the stability of its rule within the Soviet Union could have undertaken such a drastic operation as the direct repudiation of the Stalin myth. In the European satellites de-Stalinization offers some minor risks to Soviet goals. While it may not be an easy or quick process to rehabilitate "Leninist" methods of operation and control at home, within the Soviet Union the more senior Communist cadres remember vividly the pre-Stalinist or pre-1935 "methods of party work," and the refurbished leadership can therefore appeal to a genuine Leninist myth. In the satellites, the Stalinist system, with all its paraphernalia of multiple controls and terror, was imported in the baggage trains of the Soviet Army. It did not develop out of a previous Leninist tradition. To modify the simple command of "Eyes on Moscow!" is a difficult matter.

[2] The rehabilitation of the Polish Communist Party, dissolved by Stalin in 1938 (*Pravda*, February 21, 1956), may have undermined the seemingly impregnable position of Jakob Berman, long regarded as Stalin's agent in liquidating the pre-1938 leadership. The simultaneous restoration of Béla Kun to posthumous favor (*Pravda*, February 21, 1956) may not have any similar consequences for Rakosi.

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In Poland, where the attacks on Stalinist methods have gone farthest, considerable confusion and uncertainty have been evident. Loyal Polish Communists must now proclaim that their leaders were wrong in claiming that everything Soviet was best and in denying the importance of Poland's special conditions and traditions. The resistance heroes of the Polish Home Army, after years of being condemned as "agents of Western imperialism," are now praised for their valiant if "misguided" attempt to liberate Warsaw in mid-1944. In literature, "socialist realism," itself subject to some redefinition and stretching in the Soviet Union, is no longer offered to Polish writers as the sole way to please their political masters.

With the continued rapid expansion of the Soviet economy, the satellites' resources and production seem no longer to be needed so desperately by the Soviet Union as in the years of reconstruction and the Korean War. If the satellites are now to carry on an increasing proportion of their trade with the non-Soviet world, many of them may envy the Jugoslav Communists their ability to trade freely with both East and West and to secure direct assistance from the West, and particularly from the United States. If somewhat more flexible forms of economic and cultural relations are to be developed between the Soviet satellites and the non-Soviet world, the problem of defining and conforming to a wavering line of Soviet demands may cause many uncertainties, both in Moscow and in the satellite capitals. Moscow will certainly retain the essential controls, through its penetration of the satellite parties, armed forces and secret police, but the task of its apparatus of control and of the satellite Communists will be a more complex and ticklish one than it was in the "good old days" of Stalin's commands.

For Communist China, the effects of the de-Stalinization are likely to be less noticeable. For one thing, it is very hard to say how far Stalin went in trying to penetrate the control channels of the Chinese dictatorship. Since the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to Peking of mid-October 1954, the outward and hierarchical position of Chinese Communism has been made more and more equal to that of Soviet Communism. Whether the "tremendous damage which Stalin caused to the . . . international working-class movement" has any reference to Sino-Soviet relations remains obscure.

Since the close of the Congress in Moscow the Chinese Com-

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munist Politburo, without blaming Stalin directly, has spoken out strongly against ". . . some of our comrades mechanically applying Stalinist formulas in the Chinese revolution," from 1927 to 1936, and their "dogmatic errors."[3] Some further hint of dissension between Moscow and Peking perhaps may be read into or out of the speech made at the Party Congress by D. T. Shepilov, since appointed Foreign Minister:

> The progress of the socialist revolution in China has been even more unique. . . . From the point of view of pedant Marxists such an approach to the question of transforming exploitative ownership into socialist ownership almost amounts to flouting the principles of Marxism-Leninism. But in reality this is creative Marxism-Leninism in action, a masterly application of Marxist dialectic to the specific conditions of China, boldly and wisely carried out by the heroic Communist Party of China. (*Stormy applause*).[4]

Does this laudatory reference to the path chosen by Chinese Communism reflect or veil a recent struggle between the two major centers of Communism over Mao's insistence on pursuing a "Chinese path to socialism?" More recently, rumors have seeped out from satellite capitals of a speech by Khrushchev, during his visit to Warsaw in March for Bierut's funeral. He is said to have attacked Stalin for subjecting Sino-Soviet relations to a dangerous strain by attempting to clamp his control on the Chinese Party and economy.

Among the Communist Parties of the non-Soviet world the effects of the de-Stalinization campaign are likely to be slight. These Parties are too weak and insecure to do more than switch abjectly to the new Soviet line. Perhaps they will lose some of their fringe followers, but the leadership cores have been jumping obediently through the hoop held up for them by the rejection of "Stalinist methods." However, over the next few years the Moscow leadership must reckon that any minor losses of following or of prestige caused by the repudiation of the "father of the peoples" will be more than offset by the greater flexibility in tactics now gained through rejecting Stalin-worship and by broadening the Communists' opportunities to enlist the coöperation of other political and social forces behind slogans of "peace," Soviet-style, and anti-Americanism.

[3] "Concerning the Historical Experience of Dictatorship of the Proletariat," editorial in *Jen Min Jih Pao*, summarized in *Pravda*, April 7, 1956; cited from *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, May 16, 1956, p. 5.

[4] *Pravda*, February 17, 1956; cited from *Current Digest*, March 28, 1956, p. 19. Shepilov, formerly Editor of *Pravda*, is a candidate-member of the Party Presidium and a member of the Party Secretariat.

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In his public speech of February 14, Khrushchev proclaimed three important "principles" of Soviet foreign policy, leaving it to foreign commentators to describe them as "new." These are: the principle of "peaceful coexistence" of two systems, the rejection of the "inevitability" of war, and the approval of various forms of transition to "socialism," the term by which Communists describe their own dictatorship.

Khrushchev rejected the allegation that the Soviet Union puts forward the principle of peaceful coexistence purely from tactical considerations and proclaimed it as "a basic principle of Soviet foreign policy." Repeating the standard Stalinist interpretation of the nature of war, he attributed the origin of all wars and all threats of war solely to the unfortunately prolonged survival of the capitalist system and again claimed that only the Soviet system, in the long run, supports and guarantees peace.[5]

> When we speak of the fact that in the competition of the two systems—capitalist and socialist—the socialist system will triumph, that does not mean by any means that victory will be achieved through armed intervention by the socialist countries in the internal affairs of the capitalist countries.

Both the meaning and the implicit limitations of Khrushchev's standard restatement of the principle of "peaceful coexistence" were clarified by Shepilov's elaboration:

> The fact that the prerequisites for the transition to socialism mature at different times in different countries, the fact that individual countries break away from the capitalist system at different times, means that the simultaneous existence of both capitalist and socialist states is *inevitable* on our planet.

Shepilov then went on to warn the Communist Parties against the idea of a genuine or lasting reconciliation:

> The capitalist and socialist outlooks cannot be reconciled. . . . We are convinced that the final victory in the historical competition between the two systems belongs to socialism as the higher, more progressive, social system.[6]

The second "principle," as refurbished by Khrushchev, is that "war is not inevitable at the present time." In support of this assertion, Khrushchev cited the formation of a Soviet bloc of 900,000,000 people, the formation of a very large uncommitted "peace bloc," and the growth of "pro-peace" and anti-imperialist forces within the imperialist world.

[5] *Pravda,* February 15, 1956.
[6] *Pravda,* February 17, 1956; cited from *Current Digest,* March 28, 1956, p. 19.

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This "new" principle received further elaboration in a speech by Suslov, one of the Kremlin's most trusted theorists:

> The balance of forces in the world arena has now changed radically in favor of the supporters of peace and not the supporters of war. It stands to reason that, in so far as imperialism remains, the economic basis for the outbreak of wars also remains, and danger of the unleashing of military adventures by the more reactionary monopolistic circles, particularly against the countries of socialism, does not disappear. . . . Now, under the new historical conditions, there are mighty forces possessing considerable resources for preventing the imperialists from unleashing a war and, if they try to start one anyway, for crushing the aggressors and for burying forever both war and the capitalist system. . . .[7]

This formulation, stated somewhat more fully than in Khrushchev's speech, repeats almost word for word one of the basic "principles" as set forth by Stalin in his "Economic Problems of Socialism," published in October 1952. Neither Khrushchev nor Suslov credits the "imperialists" with any positive contributions to the preservation of peace. At best, the capitalists' "subjective" protestations of their desire for peace are still regarded in Moscow as a sign of "reasonableness" inspired by fear of the powers of the Soviet bloc; at worst, as a camouflage for preparations to launch a war against it.

Khrushchev's third "principle," endlessly repeated and lauded by other speakers at the Congress, dealt with "the forms of transition of various countries to socialism." Khrushchev cited with approval Lenin's assertion of mid-1917 that "All nations will come to socialism, that is inevitable, but not all will come in the same manner, each will introduce its own peculiarity into one or another form of democracy, into one or another variety of the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . ."

To buttress Lenin's prediction, Khrushchev cited the appearance of the "People's Democracies" and of Communist China.

> The leadership by the Communist Party of China, by the Communist and Workers Parties of the other countries of People's Democracy, of the great cause of socialist reconstruction, taking into account the peculiarity and particularities of each country—that is creative Marxism in action. . . . It is true that we recognize the necessity for the revolutionary reconstruction of capitalist society into socialist society. That distinguishes revolutionary Marxists from reformers, opportunists.

[7] Speech by Suslov, *Pravda*, February 17, 1956; cited from *Current Digest*, April 4, 1956, p. 23. M. A. Suslov is a full member of the Party Presidium and a member of the Party Secretariat.

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Khrushchev went on to deny that the only "path to socialism" is through civil war. He pointed out that civil war had not been necessary for the triumph of the "people's democracies" in Eastern Europe after 1944. He failed to mention the decisive rôle of the Soviet armies, the secret police and the Communist Party apparatuses in imposing Soviet control on them.

In some countries, Khrushchev said, there might even develop a "parliamentary path" to Socialism. The working class may gain "a firm majority in parliament and transform it from an organ of bourgeois democracy into an organ of true popular will. (Applause)." He continued:

> Of course, in those countries where capitalism is still strong, where it has in its hands an enormous military-police apparatus, there the serious opposition of the reactionary forces is inevitable. There the transition to socialism will take place in conditions of sharp class, revolutionary struggle.
>
> Under all forms of transition to socialism the indispensable and decisive condition is the political leadership of the working class headed by its progressive part. Without this, the transition to socialism is impossible.[8]

Khrushchev's "new" principle is simply a briefer restatement of the position set forth by Stalin in October 1952, and in many previous declarations. At that time Stalin went into even more graphic detail, pointing out that in some countries where capitalism and the bourgeoisie were weak the people, led by the vanguard of the "toiling masses," the Communist Party, would be able to seize power through elections and without civil war. Whether the "transition to socialism" is to be peaceful or bloody is, for Stalin and Khrushchev alike, determined by the will and capacity of the "capitalists" to resist. The will and the duty of the Communist Party to seize power and thereafter to exercise complete control are, for them, not in question. So much for Khrushchev's alleged "conciliatory" revision of Stalinist doctrine!

In order that Communists would not be misled into relaxing their "Bolshevik vigilance" against "compromisers" and "opportunists," Suslov spelled out further Khrushchev's statement of the Kremlin's view:

> The enemies of Communism portray the Communists as advocates of armed uprisings, violence and civil war at all times and under all conditions. This is an absurd slander of the Communists and the working class which they represent. The Communists and the working class, of course, prefer the most painless forms for the transition from the one social system to the other. . . . Whether the methods are more peaceful or more violent depends,

[8] *Pravda*, February 15, 1956, p. 4.

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not so much on the working class, as on the extent and forms of resistance of the exploiting classes which are being overthrown and which do not wish to part voluntarily with the vast property, political power and privileges they possess.

And Suslov also stated clearly the traditional Soviet view that only the Communist Party can be relied upon to "build socialism."

. . . Insuring a transition to socialism requires the establishment of political leadership of the state by the working class, headed by its vanguard. . . . Political leadership of the state by the working class is necessary in order that over a shorter or longer period, depending upon the specific conditions, the capitalist class be deprived of ownership of the means of production and that the means of production be made public property, that all attempts by the overthrown exploiting classes to restore their rule be repulsed, and that socialist reconstruction be organized.[9]

In other words, the Kremlin's position remains unchanged. Just as Stalin wrote in 1952, the Communist Parties are willing to achieve power by parliamentary means, but only in order to destroy the parliamentary system and to establish the dictatorship of the Communist Party.

Despite this uncompromising insistence upon the future "hegemony" and monopoly of power by the Communists, the Twentieth Party Congress also emphasized the desirability of reëstablishing coöperation with the moderate Socialist and labor parties. Immediately after reaffirming the aim of the Communist Parties to achieve dictatorial power, Shepilov went on to appeal to the non-Communist Socialists.

The attractive force of the idea of socialism has grown so much that—besides the proletarian Marxist revolutionaries—politicians, groups and parties who do not interpret socialism in accord with principles of revolutionary Marxism, but who are ready to fight against imperialism and for the vital interests of the working class and all the working people, declare themselves supporters of socialism. This is why in many instances the existing differences and viewpoints can be relegated and are relegated to the background when it is a question of common interest in fighting against the capitalist yoke, for freedom and democracy. Communists are opponents in principle of sectarian narrowness. They advocate that all the efforts of all kinds and varieties of mass movements of the present day must be merged into an anti-imperialist stream.[10]

In his speech Suslov spelled out somewhat further the new line of seeking rapprochements with the Social Democratic parties:

[9] Suslov, *Pravda*, February 17, 1956; cited from *Current Digest*, April 4, 1956, p. 23.
[10] Shepilov, *Pravda*, February 17, 1956; cited from *Current Digest*, March 28, 1956, p. 20.

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Unquestionably, the split of the international workers' movement, when all the forces of the people should be united to fight the menace of a new war, is doubly intolerable. Life has raised a number of important questions on which we have points of agreement with the Social Democrats. . . . In today's situation the workers' movement faces such cardinal tasks as defense of peace, national freedom and democracy. In many capitalist countries the working masses are obviously swinging strongly to the Left. The vast majority of the rank-and-file members of the socialist parties, Christian trade unions and other organizations favor peace. It is to be presumed that the idea of unity will take stronger and stronger hold among the various groups of the working class and lead to practical results. But this will not happen of itself, it will depend largely on us Communists, on our efforts along this line.[11]

Since the Twentieth Party Congress the Soviet leadership has made intensive explorations of the attitudes of the leaders of the Social Democratic parties in Western Europe. Outstanding leaders of the Norwegian and Swedish Socialist Parties have visited Moscow. Khrushchev and Bulganin have met with the leaders of the British Labor Party, and the visit of Guy Mollet to Moscow was prematurely advertised as a step toward a Socialist-Communist rapprochement. The bearlike courting of the sophisticated Western Socialists by the Kremlin has not so far increased the prospects for a revival of a "united front from above," similar to the alliance achieved in France of the mid-1930's.

If anything, the arrogance of the Soviet leaders, the obvious dangers concealed in their new attempts to embrace the Socialists in a death-hug, has worked against the Kremlin's immediate aims. Whether the more discontented local organizations of the Socialist parties will be equally adamant in resisting pressures for a "united front from below" is less certain. Perhaps the Kremlin is counting on a falling off in the present prosperity of Western Europe and on the growth of popular resistance to military expenditures to promote electoral and other forms of coöperation between Socialists and Communists "from below." Their present gestures, however futile for the moment, may pay political dividends in case of an economic crisis, which, they declare, has been postponed only by the armaments race.

In the underdeveloped countries prospects for developing cooperation between Communists and Socialists are far better than in Europe. The level of sophistication concerning the real aims of the Communist Parties is far lower. In Burma, India and In-

[11] Suslov, *Pravda,* February 17, 1956; cited from *Current Digest,* April 4, 1956, p. 23–24.

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donesia, popular understanding of the differences between Socialists and Communists is vague, and the Communists can hope, by vigorous propaganda for the united front, to absorb some of the more impatient following of the Socialist parties. Pursuit of a "united front" policy in the underdeveloped and newly parliamentary countries of Asia can be facilitated by the overtures now being made to the Socialist parties in Western Europe, for the Kremlin's new tune may blunt the warnings which the Western Socialists have so often given to their neophyte colleagues in Asia. Whether President Tito's confidential descriptions of his treatment by the Kremlin, given to selected leaders during his visits to India and Burma, will have any lasting effect is doubtful.

A more novel feature of the new Soviet line is the strong insistence on cultivating close relations with the so-called "peace bloc," made up of "those countries which are not permitting themselves to be drawn into military blocs." Khrushchev, and other orators, constantly cited India, Burma, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Egypt and Syria as the principal countries making up this third force in world politics. As during his visit to India and Burma in November and December 1955, Khrushchev spoke at the Congress in support of the "five principles" advanced by Nehru and strove to emphasize the common aims of the Soviet-led bloc and the "uncommitted bloc." In effect, the Soviet leaders have been saying since mid-1955 that, in the absence of war, the future of the world may be determined by the third force which has been taking shape in Asia. Instead of the traditional Soviet slogan that "whoever is not with us is against us," the Kremlin spokesmen are now saying "whoever is not against us is with us."

When Khrushchev praises those countries which remain aloof from military alliances, he glosses over completely the greatest military bloc of all, the Sino-Soviet alliance, buttressed by the Warsaw alliance of May 1955. In many countries, apparently, the inconsistency of his boasting of the "indestructible" Soviet-led bloc and its great military power, while simultaneously praising those countries which remain uncommitted, is scarcely noted.

By laying stress upon the "peace bloc" comprising two-thirds of humanity, the Soviet leadership can also hope to secure widespread support for particular goals: the seating of Communist China in the United Nations; the condemnation of the United States for the military support which it has accorded to the Nationalist Chinese régime on Taiwan; the denunciation of the re-

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fusal of South Vietnam to accept Communist-rigged elections. The spread of a "neutralism" which prevents the consolidation of non-Soviet forces brings many benefits for Soviet policy. Neutralism, as the Soviet leaders have emphasized constantly, remains a commodity for export beyond the periphery of the Soviet bloc, not for toleration within it.

The Kremlin's claim to be "leading the forces of peace" has been reinforced, in many parts of the world, by the broad appeal of its offers to accept a limitation on the numbers of conventional forces and by the unilateral reductions, claimed or promised, in the size of the Soviet forces. With that, Moscow has continued to press for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, thus attempting to deprive the opposing forces of their best means of resistance to any revival of direct Soviet threats. With the turning of Dairen over to the Chinese Communists and of Porkkala to Finland, the Soviet leadership can proclaim that it no longer has any bases beyond its own territory and has thus strengthened, as in Iceland, demands for the withdrawal of American and NATO forces from bases located in other countries.

During the past year the Soviet leadership has also added the instrument of long-term economic development programs to its armory of political warfare. The Soviet agreements with Afghanistan, India and Burma, and the offers to Egypt, Syria and Pakistan, have made a strong impression. They provide important and dramatic evidences of Soviet economic achievements and thus enhance the prestige of local Communist and pro-Communist forces. Offered ostensibly without political strings, the Soviet trade deals, initially at least, strengthen the independent bargaining power of the beneficiaries. An especially attractive feature is, of course, that the development assistance is given through long-term loans, at low interest, and with provision for repayment from the export surpluses of the recipient country.

All told, the offers which the Soviet bloc has made under these programs may now amount to about $900,000,000. Except in Afghanistan, the prospect that the Soviet Union would, in the next few years, be able by economic pressure to take over political control of any of its beneficiaries seems remote. If the Soviet leadership fails to gain direct political domination through this program, will it continue it? Probably, but on a modest scale. With a steel production of about 50,000,000 tons in 1956, scheduled to grow to 75,000,000 tons in 1960, and with one of the two

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largest machine-tool industries in the world, the Soviet Union will be, increasingly, in a position to divert a small percentage of its capital goods output to support its political objectives in non-Soviet parts of the world. Its ability to fix terms and interest rates by government fiat and its capacity to absorb almost any form of imports give it certain advantages. In general, Moscow's assistance programs, based on "aid through trade," are likely to be used primarily to strengthen its political influence in the uncommitted third of the world and particularly to weaken the influence of the West.

By 1949 the Soviet leadership had seen free Europe consolidated, slowly and painfully, but nonetheless consolidated against the Soviet military menace. If the Soviet Union had achieved its goal in Korea, in 1950, by swift conquest, it would probably have switched rather quickly, even under Stalin, to a campaign for stabilization and relaxation, in order to slow down the arming of the West. The United Nations opposition to the Communist seizure of South Korea plunged the Kremlin into a severe case of war jitters and led it to adopt drastic, hasty and wasteful revisions of economic and armaments programs, in both the Soviet Union and the satellites.

The Soviet leadership was at first fearful that the resistance of the free world in Korea was but a first step toward organizing a concentric attack against the new and not yet consolidated Soviet empire. After the MacArthur hearings, held in the spring of 1951, had given clear proof of the American desire to confine the war to Korea, the Kremlin began gradually to relax its tense nerves and its strained efforts. In the economic field the shift was visible by the summer of 1952. The Nineteenth Party Congress, in October 1952, laid stress on competitive coexistence, on the development of a long-range effort to undermine the stability and security of the free world by measures short of war.[12] This program was doubtless implemented somewhat hesitantly because of Stalin's physical and mental decline.

Almost as soon as Stalin died, the new leadership began exploring at a gradually quickened tempo various minor steps for relaxing international tensions. A major review of Soviet foreign policy and its methods appears to have taken place in January and February 1955, following the displacement of Malenkov

[12] *Cf.* "The Nineteenth Party Congress," by Philip E. Mosely, *Foreign Affairs*, January 1953, p. 238–256.

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from the leading rôle. This resulted in the partial eclipse of Molotov by the new Khrushchev-Bulganin leadership in the conduct of Soviet diplomacy, even prior to his replacement by Shepilov. There followed, during the rest of 1955, a series of dramatic steps designed to melt or break up the ice pack which Stalin's policies had formed around Soviet policy: the treaty with Austria, the evacuation of Porkkala, the Soviet leaders' pilgrimage to Belgrade, the Geneva Conferences, the establishment of relations with the German Federal Republic, the military supplies for Egypt, new disarmament proposals, negotiations with Japan for a peace treaty, the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to India, Burma and Afghanistan.

As so often in the conduct of Soviet policy, the public stock-taking provided by the Twentieth Party Congress has confirmed and systematized trends which were already strongly evident in the preceding months. Khrushchev's restatements of Soviet goals, enlivened by new and flexible tactics, and flavored by the denunciation of Stalin's methods of rule, are, at bottom, an expression of continuity of basic goals in Soviet policy. As under Stalin, the Kremlin seeks to slow down and reverse the consolidation of the free world, to promote neutralism beyond its own orbit, to get rid of all strategic limitations on East-West trade, to confine American power to North America, and to await new targets of opportunity. Above all, it sees in Asia a promising field for Communist expansion.

Since Soviet strategic planning is now shifting its primary attention from continental wars to intercontinental nuclear warfare, the Kremlin may well prefer to develop a lengthy period of lower-key diplomacy, while waiting to see which side will first have available a decisive stockpile of the intercontinental missile. During the period of the race for the long-range missile the Soviet leadership may seek to avoid menacing talk and alarming acts and may endeavor, by using a flexible armory of political, economic and psychological weapons, to improve its position *vis-à-vis* the principal obstacle to its ambitions, the United States. If the Soviet Union is the first to achieve the missile in decisive quantities, it may then feel free to revert to the Stalin method of threats and force. So far as the results of the Twentieth Congress go, it is clearly the manners rather than the goals of the Kremlin that have changed since Stalin's death and posthumous dethronement.

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STALIN'S GHOST AT THE PARTY CONGRESS

By Bertram D. Wolfe

WHEN his Father Confessor asked Narvaez on his deathbed, "General, have you forgiven your enemies?" the General answered: "I have no enemies. I had them shot." So Josef Stalin might have answered, too, had he believed in deathbed confession for himself, as he did for his victims. Yet one cannot have all one's enemies shot, for they grow by a chain reaction: each gap filled by tens and hundreds who knew, loved, believed in or identified themselves with the executed. This was doubtless one of the reasons for the six hours and ten minutes of silence of Stalin's heirs before they announced his death.

What debates and deals went on in those terrifying six hours we can only conjecture. But the announcement, when it came, was not so much a lamentation as an anxious call to collective leadership, orderly succession, monolithic unity, the avoidance of *razbrod i panika,* "confusion and panic."

The earliest post-Stalin issue of the Party's leading organ of theory, *Kommunist* (No. 4, March 9, 1953), declared that the Party's greatest strength lay in "collective work, collective leadership and monolithic unity." And on April 16, *Pravda* invoked some of Stalin's own words to denounce leaders who "decide important questions individually, without consulting members of the bureaus." Thus, even before his corpse was cold, the orphaned sons of the Father of the Peoples began to wrestle with his ghost. But laying a ghost is not so simple, especially when the exorcists are his accomplices, and his heirs.

II

A Party Congress is supposed to be the "supreme body" of the Communist Party. It picks the Executive, lays down the line, exacts responsibilities. But even in Lenin's day, the Congress had been drained of its sovereign powers.

Though Lenin always kept up some consultation with others ("collective leadership"), he was possessed of a selfless egoism which enabled him at all times to identify his own views with the correct line and the truth. In the years of exile abroad, he personally selected a little group of followers, usually two, to form

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a *troika.* With them he laid down the line, edited the central organ, directed the groups abroad and the underground inside Russia. Whenever these triumvirs disagreed with him, he excommunicated them, or if need be seceded himself, to set up a new *troika.* Wherever two or three were gathered together with Lenin, there was Bolshevism.

His devotion to centralism and his theory of an élite party both precluded any real devolution of power. A leadership of classless professional revolutionaries was to set up a guardianship over the working class, then take power in its name. Since anything done by his "vanguard" party in the name of the workers was, according to his theory, done by the workers themselves, it became all-important to him that no other party be permitted to call itself "proletarian." That explains the fury with which he branded every other Socialist party as "bourgeois" or "petit-bourgeois," as he did such factions in his own party as the Workers Opposition, which challenged his line and methods in the name of the working class itself.

Lenin's centralism led him to appoint the organizers who went to the localities; these returned in due course as delegates to a Congress to confirm the Center which had appointed them. Where this would lead was foreseen as early as 1904 by the then 23-year old Leon Trotsky: "The Organization of the Party will take the place of the Party itself; the Central Committee will take the place of the Organization; and finally, the Dictator will take the place of the Central Committee."

And so it came to pass . . . though when he joined fortunes with Lenin in 1917, Trotsky became himself an arch centralist. It is instructive to remember the order: *Party . . . Central Committee . . . Organization . . . Dictator.* Stalin, Malenkov and Khrushchev each in turn has had his hands on the ultimate power lever—the Organization, or, as we would say, the party machine.

Once in power, Lenin drained the Central Committee of political life by settling important matters in the Politburo, or the Orgburo, or impromptu gatherings of whichever leaders happened to be at hand when a problem arose. At the Tenth Congress in 1921, he outlawed the Workers Opposition and other critical groups, pushed through a statute forbidding factions and the raising of platforms even during Congress discussion and election periods, and had a secret decision adopted permitting the expulsion of Central Committee members elected by a Congress, with-

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out recourse to a subsequent Congress. Thereby the Congress was drained of real political life and became a rubber stamp. When the new "collective leadership" proclaims that Lenin's greatest service "to Marxism and to mankind" was "the creation of a Party of a new type" (*Pravda,* April 22, 1956) and when they launch the slogan, "Back to Leninist norms of Party leadership," these are the type of party and the norms they have in mind.[1]

From the Eleventh Congress on, with Lenin's active approval of the first two purges, every Party Congress was prepared by a prior purge of dissidents, a procedure assuring a majority for the line and leadership of the Center. After Lenin's death, Congresses became more and more infrequent. One was delayed until Trotsky had been beaten; another until Zinoviev and Kamenev had been crushed; yet another until Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky had had their strongholds taken from them.

Even after he had secured 100 percent unanimity, Stalin prepared each Congress with a purge. Thus the Seventeenth (1934) was a unanimous celebration of his victory, at which he hand-picked a "Stalinist Central Committee." Yet as the Congress adjourned the great purge was getting under way in which the "servant of the Central Committee," aided by a handful of natural deaths, was to eliminate all but 20 out of 124 Central Committee members and candidates. After the Eighteenth Congress in 1939 he did not trouble to hold a Congress for 13 years. The Nineteenth, often announced and always postponed, was held only in 1952, shortly before his death.

III

At Stalin's death, the "collective leadership" was headed by a *troika:* Malenkov, Beria, Molotov. An operation build-up began at once for Malenkov as "Head of the Party and the Government."

But nine days after Stalin's death, Malenkov was removed from control of the Party machine "at his own request." And in February 1955 he confessed to errors ("my guilt and responsibility

[1] On March 8, 1956, *Pravda* published an article by the aged G. I. Petrovsky, associate of Lenin who was released from a concentration camp and "rehabilitated" shortly after Stalin died. It was devoted to the Tenth Congress and said: "Lenin stressed that Party unity should become Party law. . . . Lenin could be merciless to enemies. The Tenth Party Congress adopted the Leninist resolution 'On Party Unity,' which condemned all opposition groups and banned all factions and groupings in the Party. . . . The Tenth Party Congress was an example of Lenin's style of leadership, *of Lenin's ability to work on a strictly collective leadership basis. . . .*" (Emphasis added).

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for the unsatisfactory state of affairs in agriculture") which could only have been committed by Khrushchev, and to "insufficient experience in local work . . . and in the direct guidance of individual branches of the national economy." At "his own request" he was relieved of the Premiership, too, and made Minister of Electric Power Stations. This ended the succession claims of triumvir No. 1.

On June 26, 1953, Lavrenti Beria was arrested. He was "tried" according to "Socialist legality:" without definite charges (at least four different official versions have been published); without being present or represented by attorney; before a Supreme Court which illegally included only one Supreme Court Justice, the other "judges" being two generals, two trade union officials, a Party official, a Deputy Minister of the Interior and the President of the Moscow City Court. Although he was not present it was reported that he "confessed." Within 24 hours of the "trial" he was shot, made a retroactive imperialist agent, and then an unperson. Subscribers to the *Encyclopedia* received a letter instructing them to remove his picture and accompanying text and paste in their place an article on the Bering Sea. Thus ended triumvir No. 2.

In September 1955, Molotov confessed that he didn't know Socialism when he saw it. On June 1, 1956, "at his own request," he was relieved of the post of Foreign Minister. The third of the triumvirs was through.

When Malenkov "requested" his removal as General Secretary, Khrushchev became de facto the boss of the Party machine. In due course he was named First Secretary, and began reorganizing the powerful Secretariat by adding men of his own choosing.

The proverb "Knowledge is power" having been reversed by totalitarianism to read "Power is knowledge," Khrushchev now began to exhibit mastery of every field. He told architects how to design a building; constructors how to use concrete and prefabricated units; managers how to apply technology; urban youth where to invest their energy and enthusiasm; farmers where corn must, should and would have to grow and why the range must be ploughed up; cotton growers why they should eat rice instead of potatoes; milkmaids how many times a day they should milk a cow; artists what are the proper proportions of sincerity and Party spirit in the arts. At the same time he became the authority on foreign affairs. With Bulganin, and often with Milkoyan or

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Shepilov, he went to Warsaw and Prague, China, Jugoslavia, Geneva, East Germany, India, Burma and Afghanistan in his pre-Congress build-up. He has since been to England and has broadly hinted at his readiness to visit the United States. Thus during all this time Molotov was Foreign Minister in name only.

The humiliation of the *troika* and the execution of Beria were but the first stage of the purges that prepared the Twentieth Congress. In July 1955 the Congress was announced and its date set for February 14, 1956, at which time it actually convened. A whirlwind of activity prepared its monolithic unanimity.

Simultaneously with the call, two new members were introduced into the Presidium: Suslov of the Central Committee Secretariat, and Kirichenko, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine. These were added not by the "sovereign" Congress, but six months before; both were known as Khrushchev men. At the same time, three new Secretaries were added to Khrushchev's Secretariat: Aristov, Belyayev and Shepilov, also Khrushchev men. Then or later, Shatalin, a Malenkov follower, disappeared from the roster of Secretaries.

That same July began changes in Party Secretaries and other high officials in all republics, provinces, regions and industrial centers. In a few cases, Khrushchev personally superintended the change; more often he sent Aristov, Chief of Cadres of the Central Committee Administrative Apparatus. These purges have been mere demotions and transfers, without the shedding of blood, except among Security Police officials and in Georgia, where a continuous blood purge has been going on from that day to this. All the changes can be summed up in the general formula: key officials 100 percent faithful to the "collective leadership" have been replaced by others more than 100 percent faithful—that is, by Khrushchev's men. They in turn have been changing their subordinates so that the changeover has been filtering down and is still continuing. As late as February 1, Kruglov, Minister of the Interior, was replaced by the Khrushchev follower, Dudorov. This process was climaxed at the Congress itself, where the Central Committee was "renovated" in similar fashion. Out of 255 members and alternates of the incoming Central Committee, 113, or more than 44 percent, are new. Of the 44 percent that disappeared in the process, Khrushchev had this to say:

> Bolshevik criticism, without regard to persons . . . included a number of members of the Central Committee. A number . . . not having justified the

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high confidence placed in them by the Party were dropped from the Central Committee. Is it necessary to prove that the unity of the Party did not lose by that but only gained?

No one thought it was necessary.

The Congress left no doubt that the First Secretary was "more equal than the others." Opening Address, Khrushchev; Report (on everything), Khrushchev; Chairman of the Resolutions Committee, Khrushchev; Chairman of the newly created bureau for coördinating Party affairs in the Russian Republic, Khrushchev; Closing Address, Khrushchev; secret report on Stalin's ghost, Khrushchev. The other addresses, even Bulganin's, were but glosses on *the* report made by Khrushchev. It took Josef Stalin three or four Congresses of "collective leadership" before he got to that point of complete domination of a Congress.

There are reasons for this haste. Khrushchev is 62, while Stalin got his hand on the main power lever while he was more than 15 years younger. Moreover, the later it is repeated in history, the faster a process, once learned, can go. It took Stalin more than a decade of experimentation before he could engineer his first trial, confession and execution such as was worked on Beria within less than a year after Stalin's demise. Nor is Khrushchev surrounded by a galaxy of stars such as surrounded Stalin. Finally, the new First Secretary had no "theoretical work" to his credit, his seven-hour report to the Congress constituting his first claim to the rôle of interpreter and infallible repository of sacred doctrine.

One has only to compare Stalin's last Congress with Khrushchev's first to become aware of the latter's sense of urgency. At the Nineteenth Congress, the Opening Address was by Molotov; the Report of the Central Committee, Malenkov; on the Nationality Question, Beria; on the Fifth Five-Year Plan, Saburov; on Party Statutes, Mikoyan, Khrushchev and Bulganin; on Program, Kaganovich; on Political Education, Suslov; Closing Address, Voroshilov. Stalin signed the basic document, "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R." Published on the eve of the Congress, it was glossed and celebrated by every speaker. Stalin spoke for ten minutes to the foreign delegations, laying down some general policy lines. The aging *Vozhd*, secure in his patriarchal dominion over the dwarfed and terrorized sons, could allow far more semblance of "collective leadership" than could the parvenu leader on his anxious way up.

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IV

So long as a Congress was supposed to lay down the line, both its function and the statutes made it an annual affair. As soon as it was reduced to a "monolith," it became a matter of convenience whether it was summoned or not. Stalin delayed his last Congress for 13 years; then the statutory term was made four years. But the post-Stalin leadership needed a Congress to confirm it in office and to serve as a sounding board. They did not wait out the four years but held the Twentieth Congress three and one-half years after the Nineteenth. As a "sounding board" it must be pronounced the most successful of Congresses.

Collective leadership. Though Khrushchev has emerged as factotum, and has openly played that rôle since the resignation of Malenkov, the slogan of "collective leadership" got all the headlines. Few seemed to remember that under the same slogan Lenin had run his personal dictatorship. Or that Stalin posed as plain wheelhorse of the "collective leadership" during four Congresses, from 1923, when illness put Lenin out of action, to 1929, when the "cult of personality" began. Or that the new "collective leadership" with Khrushchev at its head has already announced at least 30 executions from Beria to Bagirov, whereas Stalin did not kill the first of his close comrades until he had held de facto power for a decade and sole power as *Vozhd* for a half decade more. Stalin had made people so used to bloodshed that observers could not get over the fact that, though Beria be dead, Malenkov is still alive. Yet it was Stalin who entered the lists against bloodshed of comrades at the Fourteenth Congress:

> The Party cannot be led without Rykov, without Kalinin, without Tomsky, without Molotov, without Bukharin. . . . We did not agree with Comrades Zinoviev and Kamenev [on the expulsion of Trotsky]. . . . The method of lopping off, the method of bloodletting . . . is dangerous and contagious. Today you lop off one limb; tomorrow another, the day after a third—and what is left of the Party?

In the end Stalin was to verify the truth of his prophecy: bloodletting was to assume such vast, capricious and paranoiac proportions that it is hard to believe that purges on such a scale will ever be repeated by his successors. Still that is no reason for forgetting Stalin's long "collective leadership" period; nor the speed with which the new leadership has "confessed" and executed Beria and 29 others; nor the obvious fact that it was not Molotov or Mikoyan but Beria who was the main target of Stalin's charge of "lack

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of police vigilance" in the "doctors' plot." The present hue and cry about Beria is intended to cover up the fact that in this respect Khrushchev and Company have carried out Stalin's behest in a truly "Stalinist manner."

The New Men. Looked at closely, the new men turn out not to be so new. The Presidium of 11 contains seven of Stalin's old nine-man Politburo (all that are left now that Stalin and Beria are dead); plus two, Pervukhin and Saburov, added by Stalin at the Nineteenth Congress; plus two from Khrushchev's Secretariat, Suslov and Kirichenko, added not by a Congress but six months before that "sovereign body" met. In short, the Presidium consists of Stalin's men plus Khrushchev's men.

The Candidate Members (alternates), however, with the exception of Shvernik, are new. Most important of these is Zhukov. His rise, like so many of the events publicized by the Congress, did not begin there but immediately on Stalin's death. The first reshuffle found him returned from semi-rustication to a key post in the Defense Ministry. His programmatic speeches on military policy and on World War II, his place in *Pravda* pictures and high functions, his pointed toast "To Justice" made in the presence of Ambassador Bohlen, all told the observer that he had become part of the top leadership, even before the Congress gave him the title of "first" Candidate Member. His rise would appear to be due to the lack of any other popular figure among Stalin's heirs; to the importance of the armed forces in international "diplomacy;" to the dependence of Khrushchev and Company on the army when they seized and executed Beria. Marshal Zhukov has been a Party member since 1920, but he is a professional field general in whose Party loyalty there is undoubtedly some room for an army *esprit de corps*. He is regarded as a prime mover in the drive to rewrite the history of the war in a way which will downgrade Stalin and give the field generals their due, and in the drive to rehabilitate the 5,000 officers who disappeared in the Tukhachevsky purge. When he spoke at the Congress, he was one of the few prominent leaders who did not praise reporter Khrushchev or his report by name. The texture of his speech made it clear that one of his functions is to cover with the mantle of his popularity the new demands which the return to the Stalinist line of "priority of heavy industry" will make upon the people. Indeed, he gave a good working definition of that slogan when he declared: "The great achievements of heavy industry have made

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possible the rearming of our army, navy and air force with first-class military equipment."

In a régime based on absolute force, the army has become more important with the downgrading of the police. It is impossible to tell how many in the leading bodies are really *Chekists* (like Bulganin, for instance, who has been in the *Cheka* since 1918 and is an army Marshal only by virtue of being Chief of the Party's Special Section for watching and controlling the army); but the open practitioners of the profession have suffered diminution. Three who were in the Central Committee were shot with Beria; three failed of reëlection; and only three are on the new Committee. These include Dudorov, not a professional policeman but Khrushchev's appointee as Minister of the Interior; Lunev, Deputy Minister and one of Beria's "judges;" and Serov, Chairman of the Committee of State Security. For the first time in Party history there is no representative of the Security Forces on the Presidium. But Serov's name should reassure those who fear lack of "vigilance," for he acquired international renown when he took over the Baltic Republics and prepared lists of suspects, not by deeds, but—totalitarian fashion—by categories. His eleven suspect categories included Esperantists and philatelists. The man is thorough.

Khrushchev made sure that the need for strong security and "vigilance" would be understood. In his report to the Congress he set down the limits to the "rehabilitation" of corpses:

> Our Party is more monolithic than ever . . . [its] unity has been built up over years and decades of struggle . . . with Trotskyites, Bukharinites, bourgeois nationalists, and others of the worst enemies of the people, champions of the restoration of capitalism. . . .
>
> Great attention has been and is being given by the Central Committee to the strengthening of socialist legality. . . . It is necessary to say that in connection with the revision and cancellation of a number of verdicts some comrades have begun to exhibit a certain lack of confidence towards the workers in the organs of State Security. This is wrong and harmful. . . . Our Chekists in their overwhelming majority are honest workers devoted to our cause, and we have confidence in these cadres. . . .
>
> Capitalist encirclement has sent in among us not a few spies and wreckers. It would be naïve to suppose that now the enemies will cease their efforts. . . . Therefore, we must in every way strengthen revolutionary vigilance . . . and the organs of State Security.

There is evidence of friction between the career generals and the political administration of the army, whose top figure is Bulganin. Brezhnev, added to the Presidium Candidates as a

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Khrushchev man (his last job was as Party overseer for ploughing up the range in Kazakhstan) is also a political general, and thus a counterweight to Zhukov. But there has been a clean sweep of political army officials from the Central Committee. This, too, suggests that, with the execution of Beria, Khrushchev and Bulganin became more dependent upon the army.

If Zhukov is no Khrushchev man, all the other new Presidium Candidates are: Brezhnev (already identified); Furtseva, who accompanied Khrushchev to Peking and comes from his Moscow apparatus; Mukhitdinov, whom he designated as First Secretary in Uzbekistan for the drives to plough up the range and increase the cotton yield; Shepilov, from the Central Committee *Agitprop,* a Secretary under Khrushchev since last July and now Foreign Minister.

For the first time there is no Georgian on the leading bodies. Historically, Georgia has furnished leaders to both wings of Russian Socialism: Jordania, Tseretelli, Chkheidze, to Menshevism; Stalin, Yenukidze, Ordjonikidze, Beria, to Bolshevism. The new boss of Georgia, Mzhavanadze, is a *Chekist* who served under Khrushchev in the Ukraine, a second-string figure. This downgrading of the proud Georgians was at the bottom of the recent Tiflis disorders. On the other hand, many Ukrainians from Khrushchev's old machine have been advanced to higher posts in Secretariat, Presidium, Central Committee and Army.

One aspect of the "new" leadership that has been little discussed is its age. Khrushchev is 62. His associates, except Malenkov, Pervukhin and Saburov, are in their sixties or seventies. The Party, too, thanks to a restriction on new admissions, has been permitted to grow older. Its growth between the Nineteenth and Twentieth Congresses has barely kept pace with the growth of the general population. And the Congresses have "aged" faster than the Party. At the Eighteenth Congress, 1.8 percent of the delegates were over 50; at the Nineteenth, 15.3 percent; and at the Twentieth, 24 percent were over 50 years of age.[2] Though Stalin killed off almost the entire generation of Old Bolsheviks and of Civil War veterans, so that these two categories form only 6 percent of the Party, they have seven out of 11 members of the Presidium. Even if we assume that Khrushchev has won a secure hold on the top post, the problem of the succession is bound to

[2] Solomon Schwarz: "Kompartiya na dvadtsatom sezde," *Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik,* April 1956, p. 60–2.

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arise again, and with it the problem of the aging Party, the aged leadership, the rising generation knocking on the door.

The Stalinist Economic Line. Although more than nine-tenths of all discussion at the Congress was on economic questions, the newspapers had almost nothing to say on this.

When the heirs were newly orphaned and less sure of themselves, they flirted with the idea of a "rapid increase in consumer goods" on the foundation of the "priority of heavy industry." This slight turn, which came to be identified with the name of Malenkov, was abandoned about the time of Malenkov's fall. The subsequent reversal overcompensated for the brief "softening" so that the priority given to heavy industry for the power and military might of the state is now more "Stalinist" than in Stalin's day.

The same is true of agriculture. During the entire postwar period, Stalin's chief overseer for agriculture was none other than Khrushchev. In 1948 Khrushchev wrote:

> We must bear in mind that the "little worm" of individual property still sits in the mind of the *kolkhoznik*. Now as in the past, the most important vestigial residue of capitalism in the consciousness of the *kolkhoz* peasantry is the tendency to private property. This tendency . . . is a great hindrance to the rapid restoration and accumulation of capital by the communal economy . . . [it is] directed against the correct balance between the interests of the state, the *kolkhoz* and the *kolkhoznik* peasant.

The purposes of the Khrushchev drive are to destroy the "little worm" represented by the private parcel, to uproot the *kolkhozes* built around ancient village nests of solidarity and to combine them into larger and larger units—so few and so large that each can be policed by its own Machine-Tractor Station, have a Communist as chairman and be infiltrated by a Communist cell. On January 1, 1950, there were 254,000 *kolkhozes;* by the Nineteenth Congress (October 1952), they had been reduced to 97,000; by the Twentieth, to 87,371. With this drive came the growth of Party units in the amalgamated *kolkhozes* so that now only 8.4 percent of them are without such units. Within the past year alone 30,000 urban Communists were sent to *kolkhozes* to be "*elected*" their chairmen.

When the hand of Stalin was removed, Khrushchev added a fresh agricultural revolution from above—in ploughing up the new lands, sending city Communists to till the new areas and setting up *sovkhozes* (state farms) instead of *kolkhozes* (collective farms). To this he added the drive for corn.

But it was when the Twentieth Congress had adjourned that

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Khrushchev delivered the keenest thrust of all. In 1933, Stalin had softened the new state serfdom by providing the small private parcel and promising: "We Bolsheviks will see to it that every one of our collective farmers soon has a cow [of his own]." But on March 10, 1956, the Central Committee published a new decree on the collective farm in which they declared their intention to increase the number of obligatory workdays on the collective and to reduce the private plot to "truly subsidiary importance," mere "gardens . . . to provide fresh vegetables, fruits, and berries . . . as an embellishment of the peasants' way of life." Agriculture remains the Achilles heel of the Soviet economy, and the new drives in agriculture will but serve to expose the vulnerable tendon.

V

The theory back of totalitarianism is: given a complete enough monopoly of all the levers of force and persuasion, and sufficient firmness, there is nothing which cannot be planned and controlled. Yet the surprise of the Congress, in which everything was predetermined and "more monolithic than ever" (Khrushchev), was the inability to control the planned de-sanctification of Stalin.

For three and a half years, the heirs wrestled with the problem of reducing Stalin's size yet keeping his cruel "gains" in agriculture, industry, state power and foreign conquest. Eighteen days after his death, his name disappeared altogether from *Pravda;* then it reappeared again; was writ smaller, then larger, then smaller; some of his victims were amnestied, Tito was wooed, some of the losses cut that were occasioned by the increasing rigidity and paranoia of his closing years. Yet the problem remained unsolved, and the spirit would not stay in its tomb. When the Congress opened, it unexpectedly turned out that the most important delegate was Stalin's ghost.

For those who are attempting the operation are Stalin's men. Would any of them ever have become the rulers of a great nation except as his associates? Could the mediocre Molotov and Voroshilov have become symbols of "Old Bolshevism" if Stalin had not first killed Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin and the rest of Lenin's closest associates? Who raised Malenkov to the Secretariat? Who made Khrushchev the boss of agriculture and purger of the Ukraine?

In some ways the operation was well prepared by men trained

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in Stalin's school. It was he who first taught them to cast responsibility for shared misdeeds upon a corpse, when he blamed first Yagoda, then Yezhov, for the "excesses" of the blood purges. Why should they not "use" Beria's corpse, or even Stalin's, in the same fashion?

But the trouble is that these men were Stalin's creatures and accomplices. Malenkov ran the card index and dossiers of the purges. Khrushchev carried them out in the Ukraine, where they raged with unexampled fury. Bulganin was the eyes and ears of Stalin in the army. Mikoyan, Kaganovich and Khrushchev worked together to purge Moscow and each took his turn in the two-decade holocaust in the Ukraine.

In the secret session, even as Khrushchev was speaking to an audience so accustomed to listen in obedient silence, a cry escaped some one's lips: "But why didn't you kill him?" And Khrushchev, bursting into tears, blurted out: "What could we do? There was a reign of terror." Even the *Daily Worker* editor, Allen Max, has permitted himself to ask in print: "Where were the present leaders during the period of which they speak? How about their own errors?" That they were terrified does not exclude the fact that they rose into the circle of the *Vozhd* as active and willing accomplices, singing the glory of his name.

And what shall men think of a system in which not only a great people is terrified and tyrannized, but even the ruling party and the party bosses are terrified of the man they have raised to power, and powerless to restrain his fury?

Within a few weeks of Stalin's death, his heirs began a limited amnesty and "rehabilitation" of "enemies of the people" and "traitors." This operation, too, is difficult to control. Can it be limited to loyal Stalinists, while, as Khrushchev has decreed, it expressly excludes "Trotskyites, Bukharinites, bourgeois nationalists, and others of the worst enemies of the people?" Can it be limited to apologies to the corpses of Communists, without other corpses pushing their way into this strange dance of death—the millions of peasants of the forced collectivization and state-organized famine; the rightless lowest class of millions of workers in concentration camps; the extinguished nationalities?

And where shall be drawn the dividing line between the crimes of Stalin and the "great achievements?" Is it only "during his last few years" as was said at one point in the Congress? Or "during the last 20 years" as was said at another? Or when Lenin lay

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dying, as Khrushchev admitted at another point? Or when all of Lenin's closest comrades, like Trotsky, Zinoviev and Bukharin, were expelled by Stalin and the very lieutenants who are now his heirs? Was the conquest of the Baltic States and the Balkans one of Stalin's crimes or, as his heirs maintain, one of his great achievements? Shall the democrats who resisted be amnestied there? The corpses apologized to? The forced collectivization, still hated by every peasant and still resisted as every production figure testifies —was it one of the great achievements or one of Stalin's crimes? The attack on the rights of the Russian people as consumers, and on their standard of living ("the priority of heavy industry")— how shall it now be classified?

Nor is the confusion any less in the satellites. In every one of them Communists were framed as "Titoists" (apologies to the corpse!), as agents of foreign Powers (apologies to some, but not to others). Social Democrats, Democrats, loyal patriots were jailed and executed (still "reactionaries and enemies of the people," Khrushchev told Gaitskell and Eden). In every subjugated nation there are Stalin appointees at the helm, objects of a systematically fostered "cult of the personality"—like Mao in China and Rakosi in Hungary.

In Poland, the problem of "controlled exorcism" is even more unmanageable, for there Stalin outlawed the Polish Communist Party in the thirties, killing its entire Central Committee. Then came the killing of Ehrlich and Alter and other Polish Socialists, Jewish and non-Jewish; the murders in the Katyn Forest; the betrayal of the Warsaw uprising to Hitler's army. The apologies, rehabilitations and amnesties in Poland already run into the tens of thousands. Where can a line be drawn short of setting this unhappy people free to nurse their unmerited wounds?

In short, the Twentieth Congress, "more monolithic than ever before," prepared by a purge like the others, its spokesman established well in advance, its Six-Year Plan completed and adopted earlier, the enlargement of its Presidium completed six months in advance, its rôles allotted, its speeches prepared, its nearly 1,500 delegates dutifully cheering when the cue was given, asking no questions and voting *yes* on everything—has sprung its own great surprise. For three and a half years the heirs were wrestling with the problem of Stalin's ghost—alternately shrinking and enlarging it a little (the last enlargement being in December 1955). But at the Congress the ghost eluded control; the sound-

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ing board displayed monstrous powers of amplification; "operation cutdown" burst out of the bonds of the plan.

Is it an insoluble operation for Stalin's heirs and accomplices, an operation which has developed a dynamics of its own? In any case, it must by now be obvious that they have opened a new Pandora's box. Dark, terrifying shapes continue to escape from it, and the heirs are having trouble getting the lid securely nailed down once more.

Out of the strange shapes, hovering over them all, emerges a gigantic question mark—addressed to totalitarianism as a system. If a Hitler, cruel and paranoiac, can take power over and terrorize a great people; if a Stalin, cruel and paranoiac, can take power over and terrorize another great people, and nothing be done about it until violence and death befall—is there not something paranoid about the system itself? Is there not something fatal about the concentration of absolute power, the power of life and death, the monopoly of all the means of persuasion and force in irresponsible hands? Is there not something about the arduous and superhuman trade of absolute dictatorship that unhinges the mind? Will not a totalitarianism of any kind tend to engender ever afresh the absolute dictator, corrupting him by the concentration of absolute power in his hands? Is not this the realization in life of what Lord Acton obscurely sensed when he wrote: *Absolute power corrupts absolutely*?

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AGAIN THE POPULAR FRONT

By J. M. Domenach

AMONG the more sensational declarations of the Soviet leaders at the Twentieth Party Congress was Nikita Khrushchev's statement which seemed so contradictory to the tenets of Stalinism. "It is probable," he said, "that forms of transition to socialism will become more and more diversified. Moreover, the implementation of these forms need not be associated with civil war under all circumstances." Further on he was more explicit: "In this connection the question arises whether it is possible to go over to socialism by using parliamentary means." With certain conditions, he gave this possibility his endorsement: ". . . the working class in a number of capitalist countries, . . . by rallying around itself the toiling peasantry, the intelligentsia, all patriotic forces . . . is in a position to defeat the reactionary forces opposed to the popular interest, to capture a stable majority in parliament, and to transform the latter from an organ of bourgeois democracy into a genuine instrument of the people's will." Khrushchev did not specify the countries in which this seizure of power through parliamentary means was possible, but he probably had in mind primarily Italy, France and Greece, as well as the "former colonial countries" such as India, Malaya, Ceylon and various Arab countries of the Middle East.

Thus Khrushchev broke with a thesis which had become more or less established by the end of Stalin's life, namely that the revolution could be achieved only by following the Bolshevik example and with the direct aid of the power of the Soviet Union.[1] The rehabilitation of Jugoslavia as a Socialist country brought with it the recognition that there are various forms of Socialism and various ways of achieving it, among them the parliamentary; hence collaboration again becomes possible between Communist Parties and Social Democratic or bourgeois parties which continue to embrace the rules of parliamentary democracy as an article of political faith. With the repudiation of the brutal and imperialist doctrines of Stalinism and the proclamation that a peaceful and even parliamentary revolution is possible, the question of alliances between the Communists and other parties is

[1] For Stalinist theories on revolution see the article by "Historicus" in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1949.

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again on the agenda, reviving the old theme of the "popular front."

A rapid succession of important political events has confirmed the new trend. In recent months the Italian Communist Party has on several occasions supported the Segni government. In March the Communist deputies in France voted full powers to the government of Guy Mollet with respect to Algeria. This was a question on which they were not in accord with the government's policy, but they lent their support because (in the words of Maurice Thorez) "the essential concern which inspires the Party is to preserve the possibilities of a broader development of the united front with the Socialist workers."[2] Some weeks later the dissolution of the Cominform was announced. The reason given in the communiqué of the eight Communist Parties of free Europe was the need to "heal the schism in the working-class movement." Henceforth it was to be left to each party to examine "the problems of collaboration with the parties and tendencies favoring socialism." Finally, on April 20, *Pravda* affirmed still more plainly that coöperation between Socialists and Communists was now feasible. On April 30, several members of the Executive Committee of the French Socialist Party left for an official visit to Moscow, where they were received with exceptional cordiality.

The question is therefore being asked everywhere: Will the parties of the left, especially the Socialist parties, respond favorably to these friendly overtures? Will there be a revival of the popular fronts?

II

Front populaire! Few words in the vocabulary of Western Europe are so charged with passion. They instantly evoke either enthusiasm or fury. They still ring with echoes of the Spanish Civil War, of the great wave of enthusiasm which swept the French workers in 1936. But they echo, too, the somber note of the coup d'état in Prague, of the subjugation of the Social Democratic parties in all the People's Democracies. The very violence of the reaction to this slogan indicates the need for the utmost seriousness and composure in trying to understand what the significance of the popular front was in the past and what it is likely to be in the future.

In dealing with the Communists it is essential to have a firm

[2] Maurice Thorez, "Quelques questions capitales," *Cahiers du Communisme*, April 1956.

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understanding of their ideological position. Their tactical skill often obscures the fact that they always act in accordance with a firm set of principles; even their most obvious contradictions are carefully thought out. In the case of the popular front, their policy satisfies a fundamental tenet of Marxism. According to Marx, the proletariat represents more than itself alone; under the conditions of extreme exploitation to which it is subjected, the proletariat is the embodiment of the oppressed masses as a whole, and its triumph will be theirs, for its victory is the only universal victory—the only possible victory for humanity. The industrial proletariat, having become the actual or virtual majority in society, will set up its own dictatorship, which will be the dictatorship of the majority over the minority of capitalist exploiters.

But this dialectic theory has not been borne out by the evolution of modern states. Lenin was obliged to supplement it with a more practical theory which brought into play the resources of psychology and of military doctrine in a Hegelian perspective. Lenin observed that the working-class consciousness, when left to itself, bogged down in a negative "economic" struggle. To attain a *political* consciousness the proletariat must establish a relationship "with all classes and strata of the population." Therefore the object is no longer to group the workers together in mass parties on the classic Social Democratic model but to create an élite to act as a vanguard propagandizing and agitating in every sphere of political activity. The Communist Party is to organize this vanguard and direct its campaign of penetration. By definition it is not sufficient unto itself; it actually exists only in so far as it fulfills its function of training, of crystallizing "all the elements of political opposition." The alliance of the Communists with the other leftist movements is thus in the very nature of the Communist Parties; only the forms can vary depending on circumstances. "The working class must always be ready to replace one form by another without warning and without delay."[3] Among these forms, one is obviously that of the traditional parliamentary alliance. But it is not the only one, nor is it the one that has been most frequently resorted to.

The popular front is thus not a combination peculiar to France or Spain, but the implementation of a Leninist tactic, used suc-

[3] Nikolai Lenin, "'Left Wing' Communism, An Infantile Disorder." London: The Communist Party of Great Britain, n.d.

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cessfully in 1917 by the Bolsheviks. It is an alliance of the working class with the peasants and the middle classes, a coalition instigated and guided by the Communist Party. In the intervening 40 years this alliance has taken various forms which can be classified in four essential types:

1. *The "united front" in Europe (1921–1932)*

The united front was founded on unity at the bottom fostered solely by the Communists and directly guided by the Party. Its original object was to remedy the effects of the schism in the International by drawing as many Socialist workers as possible back into the fold. This tactic was designed to divide the left-wing Socialists from their leaders, who were accused of "betraying the working class." In 1932 Maurice Thorez was still uttering the slogan, "With fist brandished against the Socialist Party and hand extended to the workers abused by that party."

2. *The "national front"*

The national front consisted of an alliance between Communists and bourgeois parties for the purpose of attaining patriotic objectives. This tactic was perfected in Asia, in countries where colonialism facilitated coöperation between the working class movement, the peasants and those members of the upper classes who dreamed of independence. Inaugurated in 1920 in Siberia and Mongolia, it was applied in China from 1922 to 1927, when the chief of the Kuomintang himself put an end to it by massacring the Communists of Shanghai and then of Canton. But the national front tactic was renewed with fresh vigor among the European resistance movements between 1940 and 1945, preparing the way for Communist domination of the People's Democracies. Unlike the united front, the national front appealed to the patriotic bourgeois parties rather than to the Socialists, who became isolated and encircled with a multitude of satellite organizations.

3. *The "popular front"*

In Europe the united front had failed and had opened the way to Italian and German Fascism. It was precisely the victory of Nazism and the threat to the U.S.S.R. which it posed that impelled the Comintern in 1934 to come out with a new watchword. This time it was not a question of capturing the Socialist workers or turning the Socialist parties to the right, but of joining in a genuine alliance, free of subversion, for concerted action against Fascism. This formula was put into effect primarily in Spain and France. In these two countries the Communists were particularly

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careful not to alarm the moderate elements in the coalition, and as a result found themselves in conflict with the more radical attitudes of the revolutionary Socialists and Anarchists.[4] If the Popular Front in France eventually fell apart, it was not for internal reasons but as a result of international political developments: failure to intervene in Spain and then the Munich Pact. "The Popular Front died exactly as it was born: as the result of Communist concern over Hitler."[5]

4. *The governmental coalitions*

After Liberation the Communists were members of the government in both France and Italy. Emerging from the resistance movements, they appeared to be simply a party like any other, but one which had done more than others to justify its claim to patriotism. The governmental coalition differed from earlier alliances in that it was founded on agreement at the top on major political objectives, but did not by any means represent unity at the bottom. It is interesting to note that this coalition, which in France was called "tripartism," also fell apart for reasons involving foreign policy and the international position of Soviet Russia: 1947 marked the beginning of the cold war, when Zdhanov's thesis of increasing opposition between the "peace camp" and the "camp of the imperialist aggressors" became the official line.

Since 1947 the tactic of forming alliances has had no further successes in Western Europe. In Italy the coalition of Communists and Nenni Socialists has won votes but has not been able to attract other parties. In France the national front tactic resorted to once more under the guise of the Peace Movement has been quickly hamstrung by the sectarianism of the Communists, which reached its height with the denunciation of Titoism. But now the Twentieth Party Congress declares that the time has come to put into effect a broader system of alliances. Is this a real change? Are these to be common fronts of the same old type or will they really represent something new? The conclusions drawn from this brief review may offer a clue: the nature of the coalitions arranged by the Communists has always been determined by the international position of the Soviet Union; these coalitions have failed or partially succeeded depending on the

[4] An account of this period in France is given by J. Danos and M. Gibelin in "Juin 36." Paris: Editions Ouvrières, 1952.

[5] Pierre Ayçoberry, "Front Populaire," *Reconstruction,* February–March 1956.

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domestic circumstances which have confronted them in each country.

III

It would be a mistake to interpret the vigorous denunciation of Stalin and his narcissism as a fundamental break with the tenets of Stalinism. What it actually represents is a reappraisal of the international position of the U.S.S.R., resulting once more in a change of tactics among the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries.

The Soviet leaders were moved by two considerations: (1) The cold war has reached an impasse and it is in the interests of both camps to find a way out. (2) The internal strength and external influence of the Soviet Union and the countries of the "socialist camp" are still growing.

Consequently it is possible to relax the controls which mobilized the foreign Communist Parties in defense of the U.S.S.R. and to allow them greater initiative and flexibility. However, an examination of the directives given to the various Communist Parties, both Russian and foreign, fails to reveal anything really new: emphasis is still on the priority of heavy industry, the struggle against colonialism and in favor of national independence, the alliance of the Communists with all other opposition groups. It is true that Khrushchev and his colleagues have affirmed more plainly than ever the possibility of a peaceful and even parliamentary transition to Socialism. But Stalin himself had foreseen this possibility, although by the end of his life he had moved far away from it. "Of course," he once wrote, "in the remote future, if the proletariat is victorious in the most important capitalist countries, and if the present capitalist encirclement is replaced by a Socialist encirclement, a 'peaceful' path of development is quite possible for certain capitalist countries, whose capitalists, in view of the 'unfavorable' international situation, will consider it expedient 'voluntarily' to make substantial concessions to the proletariat."[6] The difference between the two Soviet leaders is that Khrushchev believes the stability and strength of the Socialist camp are such that it is not necessary to wait for Socialist encirclement and revolution in the major capitalist countries. This is an important difference, but is it likely

[6] J. Stalin, "Problems of Leninism." Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1940, p. 35.

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to modify, for the present, the actual nature of the alliances sought by the Communist Parties? The answer is no, as is evident from the fact that A. Mikoyan, addressing the Twentieth Congress shortly after Khrushchev had spoken, cited the coup d'état in Prague as a model for the peaceful and parliamentary seizure of power! "Thanks to the favorable situation which took shape in Czechoslovakia after the war," he said, "the socialist revolution was accomplished peacefully; the Communists came to power after having concluded an alliance not only with the working people's parties that stood close to them, but also with the bourgeois parties which supported the common national front. The people of Czechoslovakia have been victorious in a peaceful revolution."

In short, we are witnessing a break with Stalin's political practice rather than a break with the essential doctrines of Stalinism. The Soviet leaders have simply come to the conclusion that the position of their country has been strengthened and that friendly coexistence is more profitable than cold war. This superiority complex has induced them to make the tactics of the Communist Parties more tractable. Yet, in accordance with Stalin's analysis, the principal Soviet weapon continues to be "the utilization of internal contradictions in the imperialist world." In other words, in the underdeveloped or colonial countries the Communists must support the independence movements; in the capitalist countries they must unite with the leftist and neutralist forces against aggressive imperialism. In his report to the Twentieth Congress, Khrushchev clearly indicated that international considerations were behind the new overtures made to the non-Communists: "The interests of the struggle for peace make it imperative to find points of contact and on these grounds to lay the foundations for coöperation, sweeping aside mutual recriminations. Here coöperation with those circles of the socialist movement who have views on the forms of transition to socialism differing from ours is also possible and essential."

The coöperation referred to here seems to resemble the popular front concept, but with greater stress on collaboration—perhaps even reunification—with the parties and labor unions under Social Democratic influence. Will the two branches of the International, which have followed divergent paths since 1922, now begin to come together?

The Executive Committee of the Socialist International, meet-

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ing at Zurich in March, has already turned down the Communist advances and ruled out "any form of political compromise with the parties of dictatorship." The Social Democrats cannot forget that under such alliances their fellow party members in the People's Democracies were ruthlessly swallowed up, and they demand, as did the Labor Party leaders in London, the prior release of their comrades who are languishing in the prisons of the East. The Communist and Social Democratic conceptions of freedom are still essentially different: within a Socialist state the Social Democrats want to preserve the gains of political democracy, and for this the party system is an indispensable condition. But even the Jugoslav Communists have not permitted more than one party to function; it is therefore unlikely that the Soviets will permit it for a long time to come. Furthermore, the Social Democratic parties have become bourgeois and nationalist in their outlook: today they merely render lip service to the revolution and seek only to gain for the workers the greatest possible advantage from the prevailing economic and political system. Incapable of establishing the barest minimum of harmony among themselves, they independently pursue objectives which are at times selfishly nationalistic. In reality, the Socialist parties have nothing left in common with the social democracy of an earlier era other than a few revolutionary slogans and workers' hymns. The difference in the mentality and social composition of the French Socialist Party and the French Communist Party is much greater than it was in 1936.

Yet in some Socialist parties there is a lingering nostalgia for the unity of an earlier day. In France especially there is a vivid memory of the increased power which this unity gave to the left and of the great successes which it made possible in 1936. Whatever their ideological differences may be, there are many Socialists and Socialist sympathizers who dream of returning to such a state of affairs. The Communist Party, with 25 percent of the French vote, represents half of the "leftist" strength; without it, the left would be obliged to ally itself with the center-right in order to govern and would finally have to adopt policies not in harmony with its principles. The Socialist Party is tired of serving as a hostage, and a large segment of the Party would find it a relief to be able to join an honest alliance with the Communists. But do the practical conditions for such an alliance exist?

A glance at the trend of developments in Western Europe sug-

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gests that circumstances do not favor the creation of new popular fronts. The relaxation of international tension, while it permits the Communists greater tactical freedom, tends at the same time to weaken some of the forces of cohesion. Let us take the example of Italy, where a *de facto* popular front has existed ever since the Liberation; the Communists and Nenni Socialists always act together. Since the détente, the question of the Atlantic Pact has lost its urgency and no longer pushes Nenni into the arms of the Communists and away from the Christian Democrats. It becomes possible for Nenni to ally himself with certain elements in the center. Several recent votes in parliament have shown a leftist majority in which the Communists played a supplementary rather than a leading rôle, just as in France they have supported the Mollet government. Such parliamentary coalitions are of an unstable nature; they do not imply any reciprocal commitment and they leave the non-Communist partners entirely free in their movements. They are very different from the popular front, and in a way serve to lessen the likelihood of its resurrection.

Moreover, the numerical strength acquired by the Italian and French Communist Parties since the days of the Resistance is a further hindrance to the formation of balanced coalitions. These parties being much stronger than their proposed allies,[7] the latter are fearful of being swamped and forced into a subordinate position. The creation of a popular front government would raise insoluble problems in the present state of affairs, because the allies of the Communists would refuse to give them the key ministries which they would be entitled to demand. If the French Communist and Socialist Parties had an equal number of deputies, a coalition would be more likely.

Finally, developments in the economy are not conducive to a lasting rapprochement. France and Italy are experiencing the first consequences of the "neo-capitalism" which is by now solidly entrenched in Germany. The standard of living among large segments of the population is rising. First the Fiat and then the Renault plants have signed contracts with their workers providing regular salary increases tied to increased productivity. The Communists tried to block this settlement, arguing their traditional principle of non-collaboration between classes. But their attempt failed, and reform—the worst enemy of Communist

[7] There are 150 Communists and 98 Socialists among the deputies in the French National Assembly. The Communist Party has about 400,000 members, the Socialist Party about 110,000.

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dialectics—won a point. The condition of the workers in Western Europe is going through an evolution. As they approach the condition of the middle classes, the likelihood of an alliance pitting the working masses against the bourgeois parties becomes more remote.

IV

It seems, then, that the condemnation of Stalin's excesses and the overtures made by the Communists to the Socialist parties will not prove adequate to bring about the formation of new-style popular fronts. Does this mean that the possibility of eventual alliances between the Communists and other parties should be dismissed? Absolutely not. It simply means that the situation remains unchanged by recent events. In certain circumstances coalition with the Communists could become useful or even inevitable. Communist support of Western European governments may last for some time and even become more marked in Italy. But the situation in France is more unstable because of the war in Algeria. It will be difficult to go on putting off the choice between prosecuting an interminable war and agreeing to negotiate. But a policy favoring negotiation will not be possible without the Communist votes, while prolongation of the war will require censorship and other repressive measures in France herself. Only a rightist government bordering on dictatorship could carry out such a program and in these circumstances the forces of the left would quickly close ranks, just as they did in 1934 when threatened by the Fascist Leagues. Even a Socialist as far removed from Communism as Léon Blum declared before his judges in 1942: "I was convinced and I am still convinced that it is impossible to defend republican liberties in France if we exclude from that effort the working masses and the fraction of the working-class élite who still adhere to the Communist concept."

From any viewpoint, it seems clear that in the months to come the parties of the left in France are going to establish closer ties. It is desirable that these take the form of a parliamentary coalition, bound by a public agreement, rather than that of a popular front, born of the urgency of danger and sure to be quickly taken over by the Communists. The countries of Europe have become too weak to be able to afford to ostracize such a large proportion of their populations, including working-class and intellectual elements whose participation is vitally needed for national re-

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construction. Collaboration between the Communists and the other parties of the left would obviously pose a delicate question, but it is one which should be viewed dispassionately. Given the present international conditions and the internal evolution of the countries of Western Europe, it would not be the same as either the Popular Front of 1936 or the coup d'état in Czechoslovakia.

A real popular front, a reunification of the labor unions and of the Socialist and Communist Parties, would depend on a change which has not yet come about in the Soviet Union. Of course it is possible that the process of de-Stalinization may carry its instigators much farther than they wish to go and may lead willy-nilly to the reintroduction of democracy and the essential principles of human freedom into the Soviet system; it is possible that the Western Communist Parties may one day cease to take orders from the Kremlin. Under these conditions, a solid and enduring alliance between Communists and Socialists could be concluded, and perhaps new, united revolutionary parties could be founded. It is not impossible that Soviet leaders envisage the Jugoslav Communist Party as a means of luring the Socialist parties into a new International with the Communists. The Jugoslav Communist Party, which has proved its independence, would be well situated to act as intermediary between the Social Democrats of Europe and the East. But this possibility can be realized only if profound changes take place in the policy and structure of the Soviet régime. The speakers at the Twentieth Party Congress have made it plain that any such changes are still a long way off.

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EVOLUTION IN JUGOSLAVIA

By Edvard Kardelj

THERE are three basic problems in the political life of present-day Jugoslavia, two of them in domestic policy, the third in foreign policy. Together they form the starting point for all our country's political and social efforts. They are, first, to extricate the country from its previous backward state and find the most suitable forms of economic relations based on social ownership of the means of production; second, to continue building a political structure which corresponds to the country's new social and economic foundations; third, to ensure that Jugoslavia's international position is such that she can achieve her aims under conditions of peace and independence and at the fastest possible pace. A brief analysis of these problems may reveal the main features of Jugoslavia's domestic and foreign policy and the interests which shape her relations with other countries, including the United States.

I. IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE

Jugoslavia's Socialist revolution was confronted with two basic tasks. The first was to bring into play the forces which were to grapple with the country's economic, social and political backwardness. The second was to start the process of the Socialist transformation of society, because under the existing conditions it was along Socialist lines, and along Socialist lines alone, that the first question could be solved in our country.

I would like to give a few examples to show how backward prewar Jugoslavia was.

According to the official census of 1921, 80 percent of the economically active population was engaged in agriculture, while ten years later (in 1931) the proportion was still above 76 percent—a figure which remained more or less unchanged until the war. The per capita consumption of commercial energy in Jugoslavia in 1937 amounted to only one-tenth of the average European consumption (not including the Soviet Union) and was 33 times below that of the United States. Thus agriculture, even though backward, primitive and at a very low level of productivity, was the basis of the country's economic life. Agricultural products were exported and industrial consumer goods imported.

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Earnings and the standard of living reflected this general economic condition. According to data of the Central Labor Insurance Office, the average daily wage of a worker in prewar Jugoslavia was highest in 1930, when it amounted to 689 dinars a month; in the same period the cost of living of a working-class family of four amounted to 2,500 dinars. In 1934–38 the per capita use of sugar, to take one consumer item, was 4.5 kilograms, compared to 49 kilograms in Great Britain in the same period.

Industrial development was very slow, owing to the shortage of domestic capital and also because incessant internal political crises resulted in the diversion of a substantial portion of it into nonproductive channels. Moreover, the national economy before the war was in the main dominated by foreign interests, which meant that a very large part of the profits was sent abroad. According to data from annual reports of stock companies and other sources, in 1938 up to 60 percent of all stocks were foreign-owned. So pronounced was this flow of profits out of the country that there were times when up to 35 percent of the total value of exports went towards paying the interest, dividends and profits of foreign capital.

All this had brought the Jugoslav economy into a complete impasse, a state of hopeless stagnation. And this in turn aggravated social and political antagonisms and made a revolutionary outcome inevitable. There was no prospect whatsoever of the country emerging from its backward state within the old social framework; economic, social and political considerations combined to make it imperative to socialize the means of production.

The tidal wave of the revolution swept aside the economic and political obstacles built up by Jugoslavia's prewar social pattern and cleared the way for future economic and social progress. Like all revolutions, it established at the very outset a revolutionary political machinery designed to ensure its achievements and in particular to ensure the socialization of the means of production.

More than that the revolution could not do, however, because it could not eradicate overnight the country's inherited backwardness, its low level of economic development, which required specific social and political forms. Further progress is dependent upon a prolonged internal social evolution, the pace of which will be largely determined by the rate of development of the forces

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of production, that is to say, by the development of the economic foundations of society and of social consciousness under the impact of the new conditions. No rigid patterns or shortcuts are possible here. And the formalistic or dogmatic application of political formulas which had sprung from a different economic and social situation could only slow down the process.

We do not believe, in a word, that there exist universal political blueprints valid for all countries or even for all stages of Jugoslavia's own development. Different conditions call for different lines of social development as well as for various forms of economic and political organization. That is one of the reasons why we favor the peaceful and active coexistence of nations having different social and political systems.

It may well be that the future will see a gradual blurring of the differences between the various social patterns, as has usually been the case in periods of historical transition; but it is too early to argue about the absolute necessity or value of this or that form of political or economic organization based on social ownership of the means of production. This will be decided by practice. What is all-important is that there shall exist political conditions in which the political forms of economic relationships, based on the social ownership of the means of production, can adapt themselves spontaneously and consciously, as well as with a high degree of flexibility, to the development of the forces of production and social consciousness.

One feature of the Jugoslav revolution is that as it developed it proved itself able—aided by objective conditions—to avoid both sheer expediency and dogmatic extremes by evolving political forms to match the gradual development of the forces of production and economic relations. This explains why the entire process of revolutionary change occurred in Jugoslavia with much less internal shock than is usually the case.

The basic problem confronting a society which is developing along Socialist lines is to organize the social means of production and find a political answer to two questions: How to distribute the national income on the Socialist sector of production? And, more broadly, how to develop social economic planning so that it will not act as an administrative brake upon the creative initiative of the individual? This brings us to the question of the rôle of the state—or, more exactly, of the government—within a Socialist system.

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There have been two stages, so far, in the way this problem has been handled in our country. No sharp line can be drawn between the two, of course, since many elements of the first stage still are bound to play an important part. The distinction is, nonetheless, essential, as it reflects the general trend of Jugoslavia's social development.

The revolution began by setting up the machinery of government. Its main features were a high concentration of power, an extensive application of administrative methods and a considerable degree of centralization in all spheres of social life. This is typical of all revolutions; nor could we avoid such a course if we were to safeguard the new social order and also reëstablish normal conditions in the aftermath of the war and revolutionary social changes. Although this system performed a useful function in the first stage, it eventually began to display the unhealthy symptoms which invariably accompany *étatism*, namely bureaucracy and inertia which impeded the normal functioning of economic and social life. There was comparatively little material incentive for creative effort or initiative; in the main, the economy was governed by directives and detailed governmental planning. Had this process continued, it would gradually have led to hypertrophy of the control and inspection system; to a constant expansion of the administrative machinery; and thereby to an increasing imbalance between the productive and the nonproductive sections of the population. Indeed, such bureaucratic tendencies as were already making themselves felt had begun to fetter economic initiative, and this was bound to have adverse political consequences.

In order to forestall any tendency towards the perpetuation of existing political patterns, Jugoslav society had to set about a further task. It had to find ways of gradually supplementing and replacing the economic functions of government with Socialist forms of economic and moral incentive, both collective and individual, based on social ownership of the means of production; thus any extensive centralized interference in the activities of the different units of production would become superfluous. In other words, it was essential to replace gradually and as fully as possible the centralized system of administrative control and inspection with a kind of "internal control." This control would be based on the economic and social interests of the workers' collectives in the various enterprises, of the individual workers, and of the basic so-

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cial communities, namely the municipalities and districts. At the same time, these interests should encourage the efforts both of the collectives and of individual workers to improve production. For this to happen, the individual worker and the collective as a whole must have a stake in the result, and so must the locality where the worker lives. Individual material and moral incentive had gradually to replace government intervention and the system of centralized directives and supervision from above.

In the course of the last few years substantial progress has been achieved in this field. This is not the place for me to go into a detailed description; but there can be no doubt that the application of the principles mentioned has had a profound impact on the structure of our economic life in all its aspects. No longer is there need for extensive government control of economy or for a bulky centralized administrative machinery to carry it out. Instead we have economic incentives and the free coöperation and association of enterprises on a functional basis arising from the practical need to raise the level of production. This, at the same time, provides a democratic answer to the question of the centralized handling of functions which under present economic conditions must be dealt with on a centralized basis.

It is on these principles that the central economic plan is based. The plan merely lays down the general lines of the distribution of production and income.[1] It also lays down the essentials of the policy whereby the goals thus set are to be attained. This central plan is carried out by the economic organizations directly, as a law, and not, as had previously been the case, only through the application of administrative measures by the state. The central economic plan provides only a legislative framework and lays down the general norms for the economic plans of the constituent Republics and of the Communes, as well as for the economic program of the enterprises and the economic associations. Within these extremely broad limits the latter plans and programs are freely worked out. This makes it possible for them to reflect to the largest extent the interests both of the individual workers and of the Communes and the constituent Republics. When they are all given an incentive to strive for the greatest possible material achievements, they will increase production and

[1] The plan sets forth the comparative ratios between the utilization of production possibilities, the wage fund, accumulations and investments, and provides the basic elements for the distribution of accumulations.

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adapt themselves to the demands of the consumers, through economy, improved quality and greater variety of product—because precisely by so doing they can make the most substantial contribution to the betterment of the individual's economic condition and to raising the general social standard of his local community.

In consequence, the number of administrative functions which had previously been a most important political factor tends to diminish. Today the rôle of the administration is reduced to supervising the execution of the over-all economic plan, maintaining legality, ensuring the unity of the social system and carrying out certain regulative and organizational functions. The burden of executive responsibility is thus shifted to the elected bodies (the Federal Assembly, the Assemblies of the constituent Republics and the Peoples' Committees), to the self-governing bodies (the Communes), and to social organizations (the citizens' councils, as well as organizations in the fields of education, social security, etc.). Solid foundations have thereby been laid for continuous and all-round progress in all spheres of social life.

At the same time, an answer is given to the question of individual creative effort. The individual is no longer a mere cog in the machine, with little scope for action; he is not only given the *possibility* but is also confronted with the *necessity*, in his own interest, of striving for material and moral benefits through better and more productive work. He is also concerned with the performance of his fellow workers and of the enterprise as a whole because it is upon this that his own success and the progress of the enterprise and of the Commune depends. From being an individual concerned solely with earning his daily living, he becomes a socially conscious worker with increasing participation in the different spheres of social and economic activity. Gradually, it becomes possible to bridge the gulf between intellectual and manual labor.

Finally, the Communes—that is, the municipalities and districts—have an immediate interest that the forces of production shall develop as rapidly as possible. The more this happens, and the more the individual laborer increases his productivity (lifting both his personal earnings and the income of the Commune), the more rapid the rise in the general well-being. By initiating and stimulating the forces of production, the Commune substantially reduces the need for government control of the economy and this in turn diminishes bureaucratic tendencies.

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Under such a system there is a close and constant relationship between the individual and society. Society no longer exerts pressure on the individual or hamstrings his initiative; neither does it impose patterns of uniformity upon his creative efforts, but rather regulates and assists them. I am not claiming that this principle has as yet found adequate practical application in our country, but I think I can say that there is a definite trend toward its gradual realization.

Needless to say, the introduction of new economic relationships has run into difficulties, and still does so. Although the process has been carried out gradually and is constantly being tested in practice, mistakes cannot be entirely avoided. Moreover, the fact that the mechanism itself is not yet complete has allowed various egoistic and parochial tendencies to create unnecessary difficulties, both economic and political. However, it is precisely while we are endeavoring to eliminate such tendencies that we learn which aspects of the mechanism need to be corrected or supplemented by new economic, political and regulative measures. Although further difficulties of this kind will doubtless be encountered, we can safely say that the first phase of the development has yielded the expected results in full measure. The last few years have seen an extremely rapid development of the forces of production and an increase in production itself. Of course, this has not been the result solely of the changes to which I have referred, but they have certainly been an extremely important contributing factor.

The results achieved are most vividly reflected in the changes to which they have led in our legislation. Formerly regulations and administrative measures had as their main purpose to encourage initiative in production and trade through a tightened system of control. Today the main object is to regulate and guide such initiatives and to adapt them to the possibilities and requirements of society, with only the degree of control necessary to prevent the activities of individual economic organizations from harming the over-all interests of society.

These changes show that we have attained our main objective of making individual material and moral incentives a decisive element of social progress within the given social framework. At the same time, this has made possible freer economic growth as well as the gradual development of more democratic administrative forms in the economic sphere. In this connection the

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most important fact to bear in mind from a political point of view is that the incentive is essentially Socialist and is an integral part of the system of social ownership of the means of production; by that very fact it excludes a return to any form of private ownership in production. Here is the internal political strength of the new social system—that it facilitates and accelerates the development of new democratic forms of social life.

It is quite useless to dismiss a political system by describing it contemptuously as a dictatorship. I do not wish to engage in a theoretical controversy on the distinction between dictatorship and democracy. Few will deny, however, that history has known not only reactionary dictatorships but also progressive ones which ushered in eras of freedom; and conversely there have been bad democracies which undermined freedom. The revolutionary power which emerged from the deep and wide revolutionary change in Jugoslavia has had—and still has—an important political function both in transforming social relationships and advancing the country and also in accomplishing far-reaching democratic changes in the political field.

II. IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE

The new economic patterns in Jugoslavia have had a very definite impact on the country's entire political structure.

In the first place, there is the process which we call *decentralization.* Actually the term is not quite adequate, because it is meant to cover not only decentralization but also new forms of integration. What this boils down to is that forms of government related to *étatism* are replaced with democratic forms of government and integration growing out of the new economic relationships and the accompanying Socialist economic incentives. Since this, of course, requires that the basic productive and social units mentioned above shall have more independence and responsibility, it was essential to decentralize the government considerably and transfer many of its functions to them. On these foundations new forms of democratic integration will gradually be found so as to give economic associations such functions as are in the general interest of society but do not include the exercise of political authority.

The basic unit of this decentralized social structure are the Workers' Councils which are elected in every enterprise by all the workers employed there from among their own ranks and by

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secret ballot. The Workers' Councils do not own the enterprises but only operate them on behalf of society as a whole. They are, therefore, democratic political bodies, in the same way, basically, as are the People's Committees[2] in the municipalities or districts. They cannot act as they please, because they have no rights of ownership; they must remain within the framework of the overall national plan and other regulations. But they do possess definite democratic rights which give them the necessary independence in taking decisions as well as a direct say in the distribution and use of the income.

Nor is the Commune a world unto itself, since it is called upon to perform certain definite social functions. Though the Commune is not the only instrument for harmonizing collective and individual interests, it is the main one. It is the basic cell in society, the first level where the contradiction between the material demands of individuals and of society as a whole finds expression. The fact that the contradiction is solved here under the immediate control and influence of the broad masses of the people has a most favorable effect in forming social consciousness. It sometimes happens, of course, that individual selfish interests gain the upper hand over the interests of society, or else that too great pressure is put on the general standard of living. We have encountered both kinds of difficulties, and shall probably do so again. However, as the system of planning and regulation improves through experience, these harmful tendencies will gradually be reduced, and this in turn will strengthen the principles of self-government. A powerful contributing factor is the growth of social consciousness born of everyday experience. We have thus gained a further means of harmonizing collective and individual interests, on the basis of individual economic and moral incentives. This renders a considerable part of the government machinery superfluous and minimizes the need for government interference in economic and social life.

I do not claim that all the problems arising from the contradiction between individual and collective social interests have thereby been solved. Some of these problems are dealt with through other forms of democratic self-government—through social organizations, associations, the chambers of industry, agriculture, trade and so forth. The main responsibility in this regard

[2] The official term for elected local self-government bodies. Actually, in view of their size they might perhaps be more adequately described as councils, or local "parliaments."

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naturally rests with the parliaments of the Jugoslav Federation and of the constituent Republics since these are the highest social and political representative bodies. However, the results we have already achieved in developing the Communes point out clearly the future trend for democratically harmonizing individual and collective interest in the Socialist sector of economic life.

A further consequence of the changed economic foundations was the need for increasingly *democratic* forms of economic activities and management. If decentralization had taken place within the old *étatist* framework of economic management the result would have been a growth of bureaucracy and arbitrariness in the local bodies and in the various enterprises; indeed, the entire meaning of the social ownership of the means of production would have been distorted. It was clear at the very outset that it was impossible to set out to provide individual economic and other incentives and increase the autonomy of economic organizations and Communes without simultaneously democratizing the system of management and the structure of their governing bodies. Experience has done away with the notion that the organization of production is a matter for experts and technicians, with democracy confined to the political field; it has shown that bureaucracy can be overcome only through a democratic transformation of all levels of economic management.

These trends led to the emergence of the two new democratic forms of political organization which I have mentioned—the Workers' Councils and the Communes. They are a basic feature of our entire system and have a tremendous bearing on the gradual transformation of our country's political and economic life.

The Workers' Councils are no mere advisory bodies; they are vested with powers of decision and functions of management. The following are the main functions of the Workers' Councils: adoption of wage regulations, approval of the economic program of the enterprise, distribution of that part of the income of the enterprise which it is free to dispose of, the taking of decisions as to the utilization of all funds managed autonomously by the enterprise, as well as electing the board of management and supervising its work. The board of management is the direct executive body of the Workers' Council. The Workers' Councils may not, it is true, interfere with the technological aspects of production nor with day-to-day commercial activities. These come within the purview of the director of the enterprise and his technical staff.

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It is, however, the Workers' Councils which lay down the general economic policies of the enterprise within the framework of the economic plan, and in this context they may appraise and criticize the results of the technical and commercial management.

In view of his professional qualifications, the director is responsible for the direct management of the enterprise, for organizing production, for carrying out the plan; it is he who assigns various tasks and duties to workers and employees, and these are responsible to him. The director is called upon to see that the requisite discipline is observed. Should a Workers' Council feel that the director is not acting in the interest of the enterprise or of the community as a whole, it may request that he be relieved of his post; the director, for his part, has the right and duty to inform the People's Committee of the Commune if he considers that the activities of the Workers' Council do not conform with existing regulations. In the event of a disagreement, the People's Committee may, if it finds that the director's course was not justified, dissolve the Workers' Council and call for new elections.

The director of an enterprise is selected from among applicants by a commission composed of representatives of the People's Committee, professional organizations and members of the Workers' Council of the enterprise. The last-named form one-third of the membership of the commission. The candidate selected is then officially appointed by the People's Committee. The director of an enterprise is *ipso facto* a member of the Workers' Council, but he is never its chairman.

The Workers' Councils, like the other democratic forms of economic organization, are vitally interested in the activities of the Commune, in the size of its funds and in how they are used. Representing as it does the general interest, the Commune on its side has a material interest in preventing individual demands from running counter to the general needs of the Commune. It is precisely because the people who decide these matters in the Commune usually also sit in the Workers' Councils and the self-governing bodies of the other economic organizations that the Commune has become such an important instrument for harmonizing individual and collective interests.[3]

[3] Administratively speaking, the Commune covers the territory of a municipality in the usual understanding of the term. In our country, however, it is given far more extensive powers, particularly in production, and thus becomes an important form of social organization. By Commune we usually mean the integrated functions of the municipality and the district.

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The Workers' Councils and the Communes have exerted a far-reaching influence on the political and organizational structure of the state. The representative bodies of the Communes, of the constituent Republics and of the Jugoslav Federation now include Councils of Producers elected by and consisting of people immediately engaged in production. They have an equal say with the general bodies in all matters relating to the distribution of the social income. This is a democratic way of ensuring the leadership of the Socialist elements—of the workers—in social life, so that it is no longer necessary for the Government to take administrative measures or intervene directly to achieve this end. Moreover, these are the bodies which most adequately reflect the practical needs of the economy and therefore can best assure that the regulations conform to them. They are, moreover, a natural antithesis of bureaucracy.

The activities of the Workers' Councils also cover the functional coöperation of enterprises. Besides the central government's functions in regulating and planning economic activities, there obviously are other economic functions which have to be centralized, such as, for instance, organizing efforts to improve production from a technical point of view, coördinating the different plans of production, encouraging and aiding coöperation among the various enterprises, organizing auxiliary specialized services, distributing materials—in other words, everything involved today in coöperation in the field of production and in the division of labor. The considerable number of ministries formerly existing and the even more numerous boards administering the different branches of the economy have now been replaced with associations of enterprises and groupings of these known as Chambers of Industry, of Agriculture, of Trade, etc. The governing bodies of such associations are always elected by Workers' Councils and are aided by a technical staff. The government, too, is represented on them and has a direct say regarding all matters affecting the general interest. These forms of economic organization are still in their early stages in our country, but already it is clear that they are assuming an important social rôle. In any event, a democratic solution has been found to the question of functional grouping in economic life. This has made it possible for functions which under present-day economic conditions must be centralized to be so organized as to ensure both the direct influence of the enterprises and their Workers' Councils, which re-

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flects the needs of economic practice, and that of the Parliament and of the government, which speak for society as a whole.

The growing rôle of the Workers' Councils and of the Communes has also had an impact outside the economic sphere—for instance, in education, public health, etc.—with the result that the general administrative structure has lost many of its *étatist* features. Here, too, many of the functions previously discharged by the government administration at all levels have now been taken over by various democratically elected self-governing bodies. This has made it possible to reduce government control in these spheres to a minimum, and thus counteract any bureaucratic tendencies which might appear in them.

I would like to give a few examples of the importance of this process. The total population of the three largest Jugoslav cities—Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana—is 1,435,189. Some 123,400 citizens take an active part in the different self-governing bodies both inside and outside the economic sphere—with all the broad powers and functions of which I have already spoken. On the other hand, the entire Federal administration consisting of five State Secretariats and a series of lower administrative organs totals 10,328 officials and employees (this does not include the State Secretariat for National Defense).

The extent to which government administration, and especially the central government administration, has decreased through decentralization is shown by the following figures: In 1948 the Federal administration (not including National Defense) had 47,310 officials and employees. This number has now been brought down to 10,328, almost a third of them in the State Secretariats for Foreign and Internal Affairs. These figures, I think, are highly indicative of the general trend of the social and political evolution of our country.

The new democratic forms have not been artificially devised or imposed. They are a direct consequence of social ownership of the means of production. Any attempt, therefore, to gauge Jugoslav developments in terms of democratic institutions derived from the system of private ownership of the means of production is bound to be misleading.

As is only natural, a system such as ours gives considerable importance to the subjective factor, *i.e.* to the political organizations in which the social consciousness takes shape. These organizations are called upon to educate the masses in the spirit

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of the new social relationships; and by carrying on general political work and explaining the practical issues that may arise they endeavor to contribute to the adoption of consistently Socialist decisions by the various self-governing and representative bodies. Under our system this indispensable social function is performed chiefly by the League of Communists of Jugoslavia and the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Jugoslavia. These are not political parties in the traditional sense of the word, and their position in our political and social structure does not correspond to that of parties in countries with classical multi-party democracy. It is therefore quite incorrect to speak of a so-called one-party as distinct from a multi-party system or to view the problem of Socialist democracy as being how to achieve the transition from a one-party to a multi-party system. The specific leading rôle of the two political organizations in our social life notwithstanding, the democratic forms of organization which are growing up on the basis of social ownership of the means of production will necessarily develop into a non-party Socialist democracy; and within its fold the individual will not be represented through one or several parties, but directly.

To give just one example of how our political system works, I shall describe the manner in which prospective members of the assemblies are nominated. The assemblies are elected by universal suffrage and secret ballot; but an additional feature characteristic of the Jugoslav system of direct democracy is the process whereby the candidates are nominated. Candidates are nominated at meetings of the electors and by groups of citizens. All voters have the right to participate in these meetings and in the decisions reached. The meeting elects its own officers. Any voter proposes candidates. From among the persons thus proposed a choice is made by majority vote and this choice becomes the official proposal of the meeting. If one-fourth of a voters' meeting in an electoral district comes out in favor of a candidate, then the latter is nominated. Should more than one such proposal obtain the required majority, then there will be more than one candidate. Thus it is the electors who nominate the candidates. In addition, groups of not less than 200 citizens, including at least five from each of the municipalities, may nominate a candidate. As can be seen, nominations are not linked to, or made dependent upon, party affiliations. No party, not even the League of Communists of Jugoslavia or the Socialist Alliance of the Working People,

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nominates official candidates; this is done at the voters' meetings or by groups of citizens. As is only natural, political organizations give their active backing to prospective candidates; the actual decision as to their nomination, however, belongs to the meetings of the voters themselves.

Organizations like those named above and the labor unions are concentrating more and more on the task of preparing citizens to deal with the public issues within the system of social ownership of the means of production. Under existing conditions they must, of course, retain a measure of leadership in the political life of the country. The rate of progress cannot be laid down arbitrarily but will depend on the nature and development of social antagonisms; the general trend is, however, unmistakable.

Far be it from me to assert that all this is being achieved without difficulty. On the contrary, there are still many shortcomings; we are running into opposition from bureaucratic and conservative tendencies, and there is still an inclination to be guided by expediency or by egoistic interest.

Nor do I wish to say that we have already found the best possible answer to all our problems. There are still areas where we have been unable as yet to replace the system of administrative control with more democratic forms of organization. On the other hand, there have been instances where we have ventured too far in this regard, and this has sometimes led to a lack of discipline and even anarchistic tendencies. But if we compare such adverse trends to the results achieved they appear comparatively unimportant; nor is it to be expected that such far-reaching social changes can be brought about without difficulty, without mistakes or failures. We are open to correction by experience, for we have never been dogmatists who refuse to learn from the practice of everyday life. But experience has confirmed that our basic approach is correct. In all probability, certain practical forms of organization will undergo many changes, but the general trend to which I have referred will pervade the entire future growth of our society.

We do not claim, needless to say, that we shall establish an ideal society, either for ourselves or for the rest of the world. There is no ideal society. What we are striving for is to make possible that our working people shall do their utmost both for themselves and for future generations, thus contributing to the

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general progress of humanity. They are, in fact, already able to do this to the extent of existing possibilities. How far we have succeeded is not for us to say. History will be the judge. In everything we are guided, in addition to our general theoretical approach, by two considerations only: the test of experience and the support of the people. Both, as we see it, approve the course we have taken.

III. IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE

Jugoslavia is thus going through an intense process of evolution in the economic, social and political fields. In some ways this process is similar to that in other countries; nevertheless, it does have certain specific features, some of which are undoubtedly of international significance. To be successful, the efforts demanded of our people require that there be conditions of peace and of independence. That is why the process of which I have spoken is so clearly reflected in foreign policy.

The basic objectives of Jugoslavia's foreign policy are:

First, to ensure independence and equality, and by this I mean not only political independence but also economic independence and the right to pursue an independent internal development.

Second, to safeguard peace and make the greatest possible contribution to world security, to all forms of coöperation and to trade and cultural exchanges.

Third, to rule out any kind of interference in Jugoslavia's internal development and to ensure the full independence of her foreign policy.

Fourth, to establish close economic relations, on a basis of equality, with all countries in whatever manner is best calculated to further Jugoslavia's efforts to emerge from her previous state of backwardness and to develop the forces of production as rapidly as possible.

Fifth, to make the greatest possible contribution to efforts to accelerate the economic development of the underdeveloped areas of the world through appropriate democratic forms of international financing, with the aim of eliminating or at least reducing the gap between the developed and the underdeveloped countries; because precisely here lies one of the main sources of the economic and political dependence of nations and of the lack of stability in international relations.

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Sixth, to coöperate and exchange experience in Socialism and other matters with all nations developing along Socialist lines, and with all Socialist and progressive forces in the world which wish to coöperate on an equal and democratic basis and do not seek to impose their own political and ideological patterns.

Jugoslavia cannot hope, of course, to secure these conditions for herself on a lasting basis unless they are established in the world at large. Even if we leave aside the general Jugoslav attitude in favor of collective security, we must realize that under existing world conditions it is becoming increasingly difficult, if not impossible, for a nation to enjoy peace if it is not world peace, or to pursue an egoistic and narrowly nationalistic policy divorced from the general efforts to prevent aggression and develop broad international coöperation, regardless of bloc boundaries. Jugoslavia cannot and does not wish to pursue any such policy. The purpose of Jugoslav foreign policy, then, is to contribute as much as possible to world security, for we are fully aware that only under conditions of general security can Jugoslavia herself enjoy security and achieve her objectives.

It is on these premises that Jugoslavia bases her concept of peaceful and active coexistence among nations with different social systems. This is no neutralist policy stemming either from pacifist illusion or selfish nationalism. It is an active policy designed to support all trends toward peace and the peaceful elimination or blunting of antagonisms between blocs.

Such a policy arises naturally from the basic requirements, both material and political, of Jugoslavia's social development. However, our advocacy of coexistence would be little more than a pious wish or a pacifist illusion, or might even be the expression of selfishly nationalistic leanings, were it not based on international realities. In other words, what we have to ask ourselves is whether such a policy is both possible and necessary within the wider framework of international relations; whether it is in accordance with the interests of peace and of human progress; and whether it is based on a realistic appraisal of the forces currently at work on the international scene.

We feel that an analysis of existing international realities makes it possible to give a positive answer to these questions. The inherent logic of the political and social evolution now taking place in the world shows clearly that there is no other way to avoid war than through active coexistence.

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The existing balance of forces in the world is such as to preclude the possibility of any part of the world or of any bloc of nations forcing its will upon the others—or indeed even of living for any length of time in a state of economic or political isolation without this having an adverse effect upon its own rate of development. Owing, moreover, to the increasingly vigorous social evolution under way in all countries, and to the existing pattern of international relations which is the result of a number of different factors, the boundary between the world's political systems or blocs does not coincide with the borderline between the different social systems. This will become more and more apparent.

The voices of those who claim that war is the only way out are becoming weaker and weaker throughout the world. One reason is that in view of the present balance of world forces—which no amount of armaments or strengthening of the system of blocs can change to any appreciable extent—war has become if not impossible, at least extremely hazardous to launch. Furthermore, even if war were to break out, it could not possibly provide a solution to the contradictions of our times. What remained of the world after an all-devastating nuclear war would be confronted with the same social contradictions (although in a modified form); for these contradictions have not arisen accidentally or been invented but merely reflect the present stage in the material and cultural development of mankind.

These reasons, with many others, have led to a decrease in international tension and a more definite trend toward peace. In other words, the idea of coexistence is becoming a reality even though such coexistence, imposed by the force of events, is still highly unstable and sterile.

Jugoslavia's foreign policy does not incline in the least to underrate the strength of the opposing tendencies or the danger of new upheavals inherent in the unstable equilibrium upon which coexistence at present rests. Nor is it unaware of the consequences which this might have both for world peace and for Jugoslavia's own position in international affairs and, more specifically, for her independence. This need not prevent us, however, from assessing correctly the importance of the positive elements in the situation or of doing all in our power to help these elements come to the fore. I am not saying, therefore, that solutions based on the principles of peaceful and active coexist-

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ence are to be found overnight. I do say that the material forces influencing this development in this direction are powerful enough to make a policy supporting them realistic and to warrant the hope that it will yield the desired results.

This is the appraisal on which Jugoslavia's foreign policy is based. It is not prone to illusions, but neither is it inclined to underrate all the new elements which have recently appeared in the sphere of international relations, ranging from the general modification of the balance of world forces to favorable developments in Soviet foreign policy. It is precisely in view of these new elements that we are led to consider the policy of coexistence to be not only right but also realistic and most in keeping with the basic interests of our people.

Jugoslavia's desire for an independent position outside the system of bloc alignments is a reflection of her active endeavor to contribute to a further decrease in world tension and to strengthening of the idea of active coexistence. Her foreign policy does not flow, as is frequently but quite wrongly thought abroad, from neutralism and still less from a narrow nationalism. It has been dictated and is rendered possible by her specific position in the present-day world, and this is a consequence, in turn, of the particular features of her own evolution.

This explains the strength, the necessity and the permanence of Jugoslavia's foreign policy, even though foreign observers sometimes fail to understand this, preferring to speculate about subjective moods and opinions rather than to analyze the objective material and political forces which shape a country's foreign policy. It is not a question of believing or disbelieving this or that pronouncement on foreign policy but of believing or disbelieving the reality of certain basic political elements resulting from specific material and political national interests.

This is the starting point of Jugoslavia's policy towards the United States. Under existing world conditions, relations between a great nation and a small one, with very different levels of economic development and dissimilar social systems and rôles in international affairs, are obviously very complicated. This has become apparent from time to time in the case of the United States and Jugoslavia. Their relations have undoubtedly been developing favorably in recent years and very significant results have been achieved, owing to no small extent to the traditional feelings of friendship binding the two

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countries; but from time to time, one must admit, there have been trials and a certain lack of mutual understanding, due mainly, probably, to occasional misapprehensions regarding the material and political basis of the relationship. As I have already pointed out, idle speculation by either side about subjective moods can never provide a satisfactory answer but instead is liable to create confusion. The normal long-range development of friendly relations between two countries requires above all a realistic evaluation of the nature and scope of their interests since it is these that govern.

I do not wish in any way to deny or belittle the rôle of moral factors in international relations in general or the importance of the traditional friendship between Jugoslavia and the United States. In recent decades considerations of this order have gained more weight in world affairs than used to be the case. Nor do I wish to underestimate the historical significance of the obligation which all nations have assumed through the United Nations Charter to work together in friendship to strengthen peace and international security.

We all know, however, that the extent to which relations between countries are solid and enduring depends primarily upon their mutual material and political interests and on their willingness and ability to adjust, in certain fields at least, their general international interests. What these interests are, of course, depends in the final analysis on the economic, political and social evolution of each country and its place in the world. A correct and realistic appraisal of how far they can be adjusted should provide the starting point for coöperation between two countries. Relations on such a basis are realistic, equal and provide for constructive coöperation; otherwise they may easily give rise to illusions or run counter to the principle of equality, either of which would have an adverse effect on the relations themselves.

This is a general principle of international relations, and it is especially valid in the relations of two countries as different in strength, structure and social system as the United States and Jugoslavia. This is why we Jugoslavs, convinced as we are of the absolute necessity of active and friendly coöperation with the United States, have endeavored to the best of our ability to make it close and comprehensive on the realistic basis of our mutual interests, especially that of safeguarding world peace.

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There is no doubt that a healthy realism of this kind, which should not be confused with lack of principle or opportunism, is, under existing conditions, the best possible ambassador between our two countries.

These considerations should be taken into account in the relations between a Great Power and a small country, quite apart from differences in their social and political systems. It is in the nature of things that a Great Power should view its coöperation with a smaller one primarily from the viewpoint of the world political system which it leads. It is no less natural for a smaller country to be somewhat wary of this because of the possible danger to its equality and independence. This applies particularly to present-day Jugoslavia whose specific forms of internal development would be impossible in the absence of complete independence. The peoples of Jugoslavia cannot accept any form of international relations or international coöperation in which they would cease to be *subjects* of world politics and become *objects,* or which might deprive them in any degree of the equality and freedom of international action which their legitimate interests demand and which correspond to their views on international security. Thus Jugoslav-American relations cannot be based on the prospect of Jugoslavia joining the Western bloc. Her attitude on this matter has always been plain, straightforward and sincere. The recent trend of international events has given added confirmation to the realism of her attitude.

Nor should our approach to the relations of our two countries be narrowly ideological, because this would preclude the possibility of correctly assessing the objective factors which, regardless of differences of social systems, make friendly coöperation both possible and desirable. In other words, the relations between our two countries cannot rest on any hope of a return to the old pattern of things in Jugoslavia. Jugoslavia must be accepted just as she is today, with all the changes and strivings of which I have spoken. The peoples of Jugoslavia, through an arduous struggle to emerge from their semi-colonial past and backwardness, are creating new economic conditions for themselves by establishing new social relationships corresponding to their needs. They are proud of their achievements in that direction and intend to persevere in the attempt to build a better life.

These efforts, these trends, these strivings are what shape Jugoslavia's foreign policy. To underrate this fact could result

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only in a failure to comprehend the mainsprings and rôle of Jugoslav foreign policy in strengthening the country's independence and promoting active coexistence in international relations. With reference specifically to coöperation between the United States and Jugoslavia, any tendency of the sort would necessarily be extremely harmful.

All this applies, of course, to Jugoslav evaluations of the main features of United States policy towards our country. Our public opinion occasionally entertains some misconceptions on this score, ranging from fears to illusions. I may be forgiven, however, if I have drawn attention here mainly to occasional failures on the part of American public opinion to understand our foreign policy and, more especially, of the manner in which our domestic policies are reflected in it.

I have endeavored to indicate Jugoslavia's vital interests by making a brief analysis of the main trends and features of her evolution. I feel that an analysis of this sort provides a better basis for assessing a country's foreign policy than any amount of diplomatic pronouncements. Even a cursory analysis clearly shows that friendship with the United States is an essential element of Jugoslavia's foreign policy, not only in the coöperative aim to strengthen peace but also in the interest of safeguarding our independence and equality. Jugoslavia will therefore strive to maintain such relations with the United States regardless of whether she receives American aid or not. Such assistance has been of great help to the Jugoslav people and they value it highly; it has never been, however, nor will it ever be, the main consideration governing our country's relations with the United States. These have deeper roots than that, in the mutual interest of the two peoples in world peace and security and, on our side, in our concern to safeguard our independence. Good relations with the United States are therefore a permanent element of our foreign policy.

Nor has anything been changed in this respect by the marked improvement in our relations with the Soviet Union, despite implications to the contrary in certain recent superficial comments on Jugoslav foreign policy. Quite the reverse, the fact that our relations with the Soviet Union have improved so greatly and have become stable and friendly is further evidence that Jugoslavia has followed a correct line in her foreign policy and that it is a success. I may add that one of the reasons why

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we welcome this improvement is that as consistent champions of peace and active coexistence between East and West, and as a Socialist country, we favor cultural and trade exchanges.

Is it in the American interest to cultivate friendly relations with an independent Jugoslavia, a country which pursues a policy of non-alignment and which supports all forces and trends working towards peace and active coexistence among nations irrespective of their social systems? We are profoundly convinced that the answer is yes, that such coöperation is genuinely in the interest of the American people because only by being what she is and pursuing the policy which she does pursue can Jugoslavia contribute to stability and security in Europe and to world peace in general. It is therefore a disservice both to general international security and to the basic interests of the two peoples to view Jugoslav foreign policy, as some in the United States are inclined to do, in terms of bloc alignments; this can only harm friendly coöperation between our two countries, which has already shown itself to be absolutely necessary in their mutual interest.

The fact that American-Jugoslav relations have so far been developing along sound realistic lines is precisely why they have achieved such significant results. In our opinion the same realistic attitude provides a solid basis for future good relations. Whatever difficulties may from time to time have occurred were a consequence of a departure by one side or the other from the realistic approach as determined by the scope of the common interests of the two countries and by their common views on the problems of world peace and security. We must maintain this same approach in the future and thereby avoid misunderstanding, distrust or apprehension. Under such conditions alone can our relations be stable and enduring and continue to benefit, as hitherto, not only our two countries but world security in general.

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NORTH OF THE KHYBER

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

THE reason the Soviet Union feels confident of attaining its ultimate objectives in Afghanistan is indicated by Sir Isaac Newton's formula: the attraction of one body for another is in proportion to their mass and in inverse proportion to the square of the distance between them. The great landmass of the Soviet Union, frustratingly landlocked along all its southern borders, has a common frontier with Afghanistan 1,458 miles long; the United States, the competing magnet for Afghan friendship, lies on the other side of the world. There can be little doubt as to which pull is, by the laws of nature, stronger.

But the laws of nature can be qualified by human factors, in this case the foresight and calculated self-restraint of the Afghan leaders. Whether these come into play adequately and in time will depend largely on the methods used by the Soviets in pushing toward their ultimate goal. Thus our problem is not so much to identify the goal, which by our reckoning is plain, as to guess how Moscow is planning to attain it. For not only will this determine the attitude of the Afghan leaders toward the Communist and free worlds in the period while they still retain some freedom of choice; it will, in addition, carry tremendous weight with neighboring countries now hesitating whether to be neutral in fact or "neutral on the side of the Soviets."

Does the urgent Soviet interest in Afghanistan demonstrated by Khrushchev's and Bulganin's visit to Kabul last December and their grant of a credit of $100,000,000 portend an attempt to take over the country outright, rapidly and perhaps by force? Or is it the first stage in a more subtle plan to build up Afghanistan as a model showcase where the Soviet Union can exhibit its new propaganda wares? The temptation to do the first must be strong, since Afghanistan is militarily weak and isolated from Western centers of power. Afghanistan could then be used as a base to threaten India and Pakistan directly and blackmail them into "benevolent neutrality" or even partnership in a strong Soviet forward movement throughout the Middle East and Southeast Asia. But the showcase demonstration would be more in key with the present over-all Soviet strategy. Already many people in Asia, taking appearances for the fact, are speaking of the "New

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Russia." Afghanistan offers Stalin's successors a magnificent opportunity to demonstrate what "New Russia's" growing industrial power enables her to do in an unselfish spirit for her underdeveloped neighbors, ostensibly asking nothing in return for her economic and financial help but admiration and comradely friendship.

As of today, the Afghan Government undoubtedly would resist Soviet aggression with all its strength and would appeal for help to the United Nations, which might or might not find a way to help. But how it would halt an insidious process of infiltration which never at any given moment was plainly aggressive is another matter. Prime Minister Prince Mohammed Daud, a first cousin of the King, is a resolute man, and at present he has the whole apparatus of government in his hands. The extent of his power is perhaps his weakness. He is confident of being able to turn outside forces to his own purposes as completely as he handles the country's internal forces. He said to me recently in Kabul that he is quite impartial as between nations which might give his country economic help provided they did not try to attach strings to it. To a question whether the character, record and purposes of those nations should not enter into his appraisal, he replied: "That is not the point. What is essential is the Afghan determination not to be dominated. We are not afraid of anybody." It is a courageous position, but would the experience of, say, Czechoslovakia indicate that it is justified?

The tendency to self-deception is strong when the prizes offered are rich and the risks involved in accepting them are to be faced tomorrow, not today. Afghan statesmen are unwilling to admit concern over the extent to which their backward country with an annual budget of only something like $25,000,000 has become indebted to a powerful neighbor. But the big Soviet credit of last December was remarkable not simply because of Afghanistan's meagre capacities for repayment even on the generous terms offered (the credit is to run 30 years, interest is at 2 percent, the capital sum is to be repaid in 22 annual installments commencing 8 years hence). This was one of the largest Soviet credits so far to any country and it amounted to something like a quarter of all Soviet advances abroad (China excluded) as of that date. There had been Soviet loans and credits to Afghanistan before, and some help from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, but these had been comparatively small change. Including them

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all, Afghan indebtedness to the Soviet bloc is now $121,800,000 (compound interest not included). Repayment is to be in goods, but the drain on Afghan resources will nevertheless be heavy. To this must be added at least an equal charge against the budget, over a period of years, to cover internal construction costs and maintenance—transportation, labor, domestic materials, etc. Thus the eventual cost of Soviet aid to the Afghan Government will be something like $240,000,000. There is also the Afghan indebtedness to the West to be considered. Loans from the Export-Import Bank for a vast development scheme in the Helmand Valley amount to $39,500,000; and a projected small grant and loan from the United States for aviation would, if made, raise the indebtedness to the West close to $50,000,000 (again not counting interest). This sum should also be doubled to cover internal costs.

Thus the total indebtedness and domestic costs which the Afghan Government must eventually meet by payments in goods or in money will be something like $340,000,000, plus interest on the capital sums involved. This seems a staggering sum for a country with a present budget of about $25,000,000. Nor is there much flexibility in that budget; tax returns are more or less fixed by the low standard of living, and customs revenues will not be augmented by the increased trade with Russia since materials brought in under the Soviet credit will of course be exempt from duty. I have been told that the Afghan Government carries loans on the credit side of its ledger. It will take more than a device of this sort to enable it to survive the squeeze which its chief creditor will be able to impose at a chosen moment. And Moscow could avoid foreign criticism for exerting undue pressure by simply offering to assume costs of maintaining expanded facilities which the Afghan Government had found itself quite unable to support.

More is involved, of course, than the prospective interference of a creditor in the financial affairs of a weak debtor. If the United States sent engineers, technical experts and administrative advisers halfway around the world to help the Afghan Government, no conceivable harm could be done to Afghan independence or security; even if the United States wished, it could never "take Afghanistan over" by that or any other means. But if Moscow sends in a flock of Soviet experts containing the usual proportion of propagandists, spies and saboteurs, the result for Afghanistan could be fatal. Actually, in the past six months the

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number of Soviet technicians has increased from about 100 to about 500; and it must grow as plans for spending the Soviet credit are put into practice.[1] This was the sort of menace that Jugoslavia confronted in 1948; Tito's revolt against Moscow came just in the nick of time. Would Afghanistan be able to react with equal success after Soviet infiltration had gone so far?

With such benefits in view the Soviets can hardly fail to choose the second of the courses open to them in Afghanistan. They will establish a Communist showcase for the edification of neighboring Asian peoples. They will infiltrate agents in the guise of technicians into widely scattered development schemes throughout the country and in the guise of advisers into government departments. And they will be ready to move in on the mortgagee, in the nicest way possible, when his undertakings plainly exceed his capacities. The policy harmonizes with the current emphasis on peaceful coexistence; it has the further advantage of being hard for Western nations to criticize and oppose effectively. Nor is anything of immediate military importance being sacrificed. The outright acquisition of Afghanistan would not in fact improve the Soviet operational position markedly. Soviet planes already are capable of penetrating to the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea from bases on Soviet territory. To establish forward bases on Afghan territory would involve shipping in great reserves of oil and providing storage facilities; if some of them were located south of the towering Hindu Kush the undertaking would be formidable. Why make the effort when Soviet air power is already in a position to dominate at will India, Pakistan and their neighbors? The realities of the military situation are recognized in India, as can be read between the lines of Prime Minister Nehru's speeches. But intimidation is not the card which the Soviet leaders are playing at present. They hold it in reserve, meanwhile seeking to convince the uncommitted countries that if they will coöperate with Moscow their independence will not be infringed. They carry this message to the masses, and, as Khrushchev and Bulganin demonstrated, with great effect. For their aim is not simply to keep governments from throwing their weight onto the side of the free world on specific issues; their

[1] Tentative allocations have been made for the following purposes: roads and bridges, $30,000,000; education, $5,000,000; health, $8,000,000; police, $12,000,000; industrial equipment and technical services, $25,000,000; arms, $15,000,000; miscellaneous, $5,000,000.

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pacifist propaganda aims to build up such popular pressures in the countries concerned that governments will be permanently incapacitated from ever reverting to independent courses of action.

II

The Soviet leaders are playing the opening moves of their game in Afghanistan intelligently and quietly, profiting by the mistakes or lack of interest of competing nations and the complacency of the ruling circles in Kabul. But we are watching only the opening gambit; various obstacles may impede the achievement of all that the Soviet strategists hope. The first obstacle is the traditional suspicion that Afghans feel for everyone and everything coming from the wild plains beyond the Oxus, the invasion route of the destroying hosts of Jenghiz Khan, Tamerlane and successive conquerors. The second is the resistance of the Moslems to all external influences as such but more especially to those of a country where mosques have been destroyed and centers of Moslem instruction closed. A third is the considerable if vague goodwill felt for the United States.

The fear of Russia is general but does not easily find voice against the official policy of coöperation. Recently, too, it has been diminished by the eye-catching conveniences being supplied in Kabul with Russian aid—a grain elevator and bakery and a gasoline-storage tank surmounted with gleaming colored lights on a hillside above the city, besides, of course, the much-advertised paved streets which now ring unaccustomedly under the hoofs of the *tonga* ponies. As a final gesture of friendship at the end of his visit, Khrushchev announced, without warning, the gift of a 100-bed hospital to Kabul (to the confusion, incidentally, of medical authorities who were anti-Communist but greatly in need of new hospital facilities). In spite of everything, suspicion of Russia persists. One can hardly speak of a national sentiment in a country of numerous tribes speaking different languages, only 3 percent of them literate, many of them nomad, divided by mountains and deserts and with the ruling tribes, the Pushtuns, a minority in the country as a whole (though the largest single element). There are no political parties, there is no free press and Parliament is a cipher. Under these conditions no one represents a national viewpoint except the King and his cousins who control the government. Nevertheless, there are individuals

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and groups that are reputed not to be content with the present policy of playing the Soviet Union and the United States off against each other. These include several of the elder members of the royal family who remember Russia's traditional territorial ambitions and her disregard of treaty agreements in the not-so-distant past, as for instance the guarantee of the independence of Bokhara and Khiva in the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1921. They may feel that in tying itself so closely to Moscow the present government is abandoning the foreign policy practised effectively by great Afghans like Abdur Rahman and Nadir Shah, who never took more from one side than could be balanced from the other. Others who may be restless include the chiefs of certain tribes outside the dominant Pushtun group; some army officers, represented perhaps by the former Minister of Defense, dismissed last year (some say) because he acknowledged more direct allegiance to the King than to the Prime Minister; and a rather small but still not unimportant group of intellectuals who have studied or visited in Western Europe or the United States. None of these critics seems to be influential today but they might become so in a different situation.

Afghanistan being solidly Moslem, the attitude of the clerical authorities towards the contest between Communist and Western influences can be particularly important. Islam, from Morocco to Central Asia, is in a revolutionary ferment. Many influential Ulema are reported to be far in advance, both theologically and socially, of traditional Moslem usage. A considerable number are said to favor a gradual process of secularization and the modernization of the *shariah,* the sacred law, in accord with the wide latitude for evolution authorized (they claim) in the Koran. The " liberal" tendency—reformist yet nationalist—is marked in Egypt, where the famous university of Al Azhar has survived for a thousand years by adapting itself to changing conditions, as also in Iran and Iraq; and it is not absent in Afghanistan. It has wide support among the younger generation, including especially the growing number of young women who hate polygamy and want to be free of the veil.

On its face, a movement toward religious and social reform would seem to favor the West, but this is not necessarily the case. American statesmen have tended to assume that Islam is conservative and therefore an effective barrier to the spread of Communism. Their statements in that vein have had the effect of

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identifying our policy with reaction and thus turning at least a part of the modernizing leadership of Islam instinctively towards Russia, not out of any liking for Communism but because the present Soviet strategy is to support similar tendencies among Soviet Moslems and encourage them to offer coöperation to progressive Moslem leaders abroad. We seem to be in danger of being left eventually with the most old-fashioned and dogmatic local mullahs as our allies.

It will be asked why Moslem leaders in the Near and Middle East are not more swayed by accounts of the ill-treatment given their co-religionists in the Soviet Union. The answer seems to be that the accounts are only partly believed, but more that the closing of mosques and Moslem centers of instruction took place some time back and that today the stress is on freedom of religion instead of the old anti-religious slogans. The news bulletin of the Soviet Embassy in Kabul recently printed the statement that in Tashkent 30 large mosques are now open and being used freely, besides many neighborhood mosques. Doubtless this represents the same decrease in Moslem facilities as occurred in Orthodox places of worship in Moscow, where instead of the 500 or more churches existing before the Revolution there are today only about 50. Nevertheless, the Soviet authorities pretend that the Moslem faith is now adequately served in the Soviet Union and are able to make many Moslems abroad believe it. One of their devices is to select carefully which mosques and institutions shall be closed and which shall be allowed to remain open. By continuing those administered by "liberals," that is, reformists who emphasize the evolutionary aspect of Mohammedanism and advocate secularization, they profit doubly. They make sure that the future Moslem leadership in Soviet Central Asia is to be as much in tune with the social concepts of the régime as possible; and by cultivating contacts between their progressives at home and similar elements abroad they create a new Moslem community transcending national boundaries.[2]

This policy is likely to pay off for the Soviets this summer when King Saud, custodian of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, comes to Kabul on a protracted visit. His retinue as usual will be very numerous. Among them will be Moslem leaders

[2] The Chinese Communists are attempting the same manœuvre in connection with current celebrations of the 2,500th anniversary of the death of Buddha. Modifying their previous anti-religious attitude, they emphasize that in Buddhism they are united with other Asian peoples.

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who have already made contact with representatives of the true faith in the Soviet Union, Chinese Turkestan and other Communist-controlled areas where there is a vast reservoir of potential pilgrims to the Holy Places (the Soviet Union and Communist China are estimated to contain between them something over 50,000,000 Moslems). It will be a golden opportunity for the Soviets to strengthen collaboration with Moslem progressives abroad and, as a *douceur* to Ibn Saud, to arrange for the intensification of the pilgrim traffic which is so lucrative for his country.

In this situation one is rather at a loss to estimate how the Moslem character of Afghanistan will affect Moscow's ability to achieve its aims there. At present it is surely an obstacle, but we should not assume that this will continue to be the case automatically and indefinitely in Afghanistan or any Moslem country.

III

If a reservoir of goodwill toward America does indeed persist in Afghanistan it is in spite of the fact that the country is engaged in a bitter territorial dispute with Pakistan and that Pakistan is receiving military aid from the United States. The best one can do in discussing this situation with Afghans is to say that few Americans have ever heard of the "Pushtunistan question," the crux of the Afghan-Pakistan controversy, and that it never occurred even to those few that there might be an important connection between it and the plan to build up Pakistan's military strength against the Soviet Union. Indians have the same difficulty in understanding that when we decided to help Pakistan we did not have the Kashmir question in the front of our minds. In fact, in both countries there is a tendency to imply that the United States actually created the "Pushtunistan question" and the "Kashmir question."

What is meant, of course, is that without intending it we have strengthened Pakistan's hand in dealing with both questions, which in fact existed long before our military aid became a factor. It may be admitted that to the extent that Washington failed to take adequate account of possible side-effects of building up Pakistan's strength against the Soviet Union, the Afghans and Indians have a justified grievance. It is never comforting to be told that one was simply forgotten. There seem to have been serious enough miscalculations in the State Department; but apparently the most influential consideration was the Pentagon's in-

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sistent disregard of political factors in its pursuit of assumed military advantages. Explanations of this sort are not of much help to Secretary Dulles when he visits New Delhi or to members of our Embassy in Kabul when they try to explain that we are entirely neutral in the Pushtunistan dispute. Moreover, even when Indians or Afghans can be convinced that we decided to help Pakistan with Soviet aggression solely in view, they will not admit that our action was sound. As Foreign Minister Prince Naim asked me pointedly in Kabul, did I think that by arming the Pakistan army we would enable it to stand up against a Soviet attack? If not, what advantages were there in the undertaking to offset the disadvantages of upsetting the military balance in the area? In New Delhi, Prime Minister Nehru revealed similar apprehensions about the increased risk of conflict between Pakistan and India and Pakistan and Afghanistan. One may ask in return, as I did, whether even if the danger from Pakistan is real it is as great as that from the north. But one gets no agreement. Kashmir and Pushtunistan are too close, too immediate. To the criticism that the Baghdad Pact is a political liability to the West and a dubious military asset I had no sure answer.

Just what is the Pushtunistan question which so excites Afghan feelings that in March 1955 a mob attacked the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul and Pakistan in retaliation imposed a blockade on Afghanistan, cutting completely that country's usual trade routes with the outside world for five months and creating a situation very close to war?

The following are a few—but they can be only a few—of the relevant facts. There are Pushtun (or Pathan) tribes on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border (some four millions to the north, some five to the south). Those to the south inhabit what were in British times the North West Frontier Province and the so-called Tribal Territory, the latter never completely subdued or organized. The Afghan Government opposes the Pakistan program for consolidating the tribes south of the border into the present unified Pakistan state and demands that instead they be given independence or autonomy. For good measure it adds Baluchistan down to the seacoast, though that area is not inhabited by Pushtuns. To justify intervening in what would seem Pakistan's domestic affairs it argues that several million of the tribesmen are nomad, migrating in spring and autumn between the mountains and plains without regard for any political fron-

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tier. Indeed, when the tribes are on the move the mountain passes are dense with their camels and donkeys, bearing their children, fowl and household gear, while their black tents stud the hillsides along the way; and none of them carries a passport. Finally, the Afghan Government claims that when the present frontier was drawn in 1893 the Afghan Government of that day accepted it only under British pressure; and it says that it has lapsed with the departure of the British.

Pakistan replies that as one of the successor states to British India it has inherited its rights. It asserts that it will organize its territories in any way it sees fit. It says that Afghanistan's attempt to organize "free governments" among the tribes south of the border is a hostile act. And it points out that the "Durand Line" (named after the chief British negotiator in 1893), far from being temporary, was accepted subsequently by Afghanistan—in 1921, when the Anglo-Afghan Treaty recognized it as the boundary, and again in 1930, when Nadir Shah, father of the present King, exchanged letters with the Government of India reaffirming the validity of that treaty. The dispute has many additional aspects both historical and legal,[3] but they need not be amplified here beyond saying as to the former that certain parts of the tribal areas now in Pakistan were in earlier times under the rule of Kabul, and that even before the British withdrawal Afghanistan had been asking, though without obtaining satisfaction, for some special status for them; and as to the latter that most international law authorities would feel that Pakistan's claim to be the legal successor to British rights is justified. As of the present moment, neither government completely controls even the tribes on its own side of the frontier.

In the circumstances there is no need for an outside government like ours to accept the contention of either side fully. Our interest is merely to see whether there do not exist some common interests which might be invoked to draw the two countries together despite their present violent antipathies.

This has in fact been the general policy of the United States, though one senses that it was not pushed with much imagination or vigor until after the recent changes in our diplomatic representation in Kabul. President Mirza of Pakistan is sched-

[3] For a brief description of the circumstances in which a referendum was held in the area in 1947, see "Afghanistan, Independent and Encircled," by Donald N. Wilber, *Foreign Affairs*, April 1953.

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uled to visit King Zahir soon and perhaps they may then discover grounds for conciliating the present rivalry between their two countries, though recently their representatives have been talking both publicly and privately in a very obdurate way. The only promising approach for a friend of both parties would be to offer help in minimizing some of the physical results of the present stalemate. Pakistan's blockade of Afghan trade has ended, but a slowdown in the movement of goods between Afghanistan and the sea at Karachi continues and can hardly be anything but deliberate. As a result, the Afghans have begun routing as much of their foreign trade as possible through Soviet Russia. The Russians have of course hastened to make this change-over as workable and economical as possible in the hope that it will become permanent. For instance, you can now travel by air from Kabul to Berlin by the Soviet *Aeroflot* for about $170 while the tourist fare from Karachi to Frankfurt by one of the Western airlines is exactly twice as much. The Soviets have also been speeding up through rail connections from Europe to the Afghan border and are constructing new facilities for unloading freight at ports on the Oxus River. The trip thence by road over the Hindu Kush to Kabul and other centers in the south is long and over incredibly bad roads, very hard on machinery and similar heavy goods. However, the sea route via Karachi is, under present conditions, still worse. There are interminable delays in unloading and securing clearance in Karachi, then a rail journey to Peshawar, where new delays are encountered, and finally transport by road over the Khyber Pass; and while freight waits on docks or sidings machinery rusts and more fragile goods rot, so that often the value of a shipment is cut by half. In such circumstances, the most useful service the United States could undertake would be to work out a modus vivendi under which the two antagonists could exist side by side with less friction even though there had been no settlement of their central dispute.

Elements in such a modus vivendi might be the creation of a free port for Afghan commerce at Karachi, an increase in rolling stock on the Karachi-Peshawar railroad, an extension of the present Khyber Pass rail spur directly into Afghan territory and an improvement in trucking facilities from that point forward throughout Afghanistan. In all these undertakings the United States might help financially. Neither side would be asked to abandon its position in the tribal controversy but would tacitly

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sidestep it as being impossible of solution now except by war, which, presumably, neither cares to face. The United States is in a position to press a modus vivendi. It is supplying Pakistan with military supplies which the Pakistan authorities would not like to see delayed. Prince Daud, on his side, always expresses himself as anxious to demonstrate that he holds and will maintain a middle position between Soviet Russia and the West; he knows that this is a sine qua non for final American approval of certain forms of assistance recently under consideration in Washington.

One such proposal is that we might help Afghanistan develop a network of internal aviation services, utilizing some of the airfields which are to be constructed by means of the Soviet loan, and also to provide four-engine planes to establish an Afghan international air service hooking up Kandahar, the best Afghan airport, with, say, Beirut and Jiddah on the west and Bombay to the south. There is also need for a fresh survey of the vast Helmand Valley reclamation and resettlement project, the carrying costs of which now eat up something like a third of the Afghan Government's annual income. This project was financed by loans from the Export-Import Bank and is being carried forward in the face of formidable difficulties by Morrison-Knudsen, a private American engineering concern. The Afghan Government seems not to have appreciated the magnitude of the task when it requested the loan and invited in Morrison-Knudsen; and it was too inexperienced to foresee the social readjustments which would become necessary as the work progressed. The Bank seems also to have looked at the undertaking in too narrow terms. The United States Government is not directly involved but American prestige certainly is, not only in Afghanistan but all through Asia. The time has come when the project must be restudied in all respects, including not merely the physical problems connected with the creation of new arable land, power resources, flood controls and so forth but also the long-term social impact on Afghan life as a whole. The United States should offer to help arrange for an authoritative and comprehensive survey as well as to provide a part of necessary refinancing. The Afghan Government would be right in thinking that such help would be more likely to be forthcoming if its present conflict with Pakistan were in a less acute stage.

Any effort to bring the two countries together in even a limited way will of course encounter strenuous Soviet opposition.

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Bulganin showed the Soviet hand by announcing in Kabul: "We think Afghanistan's demands to give the population of bordering 'Pushtunistan' an opportunity of freely expressing their will is justified." The Soviets will try to stiffen the Afghan position by making competitive offers of help and perhaps concealed threats. The American answer to the competitive offers should be, I think, that we do not oppose assistance to backward countries from any source, the Soviet Union included, provided it does not abridge the receiving country's freedom of political action or saddle it with a mortgage which, realistically considered, it can never repay.

As to Soviet threats (if any are made), we should say only that if they are resisted, as the present Afghan leadership insists they would be, we shall, as a member of the United Nations, be actively on the side of the menaced country against the aggressor. When Secretary Dulles visited New Delhi just after the SEATO conference in Karachi he made a statement at a press conference which circulated throughout India and went far to offset the disagreeable impression created there by references to the Kashmir and Pushtunistan questions in the final SEATO communiqué. He assured the Indian Government and people that although we want to improve Pakistan's military defenses against possible Soviet aggression, this does not mean we would support Pakistan right or wrong. If ever Pakistan used its new strength to threaten or attack India, he said, "under the principles of the United Nations Charter, the United States would be supporting India." In March the Afghan Government formally protested to the SEATO Powers against interfering in its dispute with Pakistan, and has circulated copies of the protest to all United Nations members; but it has not asked the United Nations to take any action, indicating that it does not wish to force the Pushtunistan issue to a crisis. If it really fears a Pakistan attack it might perhaps ask for a reassurance from the United States similar to that given by Secretary Dulles to India.

IV

The visitor to the underdeveloped countries of the Near East and Asia must return home with the sad conviction that the good intentions of our foreign aid program and the large sums of money we have spent on it have not brought us the hoped-for results. At best, the relation of grand almoner and beneficiary is

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difficult and ungrateful. One is liable to be damned if one does help and damned if one doesn't. An example occurred after the recent overturn of a pro-Western régime in Ceylon. Washington hastened to announce that this would not prevent us from carrying through a projected grant of $5,000,000 in economic aid to that country. A leading Indian newspaper thereupon printed a cartoon showing the new Ceylonese Prime Minister being garlanded by Secretary Dulles, with a noose half-concealed in the flowers. One can imagine what savage comments there would have been if, on the contrary, the United States had withdrawn its offer of modest economic assistance because a less-friendly régime had come to power. That would have been taken as proof positive that we are willing to help only subservient régimes, in the expectation that they will make us some unpatriotic return.

We should clarify and unify our program for foreign economic aid (how often writers have repeated that plea in recent years!), and our policy in Afghanistan, the particular subject of these remarks, should accord with the established principles.

A first rule should be not to give aid in excess of the recipient's capacity to absorb it to advantage. The saturation point should be figured not on the basis of our prospective aid alone but of the total foreign aid received or promised from all sources. In deciding what is the safe limit we should not look only at the financial ledger but take account also of the recipient's degree of industrial, social and educational development; for example, we should calculate whether there are going to be sufficient foreign experts available not only to administer the program but to train local replacements and whether local educational and social factors will cripple them in the latter task. We should not compete openly with the Soviet Union or anyone else for the privilege of giving economic aid. We should offer it for specific purposes, within our capacity to give and the beneficiary's capacity to receive.

With these two qualifications in mind we should set the most generous terms possible. When they have been set and an offer made we should not modify the terms in order to outbid an offer from another source. Instead, we should say to the prospective beneficiary: "If you find the financial terms of another offer better, by all means accept it. We are not anxious to give away money except for legitimate needs of general benefit that cannot be otherwise supplied. We hope you will keep in mind other fac-

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tors besides the purely material ones involved; for instance, do look carefully whether there are not differences between the assumed aims of the United States and the other government. We hope you will not put yourselves at the mercy of some government which will later take advantage of its position as mortgagee to squeeze you politically or militarily. We hope you will not make it impossible for other countries to continue trading with you. But it is you who will suffer most directly if this happens, and we shall not attempt to dissuade you from what might be a perilous course by other than intellectual arguments." We should add that acceptance of economic aid from some other country will not of itself lessen our friendship and our desire to be helpful, nor, up to the saturation point, our willingness to continue extending aid for additional purposes. But when the saturation point has been reached, or when the terms on which assistance from some other country has been accepted make it difficult or impossible for us to continue giving help and to see that it is used economically and effectively, then no assumed political, propaganda or strategic advantages should persuade us to continue according aid. The advantages would be quickly found to be illusory, whether in the country concerned or in the world at large. What is interpreted as undignified competition with the Soviet Union for the privilege of giving Egypt the means to build the Aswan High Dam set people throughout the whole Middle East figuring, between chuckles, how to play us off to similar advantage. Our self-imposed limits on aid should not apply, perhaps, to continuing small sums to follow through a program already established or to perform relatively small services. But, with such exceptions, the general principles should rule; and the sooner they are formulated and advertised to the world the better.

Incidentally, if we stuck to our refusal to enter into direct competitive bids the underdeveloped countries might discover fairly soon that the Soviet Union is not really quite as anxious to take over a major share of the burden of helping them as Soviet propaganda pretends. In addition, Soviet motives in extending aid might be scrutinized anew. Egyptians were chagrined recently to discover the cotton which they had bartered for arms with the Czechs turning up on the Brussels market at less than world prices. A further side-advantage of Soviet participation in foreign aid programs is that the Soviet reputation for being a wise coun-

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sellor and helper, now widespread in Asia, might take some hard knocks. A dispatch from Rangoon printed in *The New York Times* of May 9 described how endless bags of cement from the Soviet Union were piling up on Rangoon docks, not only choking off the unloading of needed consumer goods but threatening to turn into solid blocks in the coming monsoon rains. The Russians seem to have sent the cement along without bothering to suggest to an unwary Burmese purchasing mission that structural steel and other building materials would be needed in order to put it to use. Since this unfortunate experience with bartering their surplus rice in Russia the inexperienced Burmese are less sure of their need for further Soviet collaboration in developing their economy. We cannot help taking a certain malicious pleasure in stories of this sort which duplicate talk about our own mismanagement, often all too accurate, in extending help in unfamiliar environments far from home.

V

What would adoption of the general foreign aid policy outlined above imply specifically in Afghanistan? There seems to be some difference of opinion inside our government as to how important it is to us that Afghanistan shall not drift into the Soviet orbit. Some military men hold that landlocked and remote countries are just so much "real estate" and that we should spend little effort and no money to help them preserve their independence. This is not because we do not favor their independence, they hasten to say, or would ever infringe it ourselves, but simply that we must not allow ourselves to be diverted by sentimental considerations or old-fashioned strategic concepts from getting ready to carry out really vital tasks in critical strategic areas. They assume that a new world war would not be fought in or near Afghanistan and that physical barriers like the Hindu Kush and the Himalayas are hardly of even secondary importance in the new air and atomic age. The argument is that as our capacities for giving do have a limit, we must spend everything available on deterring aggression in the principal theatres of war and on getting ready to defeat it there if necessary.

In rebuttal, others point out that military problems cannot be considered apart from political problems; that in the over-all world picture the stability and independence of countries like India and Pakistan are factors of incalculable strategic impor-

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tance; and that if these see the United States turn its back on Afghanistan without an attempt to help her India will tend more and more to try to ride what will seem to her to be the wave of the future and Pakistan will try belatedly to save herself by dropping out of the Baghdad Pact and coming to the best possible terms with the invincible Soviet power.

The latter argument is probably more strongly supported in Washington today than at any time in the recent past. It would seem to indicate the right position for us to take, realistically and morally as well, but only in the conditions and up to the point already indicated. The conditions are that the Afghans, who sincerely want to protect themselves from domination from any quarter, shall be as intelligent and farsighted in their steps to avoid danger as they would be courageous in meeting it in a moment of crisis. As to the point beyond which we could not go, it is the saturation point when Soviet help would have become so massive, so absorbing, that Moscow had succeeded in making it impossible for Afghanistan to wiggle out of its net. Already that point is dangerously near. How long will the Soviets allow us to continue aid that detracts from their aid or trade that competes with their trade? That is Prince Daud's approaching dilemma. When Afghanistan is paying in kind all that she is able to pay as interest on the Soviet credit—in caracul skins (the chief market for which is now New York) and in cotton and wool—what will be left to carry on trade with us or any other country outside the Soviet group? Will she not be bound to the Communist world as tightly as the Danubian states were bound to the Nazi world by Germany's monopoly of their trade?

The omens, then, are not propitious. But the Afghans are a tough and resilient lot and it is possible that even the subtle program on which the Soviet Union seems to be embarked for disarming them economically and financially will fail. Nothing that we can do can guarantee that result. But we can encourage the Afghan leaders to feel that they are not alone; we can continue our aid in moderate amounts, giving them time to get their bearings; we can perhaps be of service to them politically; and we can warn against further steps which will end almost automatically in delivering their country into foreign hands even if, seeing that result as imminent, they belatedly revolt against it.

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THE CHALLENGE TO INDIAN NATIONALISM

By Selig S. Harrison

TO Jawaharlal Nehru, India's present danger is within. Wherever he has gone across his vast country since Independence, whatever his immediate pronouncement on the affairs of India or the world, Nehru has appealed above all for national unity. "Integrate," he warns, "or perish." He sees it as his historic mission to overcome an endemic challenge to Indian nationalism—a challenge as elemental as the Hindu-Moslem schism which ended in partition and separate statehood for Pakistan less than a decade ago. This is the centrifugal force created by ten major languages, each entrenched in its own historic territory, numbering speakers in the tens of millions and wedded to differing time-honored scripts. How grave a challenge this is to a central authority restrained by parliamentary processes grows clearer year by year as the unity achieved in opposition to the British ruler slips away.

Nehru's leadership focuses more and more plainly on a single overriding objective: to assert a dominant centralizing power before the claims of regional self-interest can gather momentum. In size and resources, the ten regional components of the Indian Union can properly be compared to the sovereign nations of Europe. While of no mind to demand sovereign status, they cross swords in a sharpening political and economic competition which, unchecked, can only undermine India's strength and influence.

In the independence movement, Gandhi and Nehru gave full scope to these ten separate patriotisms within the Congress Party to arouse the spirit of each against the common foe. The British had looked primarily to administrative convenience in drawing the map of India, permitting the accidents of conquest to decide most provincial boundaries. Disregarding the multilingual political babels that resulted, the Congress set up its own provincial units on language lines, pamphleteered to the masses in their languages and promised repeatedly to redraw the map of India when the British were gone. In doing this Gandhi and Nehru deferred to their regional lieutenants, who contended that multilingual units aggravate friction between Indians and that therefore linguistic autonomy is a prerequisite of Indian unity.

Once in power, however, Nehru tried to postpone linguistic

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redistribution. Reflecting his own second thoughts, the Linguistic Provinces Commission appointed by India's Constituent Assembly in 1948 warned that its inquiry

> has in some ways been an eye-opener for us. The work of 60 years of the Indian National Congress was standing before us, face to face with centuries-old India of narrow loyalties, petty jealousies and ignorant prejudices engaged in a mortal conflict, and we were simply horrified to see how thin was the ice upon which we were skating. Some of the ablest men in the country came before us and confidently and emphatically stated that language in this country stood for and represented culture, race, history, individuality, and finally a sub-nation.

Nehru, now the head of an unwieldy, economically retarded state, well realized the heavy strain imposed by regional loyalties on his ambitious development plans. He was able to play for time until late 1952. Then a respected Gandhian disciple in the Telugu-speaking region of southern India fasted to death to win a separate Andhra state. Nehru fitfully yielded to the Telugu hysteria evoked by this martyrdom. The formation of Andhra set off a chain reaction of regional demands which culminated in the appointment of a States Reorganization Commission in 1954. The Commission reported late last year, proposing a new map of India based in general on language boundaries.

Despite concessions to all regions in the report, there were sure to be outbursts of regional fury against proposed inter-regional compromises. For example, when the Commission denied the demand of the Marathi-speaking peoples on the west coast for a separate state, with Bombay City as capital, Marathi protests grew so intense that the Nehru government finally reversed the Commission's stand. Nehru granted a Marathi state, but because he still rejected the claim to Bombay City the Marathis were not satisfied. Out of this impasse resulted the Bombay riots in January.

The furor of the moment over the adjustments attempted in the report will in the long run prove less significant than the fact that the projected reorganization does so clearly accept the linguistic demarcation of political boundaries. The disturbances which followed the report have stirred the national Congress leadership, belatedly, to declare war on the linguistic principle; but the issue cannot be settled overnight. The contest between the central power and the forces of regionalism will long remain the bedrock issue in India.

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Asian nationalism, which would appear to work clearly on the side of Indian unity, actually cancels itself out as a factor in this contest. For the separate regional patriotisms within India represent just as authentic expressions of nationalist spirit as the broader pan-Indian ideal. Independence offered the opportunity for each region to assert its own interests in the name of the golden age that each can summon forth from the millennia of Indian history.

II

The chief propulsion behind this mounting regional clamor is the new vitality of the ten regional languages which since Independence have been displacing English as the media of education and public life in India. While most of these languages have not yet been adapted to the transmission of Western scientific concepts, they have been in use for centuries as highly developed vehicles of indigenous literatures. Today, as the languages of farm and factory, of inherited folklore and a rapidly growing modern pulp culture, they are the inevitable vehicles of the mass literacy which the Indian Government is fostering.

The Indian Constitution provides that the most widespread of these languages, the north Indian Hindi language, will become the official Union language in 1965. Until then, while the Government seeks to spread Hindi, both English and Hindi will enjoy official status under the Constitution. In practice the English that all educated Indians learned during British rule remains the de facto official language in New Delhi. It is the language of national political leadership, alike in the high command of Nehru's Congress Party and the Indian Communist Politburo.

At the same time, the government program to promote instruction in Hindi is meeting keen resistance outside Hindi territory. The decision to designate Hindi as the official language is still being widely challenged in testimony before a government commission now studying language policy. No enforcement sanctions, constitutional or otherwise, back that decision up. The Constitution clearly labels education a prerogative of the states. The central government thus has been able to employ only the power of persuasion in seeking to establish uniform educational policies, although its ability to make financial grants may strengthen this power. With the Education Ministry exercising ineffective influence in regional educational councils, the regional

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universities are free for the present to go their separate linguistic ways. As a result, all ten languages, not Hindi alone, are emerging as alternatives to English.

While the aggressive tone of Hindi chauvinists has to some extent forced a tactical retreat to English on the part of educational administrators in non-Hindi regions, English, as a non-Indian language, is not likely to remain the medium of instruction once the present generation of Western-educated leaders dies out. Even now the new generation of intellectuals is quick to defend its own vested interest in the regional languages. In addition, the regional language press is on the verge of great expansion, and the Soviet Union, hoping to exploit this significant development, is offering technical assistance in one of its least expensive but potentially most influential forms. It is providing linotype machines adapted to Indian scripts.

Present trends, then, point to a rapid decline in the extent and standards of English instruction, to the teaching of most non-scientific university courses through the regional languages, and to the emergence of a generation of provincial bureaucrats and politicians literally unable to talk meaningfully to one another on a national stage.

III

In the balance of power between language regions in India, Hindi does not enjoy a strong enough position to make a reversal of the regional tide at all likely. Even at the friendly statistical hands of the Indian Government, which listed 149,844,311 Hindi speakers in its 1951 census by lumping Hindi together with Urdu and Punjabi, this total Hindi bloc constitutes at the most 46 percent of the total speakers of the ten major Indian languages. Opponents of Hindi dominance, charging that the Government juggled its figures in favor of Hindi, stress script and other differences between Hindi and its variants. If one takes the anti-Hindi argument into account only partially, the Hindi total dwindles to slightly over 100,000,000 or 31 percent of the total population. Nehru has set the Hindi bloc at 120,000,000 or 37 percent. In the multilingual Soviet Union, by contrast, Great Russian overwhelms the other languages—totalling 58.4 percent. Furthermore, unlike the numerous non-Russian regions of the Soviet Union, which with the notable exception of the Ukraine are individually small next to Great Russia, many of the non-

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Hindi regions of India have significant strength:[1]

Hindi	150,000,000	Gujarati	16,000,000
Telugu	33,000,000	Kannada	14,000,000
Marathi	27,000,000	Malayalam	13,000,000
Tamil	26,000,000	Oriya	13,000,000
Bengali	25,000,000	Assamese	5,000,000

Hindi cannot compare in literary development to at least three of these languages, Bengali, Tamil and Marathi. Yet geography and politics make the Hindi-speaking Ganges plain the heartland of India. Reflecting the tension between Hindi and its rivals, K. M. Pannikar has recently stepped forward as a champion of the non-Hindi regions. As a member of the States Reorganization Commission, the former Indian Ambassador to Peking and Cairo formally dissented from the decision to maintain the sprawling Hindi state of Uttar Pradesh as a single unit. Pannikar attacked the "dominance of Uttar Pradesh in all-India matters." In a pointed reference to its power in the Congress Party he said that "modern governments are controlled to a greater or lesser extent by party machines, within which the voting power of a numerically strong group goes a very long way." Under a party constitutional provision basing provincial representation on population, Uttar Pradesh sends 52 delegates to the All-India Congress Committee, while Pannikar's Malayalam-speaking region sends eight.

In only one of the non-Hindi regions, Tamilnad in the far south, does a significant political movement seek to arouse mass demand for outright secession from the Union. This is the movement for a sovereign republic of Dravidasthan. Initially a social protest of the Tamil masses against the power of the Brahmins

[1] *Census of India,* 1951, Paper No. 1, Languages, All-India Tables (New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1954), p. 6–7.

The Indian Constitution designates 14 languages as official languages for administrative and educational purposes. The four omitted in the list of ten major regional languages are Urdu, Punjabi, Kashmiri and Sanskrit. Champions of Urdu and Punjabi, the vehicles of Indian Moslem and Sikh culture respectively, wage political battles against Hindu power under a linguistic banner. However, neither language constitutes an undisputed majority in a homogeneous language region. As rock-bottom figures for these languages, Punjabi can be set at 6,200,000, the 1951 census figure for the Sikhs, who write Punjabi in their own Gurmukhi script; and Urdu can be set at 35,400,000, the census figure for Moslems, most of whom use Urdu script rather than the Hindi Devanagri script. A complicating factor is the widespread use of both Punjabi and Urdu by Hindus, which has led to claims of 20,000,000 for Punjabi and 50,000,000 for Urdu. Hindustani, the language of everyday speech in cities throughout north central India, draws on both Hindi and Urdu. There are varying degrees of mutual intelligibility between speakers of Hindi, Urdu, Punjabi and the two groupings of dialects at the eastern and western extremes of the Hindi region—Bihari and Rajasthani respectively.

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at the top of the caste hierarchy, the Dravidasthan movement now proclaims that only political independence can free Tamilnad from north Indian cultural and economic imperialism. Hindi is its symbol of cultural oppression, the south's limited industry

is the evidence of northern neglect, and the Tamil Brahmin is considered a fifth columnist racially kindred to the Aryan north. Tamilnad does not differ qualitatively in its regional awareness from Maharashtra, where hegemony over much of India under the emperor Shivaji ended only three centuries ago, or Bengal, where India's most strident regional literature flourishes. But a

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special edge sharpens Tamil parochialism. New Delhi seems remote to this most distant outpost of the central power. India's most fundamental linguistic dividing line separates the north Indian Sanskritic family from the southern Dravidian languages, of which Tamil is one. The entire Tamil ethos is rooted in uniquely self-contained development, outside the mainstream of Indian history. On top of these factors, the advocates of Dravidasthan exploit the deep race complex of the ebony Tamilians. All fairer-skinned India is charged with color persecution.

From the standpoint of the central government, the saving grace in the Dravidasthan demand is the linguistic diversity within the south which makes a pan-Dravidian union against the north unlikely. Although Dravidasthan partisans hold up a Dravidian federation as their ultimate goal, their own propaganda lacks conviction on this point. For their movement gains its real momentum solely within Tamil borders, and there chiefly within the alliance of aggrieved Tamil castes. In each southern region, the caste structure is regionally self-contained. These separate language-caste patterns have produced a series of distinctive political settings.

IV

The caste structure in India divides into a series of regional caste structures, all threaded loosely together within the all-embracing hierarchy of Hindu society. By and large, the linguistic boundary is the caste boundary; caste is essentially a regional affair. The caste affiliation limits inter-dining and inter-marriage to a native linguistic regional group. Take as an example the Nadar caste, whose members tap the coconut palm tree to make the country liquor known as toddy. The Tamil-speaking Nadars, a bulwark of the Dravidasthan movement, exist within the Tamil caste structure. At the same time, the Nadars fit also within a pan-Indian category, spanning all regions, in the larger structure of Hinduism. The fourfold caste pyramid throughout India—in which most regional castes have a niche—begins with the Brahmin at the top, descends to the warrior or ruler, then the merchant, and finally the laboring masses, leaving the untouchables beyond the pale. The Nadars fall in the laboring category, and so do toddy-tapping castes in other linguistic regions, but each is totally separate for all practical social and political purposes.

Although Indian nationalist literature emphasizes the unity

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of all Hindu society, linguistic regional stresses can clearly impose a great strain on this unity. It is because caste ties do not cross linguistic borders that Hinduism, for all its unifying power, is vulnerable to centrifugal forces within.

Certainly Indian nationalism gains great strength from the common identity of all Hindus in a non-Hindu world. The broad symbols in Hindu tradition encompass all India. When a Hindu performs his *sandhya* ritual at the time of his daily bath, he repeats a Sanskrit holy verse in which he imagines the waters of the Indus, Ganges and Cauvery rivers, respectively in the northwest, center and south of the subcontinent, mingling together in the waters of his small pot. To a great extent the content of regional literature draws on a common fund of Hindu culture, and folklore throughout India is often only a local variation of themes from the great *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata* epics. The fact that all Hindus have a place in a common social structure makes the local caste tie a crucial part of the larger Hindu loyalty. But at the same time the regional boundary of the operative caste unit suggests that, in terms of social forces competing for political and economic power, caste can be as divisive as it is unifying.

For this reason the linguistic demarcation of state boundaries in India intensifies conflict between castes. Their power relationship changes. The balance of power between castes in a multilingual political unit with its many caste groups differs radically from that in the smaller linguistic unit. This has already been apparent in Andhra, where two rival Telugu peasant proprietor castes, the Kammas and Reddis, have kept the state in political upheaval since its formation in 1953. Before the separation of Andhra from multilingual Madras State, the Kammas and Reddis were lost in the welter of castes. In Andhra they face each other as titans. Similarly, the formation of Maharashtra will heighten the political struggle between the major regional caste groups—the Marathi Brahmins, the Maratha peasant proprietors and the Mahar untouchables.

A distinguished Mahar son, former Law Minister B.R. Ambedkar, has long warned against Maratha subjugation of the Mahars in a linguistically-defined Maharashtra. Switzerland, Ambedkar told Parliament, has no difficulties as a multilingual state "because there linguism is not loaded with [caste] communalism. But in our country linguism is only another name for communalism."

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The linguistic boundary to caste solidifies interstate rivalries between regional caste cliques whose interests overlap. Most often it is the economic gain expected to follow the establishment of a beachhead in government that motivates these rivalries, especially at a time when widening economic opportunity in India coincides with an increasingly active government economic rôle. On one side stands the rising local caste with its would-be entrepreneurs. Ranged in opposition may be rivals from neighboring regions who happened to get a head start, or, more likely, the ubiquitous Marwari who dominates mercantile and industrial life throughout India. The Marwari merchant castes of Rajasthan exercise economic power in all regions—not only large-scale industrial power but the widely diffused power of small merchants who practise usury in villages and provincial towns. Beyond Rajasthan, the Marwari is an outsider everywhere, a ready target for regional propagandists who link him with the central government. The Marwari, for example, is the northern demon in Dravidasthan propaganda. This propaganda is financed by the Chettiar moneylenders and textile magnates of Tamilnad, rivals of the Marwaris. Thus the linguistic limit to caste reinforces the regional lines of economic competition in India.

V

Quick to exploit this inter-regional competition have been the Indian Communists, potentially dangerous but as yet deeply rooted only where they have become the political custodians of regional patriotism.[2] Communist propaganda from 1946 through 1953 depicted the Marwari as the major villain in India, the evil monopolist power behind the Nehru government, in league with Anglo-American finance to create a centralized Indian economic empire in Marwari hands. Hindi, the Communist argument ran, was the cultural instrument of the Marwaris to weaken regional solidarity.

The Indian Communists first turned to separatist tactics in 1942, using the Leninist-Stalinist principle of self-determination to justify support of the Moslem League demand for Pakistan. They amplified it as the imminent transfer of power from Britain sharpened regional consciousness, demanding in the 1946 election

[2] See a study by the author, "Caste and the Andhra Communists," scheduled to appear in *American Political Science Review,* July 1956. A forthcoming study to be published by the Modern India Project, University of California, Berkeley, will analyze at greater length the challenge presented to nationalism and Communism by regional forces throughout India.

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campaign that power go not to the provisional central government headed by Nehru but to 14 sovereign regional constituent assemblies, each empowered to decide whether or not to join the new Indian Union. Nehru, campaigning against the Communists in 1946, declared that he was "greatly surprised at the treacherous attitude of the Indian Communists, who want to create a dozen or perhaps more divisions of India."

After Independence, the separatist thrusts of the Indian Communists at the new Nehru government were the sorest point in early Indo-Soviet relations. Insurgent Communists organized parallel village governments in Telengana, the Telugu-speaking belt in southeast India. Soviet writings suggest that Soviet strategy proceeded from the belief that Indian unity would not survive. By late 1953, when Stalin's successors started to woo India with kindness, the avowed separatist policies of the Indian Communists required modification.

In this case it was relatively easy to reverse the Party line, for Communist manipulation of "national" differences is an unusually flexible weapon even by Communist standards. It can be used or repudiated, depending upon expediency, with equal support from the Leninist-Stalinist scriptures. While affirming the right of national self-determination to the point of secession, which supports local Communists in separatist programs, the Soviet literature on nationality specifies at the same time that it is only the proletariat, whose will is embodied in the Communist Party, which can decide whether it is in the interests of the nation to exercise this right on a given occasion.

In keeping with the new turn in Indo-Soviet relations, the Third Congress of the Indian Communist Party in December 1953 switched to a new policy "encouraging" the use of Hindi. This was the sole amendment to the Party program. Secretary Ajoy K. Ghosh spelled out the new line in the Party's monthly organ in May 1954, repudiating the "myth of a Marwari oppressor nation" which had been the cornerstone of Communist policy for seven years. However, in an intra-Party circular letter proposing program amendments for consideration at the 1956 Party Congress, the Central Committee still maintained that "the demands of the various nationalities of India for their free development are denied." Only last March, the Party monthly attacked "the reactionary Congress concept of India as one nation." This reluctance to give up separatism is understandable.

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The Communist record in India suggests that the Party can minimize regionalism only at the cost of its own strength.

Indian Communism is a loose federation of regional units, with the real power residing in non-Hindi regions which have a vested interest in manipulating the regionalist issue. In the delegate roster to the Third Party Congress, the Telugu belt has 23 percent of Party strength, the Malayalam belt 16 percent, and Bengal 11. Unlike the Soviet Communist Party, in which the dominant Soviet nationality is also the dominant bloc in the Party, the Hindi-speaking areas represent only 21 percent of Indian Communist strength. This is an outside figure, for it embraces the Communist delegations from all states that can by any criterion be considered within this region: Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, Punjab, Madhya Pradesh and Madhya Bharat.

An intra-Party report on the 1951 election underscored the effective use of regionalism by the Communist Parties in Andhra and in the Malayalam-speaking Kerala belt on the west coast. The report noted successes where "provincial units of the Party brought out their own manifestoes, where agitation was positive and such concrete factors as the *national* factor, the factor of unification of the nationality into linguistic provinces, were effectively utilized. . . ." For its failures in this regard, the national Party leadership rapped the knuckles of the Maharashtra Communists, who soon found an opportune moment to translate this official hint into action. In the 1956 Bombay riots, the Mahar factory hands, at once proletarians and Maharashtrians, were doubly ready to man the barricades against the Gujarati millowners. This was a moment of new Indo-Soviet amity, however, and from the standpoint of the national Communist leadership may well have been extremely inopportune for a total assault on the law and order of the Nehru government. While it is possible that the central Party leaders joined in the decision to make the most of the Bombay upheaval, it is more likely that they tried and failed to dull the edge of the local Communist rôle. Similar conflicts of interest between central and regional leaders, and between regional Communist Parties, are increasingly apparent in other controversies involving the reorganization of states.

Even the nominal restraint of the present Communist line on separatism can be changed whenever the dictates of Soviet foreign policy make this desirable. The last published reference to Indian Communist policy on the right of linguistic regions to

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secede from the Union qualified the right but did not deny it, declaring that "though for India, too, the principle of self-determination means and naturally includes the right of separation, it is inexpedient for Indian nationalities to exercise this right."[3] In a conversation in late 1953 with the Andhra Communist leader, Basava Punniah, a member of the Indian Communist Central Committee, the writer asked whether the day might come when an Indian region under Communist leadership might wish to exercise this right. He replied that

> The right of secession is brought into the picture only when connected with imperialism—otherwise it is a question of union. We don't rule out those situations, but we doubt that any Indian government any more will risk imperialist connections. Anyway, the central government is not sitting in the air. They would think very seriously before they would force us to that point. If they force a solution of their problems on the people, not by democracy but by the bayonet, then the people will decide for themselves. Why should we talk of secession now?

VI

The Nehru government, once "connected with imperialism" in the Soviet definition, now enjoys a respite from the full fury of Communist separatism. To win this respite must have been a primary motive in Indian foreign policy. For the central authority in India today must above all gain time, free from external pressures, to achieve national consolidation.

The Government hopes that an India outside the cold war will attract capital from both sides to bolster centrally-directed economic development—New Delhi's most potent weapon in the war against disunity. The Five-Year Plans assign their major outlays to economic integration, to the river valley projects, railroad lines, highways and communications networks that knit the regions together. New factories can mean new population mobility, migration between regions on a scale unknown in Indian history. Nehru has devoted unusual personal attention to the development of national scientific laboratories which place basic scientific research squarely in the hands of the central government. Technological progress flowing from nuclear research will be centrally directed, for India's embryo atomic energy program is a central monopoly. Indeed, the preponderance of the public sector in the mixed economy now emerging in India will give a

[3] E.M.S. Namboodripad, "Nationalities and the Right of Secession," *Crossroads* (former Indian Communist weekly), Sept. 6, 1953, p. 10.

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central bureaucracy decisive control over the industrialization that every region wants. To the extent that all regions can look to New Delhi for the wherewithal of progress, the financing and know-how that build dams, irrigation canals and industries, the Indian Union gains in strength. But the exercise of economic development power demands statesmanlike care. For to the extent that regions believe the national government discriminates in the allocation of capital, the Union is weakened.

Second only to economic development, Nehru's centralizing program emphasizes the civil service. The national leadership well realizes that a central bureaucracy that is truly national in its outlook can be a strategic instrument of Union power. At the same time, it sees in the new recruits increasing parochialism as a result of the new emphasis on regional languages. While English remains the medium at this writing, the recruitment examination will be taken by and large in the regional language if a Congress Party policy recommendation is carried out. Suggestions in 1955 that Hindi should be used exclusively raised thundering protest, even from nationalist leaders such as the former Home Minister, Chakravarti Rajagopalachari. The rising bureaucratic generation lacks the worldly perspective of the Indian civil servant under British administration. To instill this once again the States Reorganization Commission has proposed an intensive civil service training program to inculcate a pan-Indian perspective.

The Nehru government is resisting pressures which would draw the bureaucrat into a narrow provincial compartment. The Congress Party in Tamilnad, for example, was rebuffed in its recent behind-the-scenes struggle to win greater local control of recruitment to civil service posts in the state. As an example of measures under consideration to strengthen centralized control of the civil service, the States Reorganization Commission recommended that in any state at least half of all federal civil service posts should be filled by nonresidents. The Commission urged in addition that at least one-third of the judges in every state high court should be outsiders.

In response to linguistic separatism, Nehru has recently launched two important cultural programs to draw the regional languages into closer contact. The National Book Trust will subsidize the translation, publication and exchange of literature between regions, while the National Literary Academy prepares histories and anthologies of the regional literatures, underscoring

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cultural strands common to all. Nehru's secular emphasis does not permit him to use the Hindu pantheon as the symbol of cultural unity. In place of this, Nehru stresses India's "unity in diversity." That, says Nehru the historian, is the genius of Indian culture. Nehru and other Indian writers stress that despite all surface conflict between Hindu and Moslem, Tamil and Bengali, Indians in the long run have always reconciled their differences; Indian culture has taken as its own the best of all cultures that have crossed the land, and is the richer for it.

Nehru prescribes grim linguistic requirements in school to meet the needs of Indian unity. He not only urges Indian youth to learn English, but goes on to say that no Indian can henceforth be considered educated without command of at least four languages, first the regional language, then Hindi, English, and a second foreign language such as Russian or Chinese.

VII

Will India develop as a strong centrally-directed political whole, or will she, under the stresses of regionalism, become a congeries of loosely federated states?

The answer is inextricably linked, of course, with the shape that Indian leaders give to their political institutions in the coming decades. It is not clear, however, what kind of political institutions will assure what results. Under the present Indian Constitution, each state elects its own legislature. Since Independence, Nehru's Congress Party has maintained its power in all states, but in time a divergence could easily develop between a state party in power and the ruling national party. The central government will then have to decide whether firm action will relieve or aggravate the resulting crisis, and whether the firm action that may be needed is possible under the present Constitution. There are dangers both in bold action and in trusting to the ultimate good sense of regional leadership.

Impatience with the slow pace of economic progress, hampered as it is by regional bickering, pushes Indian leaders in the direction of a stronger and stronger central authority. For no matter how valiantly Indian nationalists press forward with integrating programs on all fronts, the central authority remains caught in a vicious circle in which national progress requires unity and unity demands rapid development.

To break through this vicious circle the central authority must

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gain a supremacy it cannot now claim. It can constitutionally seek this supremacy only through democratically-enacted legislation, such as the River Boards Bill and Water Disputes Bill now pending before Parliament. These would enhance central power to adjudicate interstate controversies and to prohibit the imposition of state fees for the use of waters of interstate rivers. But even with the passage of these mild bills—whether bills with more teeth can ever be passed is problematical—the central government would not have the last word in this realm. The same dilemma confronts Indian leadership in all spheres where state interests clash.

In his recent study of Indian administration, Dean Paul H. Appleby comments that the Indian Government "is given less basic resource in power than any other large and important nation."[4] He blames especially the absence of central machinery to oversee the use of funds turned over to the states for economic development. The Indian Government does not have its own field agencies comparable to those which exist in the United States. Thus the central government is restricted in its control over state participation in national development. Appleby warns that the extent of nationwide coördination evident since Independence has rested on "the uncertain and discontinuous power of prestige," a power which he implies may go with the passing of Nehru.

This central weakness is only relative to the strength of state resistance to incursions by the national government. It is not weakness in ultimate constitutional power. As democratic constitutions go, the Indian Constitution gives the central government strong powers. Under Article 352, the President holds emergency authority to take over any unit where national security is threatened by war, external aggression "or internal disturbance." The President has final power of review over state legislation if the governor of a state, whom he appoints, withholds legislation for presidential approval. In addition to these presidential powers, the upper house of Parliament can by a two-thirds vote assume prerogatives assigned to the states in the Constitution. All these residuary powers are constitutionally available to the center in time of showdown, but in practice governments do not like to admit the political bankruptcy that makes it necessary to resort to a final test of strength. Inexorably, representative leaders

[4] Paul H. Appleby, "Report on a Survey of Public Administration in India," Government of India, Cabinet Secretariat, New Delhi, 1954, p. 9.

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of Indian political thought appear to be coming to the common conviction that the exercise of supreme central power can no longer be the exception in time of emergency, but must become the everyday rule.

The "National Unity Platform" of S. K. Patil, leader of the Bombay Congress Party, demands a sweeping increase in central power. This view is widely shared, by business leaders, by the bureaucratic élite in the Indian Civil Service and by the military. The Indian Army's high standard of officer training, bending all to a common loyalty, leaves little sympathy for the regional outlook. Though they operate apart from these relatively Westernized elements, Hindu revivalists reinforce the nationalist position. M. S. Golwalkar, leader of the major group of Hindu extremists, charged that the recommendations of the States Reorganization Commission proved it had been "under pressure from various extraneous quarters, for this surely paves the way for the ultimate disintegration of the nation."[5]

Socialist leader Asoka Mehta has argued for "coalition politics" to avert outright dictatorship. In his concept, the democratic centrists should join together with the Congress until "national integration" permits a resumption of party politics. This turn in Socialist thinking came as the party proved increasingly unable to challenge Congress power. With no significant democratic opposition to the Congress now in sight, the developing political groupings in India follow regional leadership patterns. Mehta's plan grew out of the belief that all parties are so torn by regional pressures that the times demand a non-partisan nationalist front.

This approach is kindred to the political philosophy of Vinoba Bhave, the inheritor of the Gandhian mantle, who advocates an end to parties as a prelude to a "no-party" régime uniting all men of good will. With none of the long-range parliamentary aspirations implicit in the Socialist view, Bhave points to the Hindu political principle inherent in the institution of the village *panchayat,* or five-man council. Here there is no place for a majority victory over a minority. All must deliberate together until unanimity is possible. "God speaks in Five," according to Bhave's interpretation of Vedic tradition.

In the immediate political debate in India all these disparagers of faction take Nehru's over-all leadership for granted. Mean-

[5] *National Herald,* Lucknow, Dec. 14, 1955, p. 1.

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while, Nehru himself exhibits growing exasperation with the stresses and strains that slow Indian progress. In his present efforts to institute administrative zones embracing groups of language areas, he shows a new assertiveness. His state of mind is reflected in his warning that India will stay united "no matter what." Whatever régime follows Nehru will be confronted with even graver strains on Indian unity, and in consequence seems sure to be even more resolute in this attitude.

Inevitable as it may be in the present phase of national consolidation, an assertive central authority carries with it profound long-run dangers. It is doubtful that the Indian Union could survive a man on horseback, whose ties to one region would be certain to array rival regions against him in civil strife. A respected school of Indian nationalist thought maintains that, precisely because of its diversity, the Indian Union must take the form of a loose federation, giving full scope to local cultural integrity. This may be the wiser course, but it is doubtful that a loose federation will get a trial. The main drift is in the opposite direction, toward the centralization of power.

The resentment that follows every invasion of state prerogatives is sure to erupt in periodic crises. In this intermittent tug of war, the most tragic figure is the politician or bureaucrat whose base is in his home region but who possesses at the same time a cosmopolitan outlook. As a product of the nationalist era he knows well what he does when he takes the regional side. He does not exploit crises in order to undermine the Indian Union but to make the most of his best bargaining position. While he reassures himself that India will survive, in fact he saps the vitality of Indian nationalism when it most needs nourishment. Divided in his loyalties, he leans now to one side, now to the other.

The struggle shapes up as one of prolonged indecision. The regions may ultimately win, inflicting a slow, malignant fever on the Indian body politic. But it is more likely that a political formula will evolve by which national unity can be consolidated. The real question is: What will be the cost of this integration? In the moment of decision, will India's historic authoritarian traditions uproot democratic loyalties only recently imported? While representative institutions might survive the rise of a commanding central authority, the great danger is that sooner or later the center will discard the restraints of Parliament and Constitution in the name of nationalism.

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CALL TO ACTION IN THE NEAR EAST

By Charles Malik

THE situation in the Near East is once again fluid, awaiting creative decision. This statement is likely to be repeated again and again in the future; but the present situation certainly exemplifies it. The basic elements are all clear. With the relative easing of tensions in the Far East and elsewhere in the world, and with the relative heightening of tension in the Near East, the attention of the Western world, and especially of the United States, has lately focused on conditions in our area. American public and private opinion has had our situation actively before it for months. There seems to be an even greater desire to do something about it than there was in 1947 and 1948. The feeling is that things cannot be allowed to drift much longer. The stakes are too high for statesmen to resort only to fumbling and muddling. Nor is it fated that one must be helpless before this situation despite its incredible complexity. True, more factors (strategy, cold war, oil, Israel, emotions, religions, internal American politics, vital British interests, French tribulations, practically everybody) are involved in the Near Eastern crisis than perhaps anywhere else, but no multiplicity of factors need defy high statesmanship resolved to be firm in the right. And the right is the stability of the Near East on the basis of real justice, the prosperity of its peoples, and the bringing to bear the best possible intelligence and will upon its manifold problems. The right is so to love the peoples of the Near East and so to understand their difficulties as to make them know and choose their good; so to argue with them in all love and at all levels as to make them realize that with so many interests converging upon them from all sides, both in space and in time, they have special responsibilities not only to themselves but to the world.

In these pages I propose to be very concise, touching only on fundamental matters. In the light of the fundamental all else can be understood and adjusted. It is necessary also to abstract our attention from persons and to focus on objective political, social and spiritual conditions. In international politics—and the politics of the Near East are essentially international—long-range drifts and interests are paramount; persons and movements only express and illustrate these drifts. The statesmen, both in

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the East and in the West, cannot be hardheaded or realistic enough in dealing with our situation; and yet it is essential in a sensitive and central region like the Near East to make due allowance for the legitimate demands of freedom, truth, justice and peace. Policies and actions cannot be countenanced that clearly contravene these things. The possible can always be stretched to conform more and more with the ideal. In these reflections I do obeisance to the requirements of freedom, truth, justice and peace, in their deepest sense.

My discussion covers eight topics: the Communist penetration of the area; the Arab-Israeli conflict; the general Egyptian situation; inter-Arab relations; the rivalries among the Western Powers; the basic economic and social conditions; the wealth pouring into this region; and the abiding factors in the situation.

II

The Communist penetration of the Near East is very serious. Moscow probably has never in history had the direct or indirect influence it now enjoys in the Near East. Communist parties and front organizations are very important, but they are not the only avenues of influence. The manipulation of real or imagined grievances, of national needs, of deep-seated anti-Westernism, of religious fanaticism and of local rivalries offers great opportunities to intriguers. When the game is open it is much better to achieve your ends through those who are not identified with you or even those who persecute you. Also, Communism thrives best under persecution and therefore at times it deliberately invites it. Thus the fact that here or there the Communist Party is banned and Communists are put in prison proves little as to the degree of influence that Moscow actually wields.

The consummation of this penetration has occurred during the last 12 months, but the studied preparation for it has been going on for perhaps 30 years. Agents have been trained or primed or enlisted and placed in key positions—in trade unions, in the press, in government, in the community at large and perhaps even in Western capitals. Not a single word of criticism of the Communist world is allowed to find its way into the government-controlled press of some important Near Eastern countries, whereas defiant and exultant abuse of the West is the daily menu of the reader. The increase in recent years in the reading of Communist literature throughout the area has been phenom-

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enal both in itself and relatively to the increase in the reading of non-Communist French, English, American or other literature. Many Communist classics are now available in Arabic and the quantity and variety of Communist literature on display in bookstores is simply amazing. A book critical of Communism will hardly find a publisher and, if published, will hardly find a reader. In some countries certain sections of the press are liberally subsidized by international Communism.

It is sometimes very difficult to tell whether a man is a Communist or a nationalist: both men use exactly the same language and resort to exactly the same tactics. In some countries the general direction of policy is dominated by the Communists, and even the army falls under their influence. There is a persistent wooing of governments and public opinion by Communist trade missions, and the trade agreements signed with Communist countries have increased the volume of trade to an unprecedented degree. Communist industrial exhibits, invitations to visit the Communist countries, Communist musical and dancing troupes and other Communist cultural incursions have considerably multiplied in recent months. The clergy and laity of the Greek Orthodox Church have been the particular target of Communist cultivation: a Greek Orthodox Bishop is going to preside over the World Conference of the Partisans of Peace meeting in Peking this summer.

Three or four years ago you could criticize Communism in public; now the atmosphere has become distinctly uncongenial to that. Even one year ago to be "pro-Western," whatever the phrase may mean, was not a source of embarrassment or shame; today it is. Even in strictly private circles of very intimate friends, friends who themselves are Western-educated, who directly or indirectly owe everything to the West, and who one or two years ago would have felt a distinct source of pride and honor to be identified with the West, people are consciously restrained either in saying critical things about Communism or nice things about the West.

All of this constitutes a grand Western débâcle. The point is that it is all new. This Communist penetration is the most important phenomenon in the Near East at present, more important, in my opinion, than the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the interpretation or adjustment of every other situation, including the Arab-Israeli problem, should be made with this matter in view. To

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examine fully its profound causation will take us far afield, but among its general causes are the following: 1, the superb performance of the Communist Party, both international and local; 2, the moral rehabilitation that Communism has achieved since the Geneva Conference of last summer and as a result of the policy of coexistence and of the exchange of visits between the Communist and the non-Communist worlds; 3, the Communist success in the Bandung Conference and the sedulous exploitation by the Communists of this success; and 4, the absence of a profound Western ideology adequate to refute and replace Communism in the mind and heart of the Near East.

Among the special causes operative in the Near East are the following: *a,* Arab disaffection on account of Israel; *b,* siding by the Communists with the Arabs at the United Nations, through declarations made by Communist leaders and through agents in the Arab world, in matters related to Palestine and to North Africa, while the West seemed opposed to the Arabs; *c,* the Arab refugee camps serving as hotbeds of Communism; *d,* the recent dominating presence of the West in the Near East and the appearance of Communism by contrast as a liberator from that domination; *e,* the identification in some instances of the West with crumbling and despotic economic, social and political systems; *f,* the growth of social consciousness among the peoples of the Near East with nothing like an adequate program of reform correspondingly introduced to remedy the unjust and inhuman social and economic conditions that have prevailed since the beginning of time; *g,* lack of harmony among the Western Powers with regard to their policy in the Near East; *h,* the political and military rapprochement between some Arab countries and the Communist Powers; *i,* the fact that weak or degenerate or softened-up or pro-Communist governments developed in some lands while such development was not an historical necessity but took place almost by default; *j,* the absence of a sufficiently bold imaginative action on the part of the West and of responsible leaders and institutions in the area with respect to books, magazines, pamphlets, newspapers and the realm of ideas in general; *k,* the age-old spiritual plight of Greek Orthodoxy in the Near East, especially in its separation from Western Christianity; and *l,* the fact that certain elements in Islam admit of an interpretation that accords with Communism.

It is much harder now to meet this situation than it was two

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years ago or even one year ago. The ambiguities have multiplied frightfully. The above listing of the causes at work itself suggests a program of action. In particular, the West must soon develop an objectively just policy with respect to Palestine. So long as the injustice done the Arabs in Palestine continues, and so long as the Arabs feel that the West was responsible for this matter, they will continue turning to Communism for succor.

It is doubtful whether any policy of appeasement can in the long run succeed. Let the West, then, after making sure of an absolutely fair policy in Palestine, frankly, firmly and boldly make the friendship or at least the *real* neutrality of the Near Eastern countries (*e.g.* in the government-controlled press, in government declarations, in positive policy decisions) a condition for the friendship of the West towards them. This is a perfectly honorable position.

The political field is most important. The question is not so much what must the West do but what must the Near Eastern countries themselves do. Is there a sufficient backbone to resist Communism? This is the real question. If the people of the Near East elect to go Communist, nothing can stop them. The situation therefore cannot much improve until strong, clean, positive, courageous, farsighted governments dedicated to the principles of freedom and human welfare and entirely clear in their minds as to where their real interests lie have arisen and made themselves felt. The conception of authority and the social and economic structures of society in the Near East are such that history has always been the handmaid of governments and armies.

III

It is not difficult to show that neither Israel nor the Arabs can gain anything today by war. One must assume therefore that both parties have come or will come to this conclusion, whether by themselves or as others frankly explain the matter to them. The political and military realities, not only in the Near East, but throughout the world (and by now everybody knows that the whole world bears on this problem), are such that whichever side may be tempted to start a war can objectively calculate in advance the enormous odds against it. In the absence of a fundamental rational will to war (and one cannot argue on the basis of unreason; one can only guard against it), every incident can

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be controlled or patched up. That there is no will to war appears to be the general conclusion of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his report to the Security Council of May 10, 1956. One must further assume that the necessary international precautions have been or are in process of being taken should war break out on a large scale, precautions that appear to be relatively easy to take.

When people talk of "peace" between Israel and the Arabs they usually assimilate the problem to other international conflicts. France and Germany fought each other, and then they concluded "peace;" so did the United States and Spain; so did North and South Korea (though in this instance it is so far only an armistice); why, then, is the same pattern not possible in Palestine? This mode of thinking overlooks the fact that by every standard the situation in Palestine is *sui generis*. To mention only three radical differences: In some of the other international conflicts there was a victor who could impose peace on the vanquished; there is no such overpowering victor in the present instance. In most cases there was an underlying unity of culture or race or religion, so that the conflict had in a profound sense the character of a family quarrel; there is no such underlying unity in the present instance. In the other cases war broke out between already existing states; in this instance the Arabs view Israel as a creation by force of a state that displaced them from their own land. It follows that the categories of thought applicable to other "wars" are not applicable here.

It begins to appear, then, that the present outlook is one of no war and no peace. This is exactly how strange the situation is. But allowing that normal political, social and economic intercourse between Israel and the Arab world is not now possible, does it follow that nothing whatsoever can be done about the situation? Nothing of the sort follows. What first follows is that people must be realistic, calm and unsentimental in face of this utterly strange, utterly unique situation, and that, from the point of view of world peace and even of some hope for the Near Eastern situation itself, no war is already a very great gain.

Looking more positively beyond all this, however, it appears to me: *a*, that the Arab refugee situation can be eased up partly through Western Galilee, partly through some acceptable plan for the development of the Jordan Valley waters, partly through some agreed arrangement for the resettlement of the remaining

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refugees in Arab lands; *b,* that regardless of the coolness of some quarters to this matter, regardless of the apparent impossibility of Israel entertaining the cession of Western Galilee, and regardless of the obvious difficulty connected with the ultimate political disposition of Western Galilee should Israel agree to ceding it, Western Galilee is a clearly indicated key to the solution of the problem of Arab refugees, especially if, having regard to the United Nations resolutions of 1947 and 1948, some juridical basis in international law and not just in sheer force is to be discovered for this whole tangled problem; *c,* that the question of connecting Egypt with the other Arab countries by land through the Negeb is not insoluble; *d,* that the problem of compensation for property or money seized or lost or relinquished is not insoluble; *e,* that a return to some form of the United Nations scheme for the internationalization of Jerusalem should be pressed; *f,* that the problem of armaments race and armaments balance, including the problem of the supply of arms from Communist countries, should not be beyond the resourcefulness of Western diplomacy and action; and *g,* that the recent reseizing by the United Nations of the Palestine question, with the vigorous activity displayed by the Secretary-General, may lead to further precise definition of difficulties and therefore to a more active search for their solution.

In his speech at the B'nai B'rith Convention on May 8, 1956, Secretary Dulles said: "There was a belief [among the NATO Powers meeting the week before in Paris] that reliance should, above all, be placed in the processes of the United Nations, and that we can, perhaps, do so now with somewhat greater confidence, since the Soviet Union seems at least to be increasingly aware of the dangerous consequences of reckless action and has indicated that it, too, would be prepared to support a solution through the United Nations. . . . Past efforts toward a settlement of the substantive issues in the Middle East have encountered serious obstacles. The task is immensely complex and I have no illusion that solutions will be easily come by. But if progress is difficult it is also necessary, and we intend to make that progress."

Mr. Dulles has in mind the Soviet statement on the Middle East of April 17, 1956, and the Soviet support at the Security Council of the United States resolution dispatching the Secretary-General to the Near East. Both of these Soviet moves reg-

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ister the firm presence of the Soviet Union in the Near East; and the remission by the Western Powers of the Palestine question to the councils of the United Nations together with their silence on the Three-Power declaration of 1950 both signify their acceptance, at least for the time being, of this presence. The next phase appears to be a trial by the Great Powers among themselves of the new Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence in its bearing upon the Near East. In the interest of world peace the situation in the Near East can be composed by agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council. This agreement could include adjustment of their respective interests in the Near East, including concessions to the Soviet Union in matters of strategy and even of oil. This ought to bring home to all concerned the obvious fact that the Near East is not in another planet nor even at the South Pole (even there the Powers are present and in conflict) but at the heart of the world, and that since everything bears upon it, its questions are functions not only of its own peoples but also of the interests of the Great Powers. This is a sobering thought both to the wise and to the childish.

Israel is a great mystery. You are not dealing with political issues only: there are profound theological dimensions to the mystery. But whatever the aspect under which the situation is viewed, the Near East can never be the same again after the rise of Israel. The present political reaction is only the first spontaneous, and to that extent superficial, reaction to this new and strange fact. In the maturation of their reaction, when they wake up sufficiently to what has really happened and when they take in its total meaning, the Arabs will in their wonder reach down to far deeper levels of their existence. They will undergo a profound transformation. It is most important that the world, including Israel and world Jewry, should base their relations to the Arabs on manifest principles of justice and truth. Force and arbitrary decision introduce a vicious circle with no end. But objective truth and justice can still the emotions and help in establishing peace.

IV

The economic and social problems of Egypt require the undivided attention of Egypt for at least a generation, and even then they will not be met without a scientific and technological

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revolution in Egypt. The question is whether, having regard to the demographic factor and the available natural resources, the average Egyptian standard of living can conceivably rise to that of France or Italy, not to mention the United States. This question could have been, and was in fact, practically overlooked in former ages when the masses were asleep; in this socialistic age it assumes primary political importance. No one who does not have the profoundest insight into this crucial problem can understand the present and probable future developments of Egypt; and no one who does not have some answer to it can really help Egypt.

Now an adequate revolution in science and technology is not something that can be simply wished or easily bought; it requires intimate association with the living sources of science and technology. There are only three such living sources: the Soviet Union, Western Europe and North America. Egypt, to be able to face her fundamental issues, must (and this applies in varying degrees to all underdeveloped countries) associate herself with one or a proper combination of these three sources. So long as the cold war in any form continues, Egypt cannot associate herself equally with all three. Essentially, therefore, neutralism is impossible for Egypt; at best it is fraught with the greatest dangers.

The Egyptian problem, therefore, from the point of view of Egypt's relations to the outside world, is twofold: *a,* whether a happy association, on the basis of sincere friendship and understanding and on terms of strict and honorable equality, can be worked out between Egypt and the Atlantic Community, or whether Egypt is fated ultimately to associate herself with the Communist world; and *b,* the sort of relations that will develop between Egypt and the other Near Eastern countries, including Israel and Turkey, as a result of either alternative.

But an association to be equal presupposes that the associates are in fact equal precisely in that for which they have come together. If one associate remains behind the other in that which brought them together, then he will continue to be dependent upon his partner. It is science and technology that brings Egypt and some living source of science and technology together; therefore it is necessary for Egypt to catch up in these fields. But science and technology can never be mechanically grafted from the outside: they can take and grow only in cultures that *are*

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scientific; they are in fact the inner free creation of cultures that are already fundamentally determined and oriented in a certain way. But this requires a totally different spirit from what obtains among the peoples of the Near East. Not until there is a radical distinction in the mind between truth and error, fact and fancy, reason and imagination, reality and dreams, knowledge and poetry, achievement and wish, the common good and the individual good, the universal and the particular, and not until this distinction embodies itself not only in the attitude of the people to nature, life, society, history and other people, but in vigorous, free intellectual institutions in communion with the cumulative tradition of science, can a culture "become" scientific and therefore help in the advancement of science. For Egypt and for every country in the Near East this means profound transformations of the mind and spirit.

By reason of her splendid location and her cultural riches, Egypt occupies a dominant position in the Arab world. Nothing therefore is more important than how she conceives and develops her rôle among her Arab neighbors. Is this rôle going to be primarily political? If it is, what is the degree of real independence that Egypt's Arab partners can enjoy? On reflection, and when one considers responsibly every factor, it can be shown that the most fruitful and stable association among the Arab states must have regard to the diversity of their interests and even of their destiny. They complement one another, and therefore they should be and feel free and equal among themselves. Within this equality, the "unity of the Nile Valley" is an ultimate fact that must sooner or later express itself in appropriate political terms.

But Egypt's rôle cannot be only political; it cannot move only among the categories of rule and dominion and Arab unity. Egypt has always been a fecund source of ideas and attitudes. And this is the most important problem. What is the fundamental bent of the will and mind that is going to emerge from Egypt? Responsible statesmen and thinkers cannot ponder this question too deeply. Let everyone therefore who really loves Egypt stress on every occasion and before all and sundry the supreme importance, not only of the political categories of glory and power and unity, not only of raising the standard of living of the masses, but of real freedom of thought and conscience, of light, of truth and of joy.

Egypt is faced with four ultimate challenges: the challenge of

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the masses, the challenge of finding her real position in the Arab world, the illusion of neutralism and the reality of freedom. If she rises to these challenges in accordance with the truth, Egypt has a glorious future.

V

The division between the Nile and the Euphrates-Tigris valleys must be reckoned as one of the permanent geopolitical facts of this region. This division can be modulated, but it cannot be overcome. Another division is between the Hashemites and the Saudis, and unless Saudi Arabia feels itself firmly secure, it must ally itself with Egypt.

There is a fundamental phenomenon in Near Eastern life today, and that is the extent to which the oil riches of this area can affect not only international but also inter-Arab relations. As a result, we have hardly ever seen the corruption of character that now prevails. Gold and money in the hands of frightened or insecure or ambitious or unprincipled people are terrible things. Friends and allies can be bought and sold. It is nonsense to be indifferent in the face of ultimate things affecting the destiny of peoples and cultures and the relations between the West and the Near East.

Syria is the ally of Egypt but Jordan and Lebanon are standing relatively aloof. The possibilities of development in Iraq and Syria are immense. If suitable and stable relations are evolved between the northern Arab countries they can promote a high standard of living and they can add considerably to the stability of the area. This problem is ripe for consideration. Difficulties among the Arabs, between the Arabs and Israel, and between the Arabs and the West, stand in the way of a closer association among the northern Arab countries; but these difficulties can all be looked into and overcome. Three principles should in the end decide the matter: what is natural, what is good for the peace and security of the area and what is good for the cause of freedom, light and truth.

Lebanon should remain open to the East and to the West so that both worlds could feel at home in it. The wonderful intellectual and spiritual liberties of Lebanon should not be sacrificed no matter in what name and for what cause. These liberties are a boon to everybody. Eastern and Western statesmanship can combine to work out adequate guarantees for Lebanon as an

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authentic home of freedom—freedom of enterprise, freedom of thought, freedom of conscience, freedom of being and freedom of becoming.

VI

I believe a resolute common policy and united front by the Western Powers, whereby they adjust their interests to one another with no infringement upon the rights and interests of the peoples of the Near East, can master, if not altogether solve, every problem in the Near East, despite the alarming Communist penetration. This is a challenge to their perspicacity in the present total world situation. Community of policy does not mean forming a bloc against the countries of the Near East; it does not mean agreeing at our expense; it means uniting in a firm and enlightened policy of justice and friendship towards the peoples of the area. What is needed is solid agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom and France on the precise lines of policy that would give effect to Mr. Dulles's statement on May 8, 1956: "Also we want friendly political, cultural and economic relations with all the the nations of the area on a basis of impartiality." Rising above narrow interests and taking every delicate matter into account, the realm of freedom ought to be able to develop a finely-modulated plan that is objectively defensible and that does not offend.

If Western civilization is not internally resilient enough to effect a working accommodation among its diverse interests in the Near East on the basis of freedom and justice, then Marx was right in predicting that the West will fall under the weight of its own internal contradictions. But since it is a matter not only of blind interests (as Marx believed), but of reason and conscious will, the West could rise both to master its diverse interests and to invalidate Marx. The blind fatalism of Marx can be easily overcome by the conscious design of reason. But people must rise above themselves and the Atlantic Community must really feel and act as one.

A common effective Western policy requires not only agreement by the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain and the Premier of France and their Foreign Secretaries (always on the basis of justice and respect for the peoples concerned), but strict coördination on the lowest operative level in the field. One at times gains the impression either

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that there is not enough discipline on this level with respect to the higher authorities, or that there is no real unity of vision at the top, or that it is part of this unity of vision that the operative agents shall appear to be working at cross purposes. This last alternative is farfetched and only the perplexed and wondering mind thinks of it. Whatever the cause and whatever the mode of its operation, the Western Powers do not seem to see eye to eye with one another nor to be able to cover up their differences, if not before the public, at least before those who know. The result has been a scandalous weakening of Western prestige. The political and intellectual retreat of the West from the Near East is in no small measure due to inexcusable rivalries among the Western Powers themselves.

One might see in this phenomenon only a transient stage of adjustment among the Western Powers with respect to their relative presence in the Near East. According to this view we are witnessing one grand historical movement whereby America is gradually displacing Europe in the Near East, with the inevitable frictions, pains and temporary vacua that attend such a process. But there are a few basic truths that must be kept in mind. It is true the presence of the United States is being increasingly felt in the Near East: there is no comparison between the American entanglement in the Near East today and the state of affairs 20 or even 10 years ago. Israel, Turkey, the Arabian oil fields, the general military and economic interests of the Atlantic Community, all of these and many others profoundly commit America in this area. But, first, France is a great Mediterranean Power and has had intimate relations with the Near East for centuries, and culturally she cannot be displaced. Second, the United Kingdom has still the closest ties with the Near East through Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, the Suez base, Cyprus (despite the present difficulties there), East Africa, and the oil fields of the Persian Gulf; and the economy of the United Kingdom, and indeed of Europe in general, is far more dependent upon the oil of the Middle East than is that of the United States. It appears that the Middle East is vital to the United Kingdom and to Western Europe. Third, Australia and New Zealand, and other parts of the Commonwealth, have a stake in the Middle East; and Australian and New Zealand forces fought and died in the Middle East in two world wars. And fourth, it is true there have been in history and indeed there are today vast movements of

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adjustment and displacement of influence among big and small Powers alike, and some such adjustment is always inevitable, but if one asks what are the historical movements of the present age, one must mention, side by side with Communism, the industrialization of Russia and the rise of Asia and Africa, *the integration of the Atlantic Community*. Presumably, then, within the unity of this Community questions of displacement and adjustment of power arise as within one family. Presumably, England, France and America, as integral parts of this Community, need not rival or displace or undermine one another in the Near East, or anywhere else. I am aware of the complication of Communism in the case of France, but the French nation, so long as it is a pillar in the Atlantic Community, can never turn Communist. From all this it follows that the Western Powers have absolutely no excuse not to reinforce one another in the calm elaboration of a common Western policy in the Near East on the basis of justice.

Historically, strategically, economically, politically and culturally the West is vitally linked to the Near East. The Mediterranean is an offshoot of the Atlantic, and every Atlantic culture is aware of its ultimate Near Eastern roots. The accession of Italy, Greece and Turkey to the Atlantic Community is proof of this. There can therefore be for the West no hostile Near East developing. For more than a century the only external influences energizing our area have been Western. The misunderstanding between Greece and England on account of Cyprus will pass. Turkey, despite her economic problems, will stand. The Persian situation, never ideal, is nevertheless better than under Mossadegh. Iraq seems to hold firm in her friendship with the West. Lebanon's attachment to the West is well known (for instance, there are as many people from Lebanon in North and South America as there are in Lebanon herself). And there are many economic and juridical ties between the West and the other countries of the Near East. All in all, then, the balance sheet for the West in the Near East is not unfavorable. The political, intellectual and spiritual setback suffered in certain quarters should therefore be redressed. The alliance between Communism, radical nationalism, anti-Westernism, xenophobia and religious reaction and fanaticism need not be the last word. If wisdom, depth and firmness in the right come to their own, I am sure a fruitful era of coöperation between the West and all the countries of the Near East can be inaugurated on the basis of honor, equality

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and mutual respect. But it is essential that whatever the West does with its enemies or with those who have no feeling for its values, it should not forsake its friends.

VII

It is within the power of the Western world to help introduce in the Near East vast schemes of economic and social development. The Aswan Dam and other projects in Egypt, the Jordan Valley, the Litani Project, the vast irrigation projects in Syria and Iraq, these and many other possibilities can no longer wait to be initiated. Not only the elementary cause of human welfare, not only the policy of combatting Communism in the Near East, but the cause of peace itself demands that. The age-old conditions of squalor and inhumanity prevailing in the Middle East can no longer be tolerated. The West could have done much more for economic and social progress in the Near East during the decades of its responsibility for it. Now that the people themselves are responsible for their destiny, the West can come in only as a friend and partner.

The tragedy is that what is socially and economically necessary and possible meets with political difficulties. Western capital and technique can do wonders in this area, but it is immobilized so long as the political factor is not cleared. The West says in effect it cannot help unconditionally; and this is certainly natural and just. But what the West means by this is two things: *a,* it must make sure that the countries helped will not (as happened elsewhere) join the enemies of the West or otherwise count against the West in an emergency; and *b,* it must make sure that Israel is not endangered. The West appears therefore to say: "Let me be sure of your essential friendship, or at least that you will not count against me in an emergency, and let me be sure that your development will not endanger Israel, and there are no limits to what you and I can do together for economic and social progress in the Near East." What is being done at present (through Point Four, etc.) outside this proposed scope is important, but it is entirely inadequate to the objective needs of the situation.

One understands both conditions although one may not agree with one or the other of them. It is right that the West make sure that what it does should not one day be turned against it; at least it cannot afford such a risk until the outcome of its struggle with Communism has become more clear. This the countries

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of the Near East must and can be made to understand. As we pointed out above, there are only three living sources of science and technology in the world, and so long as the cold war in any form rages, the underdeveloped countries cannot associate themselves equally with all of them. But the things of the world are never pure black and pure white, and it is wise never to give up a country until both people and government are distinctly and clearly against one. (Has the West, for example, given up Eastern Europe or even the peoples of Russia?) The West has ample opportunities to prevent such an unnecessary eventuality. Thus the West could be far more sophisticated, far more *nuancé,* far less rigid (as in fact in many instances it is), in its approach than the above statement of its position might suggest.

Furthermore, trust begets trust. When otherwise neutral or bewildered people are faced with a truly generous act, they are bound to respond. If America, for instance, in the characteristically generous American spirit, comes to Egypt with the offer to *present Egypt with the Aswan Dam without any conditions,* nothing is more certain than that this act would make the strongest possible positive impression upon both the government and people of Egypt. What are one or two billion dollars in 10 or 20 years beside this result?

Again, one way of stiffening the resistance of the countries of the Middle East to Communism is to demonstrate to them that you have a better answer to their problems yourself. Although there are many other factors involved (*e.g.* the state of mind of the intellectuals), factors that should never be lost sight of, yet the continuance of the appalling and shameful economic and social conditions is certainly no help in the fight against Communism. You do not tell a man caught in a house on fire, "First put out the fire and then I will help you get out of the house." Give him the means to get out of the house himself and then judge him if he does not help you in putting out the fire. Most certainly you should make sure that your house does not catch fire as a result of his behavior either before or after he quits the house. I am certain this precaution is well within the resourcefulness of the West.

Moreover, the Near East does not lack leaders who would have nothing of Communism, who would like to be related to the West and who are afire with social vision. It is these men who should be encouraged to put through the necessary reform.

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The future of the Near East depends on the 50 men of vision who are not sufficiently encouraged and supported by those who care.

As to the hard dilemma with which the West confronts the Arabs, I can only add to what I said above under Arab-Israeli relations that it is not fair nor finally conducive to peace to tie the fate of the Arabs so rigidly to that of Israel. Let the two peoples develop for the time being along two parallel independent lines. Let the West give Israel every guarantee but let it not in the meantime penalize the Arabs. The independent parallel development obviously cannot go on forever, but for the present let not the progress of the Arabs be delayed. This is the test of the policy of "impartiality." Western idealists desire to see Israel and the Arabs embrace each other tomorrow and live as good neighbors in the manner of the Americans and Canadians. This is not possible. I am certain, if Israel does not want to expand, and if the West absolutely guarantees it, then with the giving of this guarantee the West can feel free to help liberally in the economic and social advancement of the Arabs.

VIII

Billions upon billions of dollars are going to pour into the Near East in the next 50 or 100 years from the exploitation of the oil resources of the region. With the exception of Iraq, the immediate beneficiaries of this wealth are desert kingdoms and sheikhdoms which cannot develop or support a flourishing civilization. This is an ideal situation for the generation of tensions, jealousies and strains. Is it altogether impossible—humanly and politically—for the combined wisdom of the West and the Near East to examine and overcome this situation? I believe ways and means can be found (banks, corporations, development schemes, industrial institutes, political arrangements, etc.) for the more equitable distribution of this wealth in the Near East and for its productive investment throughout the region. At present this wealth finds its way here and there for the most part according to a law of caprice, but what is needed is rational, farsighted design on a regional basis. Despite its fabulous quantities, this wealth is still finite, and therefore it is not likely to last more than one or two or at the most three or four generations, especially owing to the certain development of alternate nuclear and other kinds of fuel. Thus unless in the very short interval of grace

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granted us this wealth is turned into capital investment in the Near East, when the excitement is over the desert will once again assert its sway over this land. Life in the Near East is a perpetual fight against the desert, and always the desert won in the past. If all of us are wise, there is now a bare chance, owing to what the desert itself has been hiding all these ages in its bosom, to conquer the desert for good.

IX

The situation in the Near East is in flux. Underneath the flux there are certain abiding factors that should never be lost sight of. These are: 1, the economic, social, political and spiritual problems of the Near East; 2, the oil of the region; 3, the pre-eminent strategic importance of the area; 4, the modulation of the presence of the West in the Near East; 5, the Russian shadow or the Communist penetration; 6, Arab nationalism and the question of how the Arabs are going to develop their association among themselves; 7, the bearing of Zionism upon the Near East; 8, the question of how Arab, Jew, Turk and Persian shall develop their relations among themselves; and 9, Islam. The history of the Near East for a long time to come will be enacted by the actual, concrete day-to-day interlacing, interaction and interpenetration of these nine basic elements in the situation.

There is no problem in the Near East in which the United States is not involved and to the solution of which it cannot make a considerable contribution. It follows that responsibility for the development of events in the Near East falls in part upon the United States. A modicum of sustained determination by the United States on the deepest possible plane can do wonders in the Near East. The most important requisite is a profound grasp of the ultimate issues at stake, including above all the intellectual, moral and spiritual issues. On the basis of such a grasp the course of practical political wisdom becomes perfectly plain. When vision, wisdom and determination thus join, and when the means to give effect to these are available, then history in the most exalted sense is set in motion. At the moment when the Near East is coming again on the stage of history, the United States is entering the history of the Near East.

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ATOMIC ENERGY AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

By Louis Armand

HOW are the countries of Europe going to handle the industrial transformation brought about by the development of atomic energy? Will that transformation contribute to the building of a united Europe and if so to what extent? These questions could not have even been foreseen a few years ago, but today they are provoking the most urgent sort of discussions in the chancelleries of the Western world.

The technical evolution has become so explosive that it affects most of the great problems of our time profoundly, indeed often rudely. The points of reference used in forming foreign policy constantly shift. Countries are called on to adapt themselves to change with a speed and flexibility quite foreign to the traditions of government. This was what happened when oil was discovered in great quantities in the Middle East. It is revealed again today with the development of the nuclear industry. It may be emphasized again on an even greater scale when the sun's rays are harnessed to create motive power and produce food.

Atomic energy today interests us on the continent of Europe in the highest degree because it will enable us to resolve a twofold problem which is becoming increasingly acute and for which until now we have had no practical solution. First, the European countries are consuming more and more power (an increase of 40 percent within the last 25 years), although per capita consumption is still relatively low (the equivalent of 2.5 tons of coal per year as compared to 7.6 tons in the United States), and since power consumption has a direct bearing on the standard of living, every effort must be made to improve the rate of increase. But Europe can no longer supply her current needs. She imports almost all of her oil (95 percent) from the Middle East, and she will be dependent on this source in the future if she is to sustain a policy of economic expansion. In the second place, energy derived from domestic natural resources is more expensive on this side of the Atlantic than in the United States (for example, certain coals cost $15 per ton as against $6) and this disparity will increase in the case both of coal and of hydroelectric power. The fact is that in Europe the best coal veins and power

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sites are already being exploited, and, except in a few countries, any new ones that might be worked are unlikely to yield worthwhile returns.

Thus all who were aware of the difficulties confronting the European economy were immensely relieved when atomic scientists declared a few years ago that they would be capable, within a relatively short time, of producing large quantities of energy at a net cost low enough to become competitive with existing sources of energy. Furthermore, since conventional resources are more costly and less abundant in Europe than in America, it was logical to suppose that the new form of energy would be applied on our side of the Atlantic first.

This difference between the two continents in the sense of urgency with which they face the problems of supply and price is illustrated by the American effort to find the best reactor and to perfect various prototypes while the British Government concentrates on the simplest type (natural uranium and graphite) so as to attain mass production of power as quickly as possible. The British hope to achieve the nuclear equivalent of eight to ten million tons of coal per year by 1965.

The British example should be studied carefully by the European countries, for it shows them not only why it is in their interest to exploit the atom as a source of energy for peaceful purposes, but also why they must hasten to do so as promptly as possible. Actual production must inevitably be preceded by a period of organization devoted to research and industrial conversion. Consequently, a number of important decisions must be taken now if atomic energy is to play an effective rôle in Europe's economy within a reasonable period of time, say, 20 years.[1]

But many people who do not realize the technical problems involved have been lulled by the prospect of this relatively long period into underestimating the urgency of the situation. It was not until May 1954 that a report prepared for the Council of the O.E.E.C. suggested for the first time that an atomic research

[1] The most optimistic estimates made so far in America and England show that 20 years from now atomic energy output will still be relatively low. According to the McKinney report to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the amount of electric power of nuclear origin which the United States will be able to produce by 1975 will be 45 million k.w., while as of the same date the total figure for electric power will be somewhere between 300 and 440 million k.w., or a proportion for nuclear power of 10 to 15 percent. In the United Kingdom the proportion will be from 18 to 26 percent, according to the estimates of the White Paper of February 1955 (Cmd. 9389), which calculates that nuclear electric power produced in 1975 will amount to some 10 to 15 million k.w., out of a total of about 57 million k.w. Since then it has been estimated that this percentage may be significantly increased.

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group should be set up without delay.[2] The suggestion was accepted and a Commission to determine the most feasible method of coöperation among member countries submitted its conclusions to the Council at its session held in February 1956.

In a parallel action, the six nations participating in the European Coal and Steel Community decided at their conference at Messina in the spring of 1955 to include the same problem on their agenda. Thus, at the instance of the Intergovernmental Committee sitting at Brussels under the chairmanship of Paul-Henri Spaak, a commission of experts immediately undertook important studies, subsequently incorporated in a general report for discussion by the foreign ministers of the six countries.

Furthermore, on January 18, 1956, the Action Committee for a United States of Europe decided, on recommendation of its chairman, Jean Monnet, to submit for parliamentary approval in the countries of the Coal and Steel Community a declaration "inviting the governments to conclude without delay a treaty . . . assuring the exclusively peaceful development of atomic energy." During March and April favorable votes were obtained in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands; as of the time of writing, the French, Italian and Luxembourg parliaments had not yet voted.

During the same period the European states have also participated in the work of the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency. From all this it can be seen that the problem is indeed in the forefront of our concerns in Europe.

II

Among these studies reflecting so many common hopes we can discern a certain number of ideas which also are common to all. Each project, for example, has the same point of departure, namely, the inability of any one of the countries concerned to shoulder by itself the burdens involved in developing the atomic industry satisfactorily. The unanimity of opinion in this regard is quite remarkable. There is likewise unanimous agreement on the need to set up an agency with essential functions as follows:

1. To coördinate programs and facilitate the development of research. It would be the agency's task to prevent the industries and research laboratories of the different countries from duplicating each other's efforts and to guide them into areas which

[2] L. Armand, "Some Aspects of the European Energy Problem." Paris: O.E.E.C., 1955.

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had been insufficiently explored. In this coördinating rôle the agency would also encourage better utilization of existing installations, creation of joint enterprises for the construction of various types of reactors, and standardization of equipment to make industrial expansion as productive as possible.

2. To facilitate the free exchange of knowledge and technical personnel and to assure the sharing of information. This would constitute the first step toward real international technical coöperation. In the same spirit, participating countries which have bilateral agreements with non-member countries regarding exchange of information would seek the authorization of the latter to share such information with other member states. Also, the agency would protect patent rights and see to it that patent holders did not halt or restrict the industrial application of new technology.

3. To create schools for training specialists in different branches of nuclear science and engineering, such as prospecting for minerals, producing nuclear materials of exceptional purity, developing methods of treating metals after irradiation and producing and using radio isotopes. In the opinion of the Brussels experts, these schools for specialists should be combined with a bureau of standards and, above all, a research center.

4. To define scientifically standards of health and safety to protect both the public and workers in mines and nuclear plants.

5. To finance the creation or rapid development of basic equipment lacking in countries having no military program of atomic energy. Creation of this basic plant is a prerequisite to the full development of industry; but it involves major investments beyond the means of private enterprise or even individual governments. Among the projects agreed upon at Brussels, priority was given to a plant for separating uranium isotopes and a plant for the chemical treatment of irradiated uranium.

6. To guarantee, by a form of joint market, free and adequate access to new materials, especially natural or enriched uranium, thorium and their derivatives obtained from reactors, such as uranium and plutonium isotopes.

7. To assure control of the use of fissionable materials.[3]

As regards organization, the ideas of the O.E.E.C. differ con-

[3] Only on this last point do the projects drawn up at Brussels and by the O.E.E.C. parallel those proposed by the United Nations for the International Atomic Energy Agency. The other points involve problems peculiar to Europe. This absence of overlapping and conformity demonstrates the originality as well as the importance of the work being done in Europe.

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siderably from those of the Brussels Intergovernmental Committee. The latter envisages the creation of an agency enjoying powers which could certainly be called "supranational." However, they could also be considered simply directive powers delegated to an "executive" acting within the framework of a well-defined mission, namely to encourage the formation of associations which are indispensable to the most successful evolution of nuclear industries. This agency, which has already been christened "Euratom," would report to the political Assembly of the Coal and Steel Community and would be under the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the High Authority.

It is proposed that Euratom should have its own budget, which not merely would support the joint installations described above but also would underwrite a large part of the undertakings in the individual countries. This is especially necessary since operations are not financed everywhere in the same way: the production of electricity, for example, is nationalized in France but not in the other five countries.

The Euratom budget will likewise provide for the purchase of uranium and thorium—a provision vital for the control of fissionable materials. Clearly, the Brussels Committee attaches great importance to the creation of this joint market, for it will assure a basic unity highly desirable in the economic policy of the six countries. Finally, Euratom must bear the expense of plants specializing in the reprocessing of irradiated materials. Since these plants will be its property, its rôle in relation to European industry will be analogous to that of the Atomic Energy Commission in relation to industries in the United States.

It is proposed that the treaty creating Euratom shall be signed by the governments concerned and submitted for parliamentary ratification within the next few months. According to optimistic estimates the institutions could be set up by 1957.

III

The Euratom project has provoked widespread discussion, in the course of which the position of its opponents has become clear.

These opponents include, first of all, those who are averse on general grounds to the creation of an economically united Europe. They exist in all countries, but their number and their influence on this particular question are very limited in view of the testimony of both technical and economic experts that a European

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association in this field is most necessary. Furthermore, in this case their opposition does not have the support of vested interests attempting to hold on to what they have. In other words, the situation is very different from that faced by the Coal and Steel Community, which has the difficult task of coördinating the operations of great industries long in competition with each other. In the field of atomic energy we are starting from scratch.

The peaceful character of Euratom has also given rise to lively controversies. The tone of these suggests that some people are trying to renew the old quarrel over E.D.C. The problem is in fact a delicate one; the position of the French Government will not really be known until the text of the treaty has been put into final shape.

What we can say now is that it seems practicable to secure the agreement of the six countries under a control plan limited solely to the peaceful application of atomic energy. As for a definite renunciation of weapons of war, this seems more difficult, because no one can foresee all the military uses to which atomic fission may be put. In addition to the bomb and the submarine, artillery devices have already been tried out, and it is probable that certain purely defensive weapons will come next. A recent proposal has the advantage of taking into consideration the possible participation of Europe, and particularly of France, in a general disarmament program. In brief, it suggests that the member nations of Euratom pledge themselves to abstain for five years from manufacturing nuclear weapons, with the understanding that at the expiration of that period the question would be reconsidered in the light of the current political situation and the evolution of technology.

In Belgium and even more in Germany the Euratom project has given rise to apprehension of quite another order. Here the production of electricity is in the hands of private companies. Like the industrial chemical concerns, these fear that the activities of an international agency will strengthen the tendency toward statism and nationalization.

The answer to this is easy. Euratom does not constitute an additional threat, because the utilization of fissionable materials must in any case be under state supervision. The proof is that both in the United States and in Great Britain the government controls the use of the atomic raw materials, over which it has a monopoly. Their right to do this is incontestable since it stems

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from the close inter-relationship between the nuclear industry and national defense; and it will be all the more justified as uranium and thorium become the objects of international exchange. Euratom represents only one of the ways in which inevitable control might be exercised; but private industry may well find that it is in its own interest that such control shall be entrusted to the agency which is to manage the joint installations and which will thus acquire knowledge and understanding of industrial problems. As for alleged statist tendencies in Euratom, it is precisely in order to minimize them that the Intergovernmental Committee at Brussels specified that the joint installations are to represent not more than one-fifth of the total investments. Each country will thus retain considerable freedom of action, guaranteeing the best utilization of its own technical resources.

Thus it may be said that the six governments are well informed on all aspects of the problem and are equipped to understand the nature and causes of any objections that are likely to be raised. They therefore are in a position to draw up a definitive treaty text which will stand a good chance of being approved with a minimum of delay.

IV

Finally, we must examine the question of how the Euratom project harmonizes with the ideas held by the Council of O.E.E.C.

There has never in fact been a fundamental difference of viewpoints. All those engaged in the effort to rebuild Europe have stressed their desire to coördinate their efforts. Both in the O.E.E.C. and at Brussels it has been acknowledged that if the six countries of the European Coal and Steel Community are going to create a joint agency in the atomic field it should be the nucleus of European coöperation. Specifically, it will be the valid representative of the six nations concerned. This position has already been given official sanction of a sort, since M. Spaak spoke in the name of the Community at the last meeting of the O.E.E.C.

A distinction must be drawn between the United Kingdom and the other states outside the Coal and Steel Community. Because Britain manufactures nuclear weapons she finds herself in a very special position. This fact gives added support to the more traditional reasons which have caused her to remain aloof from Europe's collective enterprises. But there is no doubt that be-

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cause of her advances in the field of atomic technology Britain can provide invaluable assistance in the development of nuclear industry on the Continent. For this reason the Commission of Experts in Brussels has specified that Euratom must strive to coöperate with her as closely as possible. The significance of this declaration was underlined by the fact that a British delegate was present as an observer when it was made.

In the course of the proceedings of O.E.E.C., other countries, notably Switzerland and Sweden, have shown great interest in the nuclear energy projects. Through the intermediary of the O.E.E.C. such countries can associate themselves with Euratom, both for the exchange of technical information and for the utilization of joint installations. In other words, these are activities in which all countries and institutions can participate if they wish.

On the other hand, it does not appear that the O.E.E.C. could establish an agency for the purchase and distribution of fissionable materials on the lines of the one envisaged by the Brussels Committee (although it is not ruled out that contracts may be drawn up between certain countries and Euratom). As regards the joint market for raw materials and nuclear equipment, there is complete harmony between the O.E.E.C. and the Community countries, with the distinction that Euratom will be authorized to insure their free circulation, whereas the O.E.E.C. will be limited to making recommendations.

V

This brief summary shows that in the sphere of nuclear energy more than in any other an effort is being made to convert the "little Europe" of the six into the nucleus of a greater Europe. That is why Euratom promises to attract the adherence of such a large number of Europeans—a point that must be added to those already mentioned in its favor.

To sum up:

From the technical point of view, no form of integration is less controversial than integration in the field of nuclear energy.

None is less likely to conflict with established positions. The aim is to set up new installations, whether within the framework of the new community or of the national economies, though always on the understanding that the installations in each country shall be coördinated with those of the others.

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In none is the objection to intergovernmental control less valid. Such control is necessitated in this case by the very nature of the nuclear industry.

Finally, the setting up of Euratom will create structures and machinery which may well encourage further economic integration. Thus the functioning of a real joint market in a new field, where it will have the greatest possibilities of success, will favor the development of a joint market in general. In addition, the scope of the joint financial enterprise involved will serve as an example for other investments on a scale in keeping with our times; the same can be said of the laboratories and the research center which Euratom is already planning and which may turn out to be the first of many international universities. Thus we have the right to hope that Euratom, with its various activities and the far-reaching consequences they may have, is in the vanguard of European economic unity.

Alternatively, if integration is not achieved the European countries, each on its own, will seek bilateral agreements with countries which are far advanced in nuclear technology and have supplies of enriched fuel. Obviously, such agreements will be made first of all with the United States. But the possibility that they might later be made with certain European states and with Soviet Russia must not be excluded.

In any case, if such agreements as that recently concluded between Belgium and the United States were to become the rule, it would be difficult for the European states to mobilize their intellectual and industrial resources for the exploitation of nuclear energy. Since they would not be able to participate in the development and application of techniques, they would soon find themselves in the position of "satellites." How could fragmented Europe possibly solve the problems on which her future depends? Her personality, her economic solvency, have already been threatened by the fact that she has played no part in the great oil adventure; and they have been weakened by other factors, for example her being left out of the building of long-range aircraft. Would she not then be in danger of losing her birthright altogether?

Western Europe still deserves to be considered the center of Western civilization and one of the richest sources of scientific and technical personnel. Clearly, this wealth should be used to the fullest possible extent to raise living standards, not only in

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the highly developed countries, but in those—including Russia—where only the presence of large numbers of engineers can assure the application of new technology.

Because of the rôle which nuclear energy is called upon to play and because of the attendant political circumstances, the atomic problem places Europe at a turning point. The decision taken with regard to Euratom will determine whether the Continent is to move in a direction favorable or unfavorable to its destiny. Either divisive forces will continue to grow, making the atomic age one of technological slavery for the European countries; or we shall see the birth of a new unity and confidence among nations which heretofore have been most active in the development of both spiritual and material riches—permitting them to deal with the new World Powers, particularly the United States, without any feeling of inferiority. It will not be of advantage to America to have to deal with a clientele composed of states which have lost all their vigor and individuality and which will continue to require all sorts of help. Rather, the United States stands to benefit by dealing with a community conscious of its own worth, a co-partner able to offer its associates a valuable contribution in an exchange of resources and ideas.

This seems to be the feeling in Washington. After studying the European problem in detail and measuring the importance of what is at stake, the United States has declared itself in favor of Euratom. Let us hope that the clauses of the constitutive treaty will make it possible for the United States and Great Britain to give effective support to the launching of the nuclear industry in Europe. And let us hope that Europe in turn can occupy in this field the place which her scientific and industrial traditions warrant and which alone can enable her to view the future with confidence.

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INDIA'S NEW FIVE-YEAR PLAN

By E. P. W. da Costa

INDIA'S Second Five-Year Plan commenced on the first of April 1956. Largely under the Prime Minister's personal direction, a Plan Frame for the Second Plan had been made available fully 12 months earlier and during that year there was much lively debate on its contents.[1] But the final document presented to Parliament on May 15, 1956, was based substantially on the original estimates. This is largely because the range of choice at this time is remarkably small, both in a political and economic sense.

Those who read into India's Second Plan a leftist turn must appreciate this point: that the size of the Plan and its structure have been fixed by non-ideological considerations.[2] While undue emphasis was placed on controls, and although it certainly restricted private organized industry, it was not totalitarian. In any case, the major bias against the private sector has been corrected; under the new Industrial Policy Resolution, Indian organized industry has a substantial and honored place.

The Second Plan is no more based on ideology than the First was. True, the debate concerning the Socialistic pattern of society continues, but anyone who knows the capacities of the private and public sectors in the Indian economy knows that this is really a minor issue. The private sector is fully extended and its order books are largely filled for the next five years. On its own account, organized industry will probably have a seventh of the Plan and will be acting as agent of the public sector perhaps for another third. Housing and other activities in the private sector might account for still another third. It is doubtful if the

[1] This advance preparation is itself some indication of progress. The First Five-Year Plan appeared in draft nearly 12 months *after* the period covered by the Plan had begun, and was finally approved by the National Development Council six months later (November 1952). This inordinate delay was, however, somewhat less than that which occurred in the publication of China's First Plan.

[2] It is unfortunate that the Plan Frame was designed in the Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta, a laboratory financed by the Government of India, but under the direction of Professor P. C. Mahalanobis whose personal views are known to veer towards the left. Because of this personal equation it is often forgotten that, while the Indian Statistical Institute has been host to a number of scholars from Eastern European countries and particularly from Soviet Russia, it has offered its hospitality in an even larger measure to economists from the free world. There was in any case nothing in the Plan Frame which suggests that its structure was designed by visiting economists.

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national income accruing from the activities of the private sector will be less than 80 percent at the end of the Plan, as against about 90 percent today. In other words, at the end of this Plan, based (as one is all too frequently reminded in the final document) on the concept of a Socialistic pattern of society, the Indian Union may well be less "Socialistic" than the United States is today. Indeed, the public sector cannot augment its resources or its capacity by further ventures in nationalization, such as its unwise nationalization of life insurance in January 1956. It is already too heavily burdened in both respects. This is a view of which Mr. K. C. Neogy, a member of the Planning Commission, has made no secret although he signed the Plan Report without a dissenting note. It is also the view forcefully argued by Dr. John Matthai, a former Finance Minister of India and chairman of the Indian Taxation Enquiry Commission, which has done much to present the case for heavier personal and indirect taxation. But these controversies, like the issues on which they are based, belong to the second order of magnitude. There is more noise than substance in the verbal duels on the disputed area which the public sector in India unwisely occupies.

The conditions which have determined the shape of the Second Five-Year Plan flow logically, and even structurally, from performance in the First Plan. *Natura non facit saltum.* Again and again, the eminent British economist, Alfred Marshall, drew attention to the basic continuity in the pattern of national economic growth. India's Second Plan, although it looks far more ambitious than the First, might be described properly as a rational projection of the best performances of the last five years. Thus, in the last three years of the First Five-Year Plan the rate of economic progress has been as high as 4 percent per year; it would be inconceivable that India's Second Plan, which had necessarily to be more satisfying both politically and economically, could start with an income figure of less than 5 percent per year. Thus it was that the planners set as their goal a 25 percent increase in the national income in five years.

Again, it was obvious that major shortages in the period 1955 to 1960 would be in steel, cement, fertilizers, electrical machinery and what might be described comprehensively as capital goods, particularly for the consumption goods industries already established. This was no choice in favor of the Soviet pattern of heavy industry as against consumer goods. It was nothing more than

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a balancing act designed to provide the opportunities for development of the economy on a sound industrial base. The individual targets have all been designed to meet actual shortages, not to build any idle monuments to heavy industry. No authoritative spokesman of the private sector has at any time questioned the wisdom of the allocations for steel, cement, fertilizers or railway transport, which among them absorb half the financial investment in the Second Plan. To speak, therefore, of India's Second Plan as containing a bias towards heavy industry because of an ideological twist has no warrant of any kind.

There are dramatic stories to tell about the rise in both agricultural and industrial production. Although none of the great multi-purpose projects included in the First Five-Year Plan has been completed or has contributed significantly to irrigation, the planned target of 7,000,000 additional tons of food grains has been exceeded by 4,000,000 tons. Again, the cotton target of 1.2 million bales was also surpassed by 50 percent in 1955–56. The performance of the economy in the sphere of organized industry was even more spectacular. The Interim Index of Indian Industrial Production recorded an all-time peak of 170 in December 1955—a gain of 53 points since the inauguration of the Plan. Average industrial production in organized industries has thus risen by more than 50 percent in five years; even if the new Plan were not designed for industrialization, the mere extension of this trend would have meant that about the same volume of industrialization would have been generated by the "normal" growth of the Indian economy.

However, this "normal" pattern could not have continued without the addition of much steel, which has been in desperately short supply in the last year, and which had necessarily to occupy a central place in any new plan. A similar argument applies to cement; production is to increase from under 5,000,000 tons to well over 10,000,000 tons per year within the next five years. The provision for transport and communications, which now comprise 29 percent of the Plan against 24 percent in the first five years, is the natural corollary to the industrial development program. Thus in a vital sense the main targets of the Second Plan were determined by the belief that existing trends of development in agriculture, industry and transport should be maintained. They form a consistent set of figures which should permit the national income to exceed targets, as in the First

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Five-Year Plan, if the new resources are properly utilized. One of the virtues of this Plan is that it is largely designed to follow existing channels of the economy. If it had sought a violent change of direction, its success would have been far more open to question.

Is India's Second Five-Year Plan likely to be the resounding success which the First Plan was in terms of overfulfillment of targets and the absence of the dreaded foreign exchange gap? In the First Five-Year Plan the aim was to raise national income by 11 percent; the latest figures show an increase of 18 percent, surpassing the goal by 50 percent. These gains are fairly evenly distributed throughout the economy, although agriculture's share is not as great as is generally supposed. The main pacemakers were factory establishments, commerce, transport and communications, and the expansion of professional and government services.

How far the Second Five-Year Plan will follow this particular course may be questioned. The Plan figures for factory establishments, small enterprises and construction have now been raised so high that they do not permit much leeway for "unplanned" production, which contributed substantially to the success of the First Five-Year Plan. It would appear, however, that expansion of markets in areas where Plan figures have not been fixed still offers important opportunities. One unofficial source predicts that the national income will surpass the goal by something like 25 percent, thanks to unplanned income estimated at nine billion rupees.

If one accepts this view that the buoyancy of the Indian economy has again been underestimated by about as much as in the First Five-Year Plan, one might not be unduly concerned about the projected rupee gap of four billion rupees. It is quite otherwise with the foreign exchange gap. In the First Five-Year Plan there was, indeed, a foreign exchange gap of seven billion rupees. But it represented items which the Indian economy could well produce for itself, such as food grains and raw cotton. In fact, Indian imports of food grains were two billion rupees less than scheduled, and there was also a large reduction in cotton imports. For the rest, a moderate improvement in the terms of trade and the rise of capital goods production in the last three years have dispelled the gap totally. This cannot happen in the Second Five-Year Plan where imports include three large steel plants each

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producing 1,000,000 tons of ingots, two steel expansion projects, three fertilizer factories and imports of about 6,000,000 tons of finished steel over the next four years. No contingency of Indian economics will permit the production of these items; the hard core of the foreign exchange gap in the Second Plan cannot, therefore, be broken.

It is in this refractory foreign exchange gap that the largest discrepancy between India's two plans appears. The shadow of this gap has already appeared with the steel imports of the current year which are changing a markedly favorable payments balance into an adverse one. Because of inflationary pressures, the adverse balance of trade is welcome. But it cannot be financed indefinitely unless some major developments take place in the foreign exchange field. It is not unlikely that with transport and defense requirements growing somewhat more than was anticipated, the gap may reach ten billion rupees over the five-year period. It is possible that two billion rupees of this figure might be financed by a further utilization of sterling balances, which have been drawn on very conservatively. Nevertheless, there is likely to remain a hard core of about eight billion rupees which has still to be resolved. The greatest weakness of India's Second Five-Year Plan is that it exhibits this gap without giving any indication how the problem can be solved.

This is partly because Indian authorities are not by any means agreed on a solution. Some would place their faith in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which has an important mission in India at the present time. Others have argued that a drive to develop exports, and in particular agricultural exports, might conceivably bridge another two billion rupees. If the International Bank could invest four billion rupees in this country over the period of five years the balance of about two billions would cause no great concern. But neither the International Bank nor the capital markets of the world have yet shown their hand. It is certain, however, that little can be expected of private foreign capital. The "climate," it is said, is not good, though there are few countries in which a rate of growth of better than 4 percent can be foreseen for so long a time.

As long as major uncertainties remain in regard to the foreign exchange balance, the whole of India's Second Five-Year Plan is clouded with uncertainty. The achievements of the First Five-Year Plan have been so remarkable and the aspirations of the

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people have been raised to such a point that a serious reverse in the rate of growth might have major political consequences. The search for assurance against failure of the Second Plan has brought cold war controversies to India's door. Eastern European countries have not been slow to enter into the arena which this situation provides. Soviet Russia has undertaken the building of one of the steel plants on terms of deferred payment which have not been matched either by the Germans or the British. The Russians have offered technical assistance in oil exploration and in the development of other mineral resources, notably the diamond mines of Panna. Through UNESCO they are to take part in a large training scheme with headquarters at Bombay. In view of India's large foreign exchange gap—and so long as no strings are attached to these offers—it is clearly not in India's interest to decline the proffered aid. This is a view held almost without exception by the Indian people.

The political implications of India's Plans extend far beyond the national frontiers. For one thing, there is the challenge across the Himalayas of the People's Republic of China. India's First Five-Year Plan has shown that Asian countries can surmount huge economic obstacles without substantial foreign assistance and within the framework of democratic institutions. Indeed, the rate at which these obstacles have been surmounted in India should give the free world faith and courage. There is no conclusive evidence that China has achieved a comparable advance in her First Five-Year Plan. In this sense India's comparative success belongs to the whole free world, because she has used the free world's means.

While India has thus served the free world, she has also astutely served herself. There is no doubt that the Communist influence within India has declined very steeply in the last few years. This decline is shown in four opinion surveys recently conducted by the Indian Institute of Public Opinion in the States of West Bengal, Travancore-Cochin and Delhi. It is true that the controversies of the States Reorganization have weakened Congress Party prestige to some extent, but other political parties have suffered even more. There can be no reasonable doubt that the political stability of India has been strengthened by Congress policies such as those contained in the Second Plan.

Friends of the free world in India do not doubt the effectiveness of India's foreign and domestic policy in maintaining the

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morale of the people and the prestige of Congress governments inside India. Nor do they, by and large, view with any serious concern the volume of Russian assistance now available. The reason for this confidence arises from the structure of opinion inside the country. While public opinion in India is predominantly neutral in outlook in foreign affairs, it remains strongly anti-Communist and essentially democratic and freedom-loving within.

The character of the internal political challenge that India faces at the present time is often misunderstood in the United States. It is not merely a matter of generating economic progress on the substantial scale envisaged in the Second Five-Year Plan. Almost equally important has been the objective of providing a substantial volume of new employment in order to offset Communist activity, which thrives more on unemployment than on other forms of economic distress. It is significant that Communism in India has its roots not among the very poor but among the educated unemployed. The middle classes, in spite of the severe pressure of prices, exhibit a sturdy devotion to stability which has confounded the Communists even after 35 years of sustained work in the fertile soil of Calcutta. There are thus defenses in India even against unemployment. But it is clearly unwise to place too heavy a reliance upon them, and India's Second Five-Year Plan has, therefore, set itself the objective of providing 8,000,000 new jobs within five years, a figure which is twice as large as total unemployment in organized industry, mining and railway transport. The scale at which new employment is planned has no parallel in Indian history; this may be treated as a measure of the determination with which Communism is to be rooted out of the country.

Because India's Plans are thus buttressing the democratic way of life, one might have expected them to command more approbation in the free world than has been the case. There is no doubt that if the true facts of the Indian political and economic situation were understood in the United States, there would be a spontaneous upsurge of popular appreciation. By and large, the Indian people have done this job for themselves. Government planning and development finance have aided purchasing power far more than production. The victories of the First Five-Year Plan were essentially free enterprise victories, though the Government's policy in holding the ring has been magnificent.

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One of the unfortunate by-products of the cold war is this failure on both sides to see clearly the common bonds of political philosophy and economic practice between India and the United States. In an important sense, it is the United States, more than any other country, that India is copying. The character of Indian expansion bears more than superficial resemblance to the expanding economy of the United States after 1868. The growth of the American and Indian economies springs from the same basic economic strength—the presence of large internal markets and the means to supply them from within. With their continental character both countries can develop their own supplies of food grains and industrial raw materials enabling them to finance a far higher rate of economic development than hard-pressed economies such as those of Britain or Japan.

The parallels with the United States, both in politics and economics, are now becoming so clear that one might hazard the guess that between 50 and 100 years from now the Indian Union will possess an economy as massive in terms of productive capacity and of welfare as that of the United States today. It is appropriate that this should be accomplished with the active assistance of democratic countries which have both an ideological and strategic interest in assisting Indian development, now running a classic race with the People's Republic of China. The fact that India has already done so much to demonstrate the vitality of the democratic way and in the first stage of her journey has outstripped the People's Republic should be a source of special satisfaction to the United States.

It might be remembered that it was in his search for a new route to India that Columbus first stumbled on the Americas. Out of that great accident there came a faith; and after a faith there came a civilization; out of that civilization came abounding prosperity. In a sense, therefore, India, or at least the vision of her splendor, was a condition in the making of America. The wheel is coming full circle. India's expanding economic needs are driving her hard, albeit vaguely, in search of a new route to prosperity. In this search she may well stumble on the pattern developed in the United States, with which she has so much in common. If, under the altered circumstances of the twentieth century, the American experiment could be successful in India, that would be evidence of its abiding character. In this sense, the United States is also being tested on Indian soil.

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Eight thoughtful and informed essays on some of the thorniest problems confronting the United States: the conduct of defense and foreign policies in a thermonuclear age.

RUSSIA AND AMERICA: DANGERS AND PROSPECTS. By HENRY L. ROBERTS. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1956, 251 p. $3.50.

This report, based on the discussions of a study group at the Council on Foreign Relations during the past two years, deals with the problem of Soviet-American relations and the requirements of an American policy to meet the international challenge of Communism. Among the chapter headings are "The Atom and Communist Totalitarianism," "Strengths and Vulnerabilities" and "Allies and Neutrals." Two chapters deal with economic and social policy, and a concluding section, "Areas of Conflict," discusses Germany, East European satellites and Communist China. There is an introduction by John J. McCloy, the group chairman.

THIS IS OUR WORLD. By LOUIS FISCHER. New York: Harper, 1956, 522 p. $5.00.

An informal but informative political travel diary by an experienced journalist, recording conversations and observations around the world over the last decade.

EL PROBLEMA DE LA ALTERACIÓN DEL EQUILIBRIO EN EL MUNDO POSBÉLICO. By CAMILO BARCIA TRELLES. São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais (for the Universidade de São Paulo), 1955, 457 p.

An analysis of post-1945 international relations, interpreted as a running conflict between Washington and Moscow, a conflict to which the other nations are trying to adjust themselves—whether by alignment or by neutrality.

THE INFLUENCE OF FORCE IN FOREIGN RELATIONS. By CAPTAIN W. D. PULESTON. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1955, 254 p. $4.50.

Captain Puleston, U.S.N. (Retired), after discussing the rôle of force in history

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and criticizing a number of features of recent American policy and strategy, is inclined to conclude that war is the "instrument chosen by the modern world to secure its rapid development."

WORLD WITHOUT BARRIERS. By Emanuel R. Posnack. New York: Morrow, 1956, 434 p. $5.00.

After making a critique of Marxist theory and Communist practice the author concludes that notwithstanding the precarious state of the world there are ways of bridging the gap between East and West, and much the West can do to maintain itself and yet reduce the dangers of war.

SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1953. By Peter Calvocoressi, assisted by Cora Bell. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1956, 400 p. $7.70.

DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1953. Selected and Edited by Denise Folliot. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1956, 515 p. $9.20.

The latest volume of this valuable series of Surveys—and regrettably the last to be prepared by Mr. Calvocoressi—is dominated by the death of Marshal Stalin and the changes in the international scene which began to ensue. With corresponding documents in the accompanying volume.

L'ANNÉE POLITIQUE 1953. By André Siegfried and Others. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1954, 707 p. Fr. 1900.

L'ANNÉE POLITIQUE 1954. By André Siegfried and Others. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1955, 735 p. Fr. 2500.

Two further volumes of a useful chronological review of political, economic, diplomatic and social developments in France and the French Union.

THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL, 1919–1943: DOCUMENTS. VOLUME I, 1919–1922. Selected and Edited by Jane Degras. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1956, 463 p. $8.80.

This first volume of selected documents on the aims and policies of the Communist International goes down to the end of the Fourth World Congress in December 1922.

THE HUNGRY SHEEP. By Sir David Kelly. London: Hollis, 1955, 244 p. 18/.

A vigorous, caustic and wide-ranging inquiry into the "foul contagion" of our times—including an essay on the Soviet Empire—by the former British Ambassador in Moscow. Sir David finds many intellectual and spiritual enemies within the gates.

DEMOCRACY AND MARXISM. By H. B. Mayo. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955, 364 p. $5.50.

An extensive analysis of Marxism and its relationship, or antagonism, to democracy. The author is Professor of Political Science at the University of Alberta, Canada.

THE LOYAL AND THE DISLOYAL. By Morton Grodzins. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956, 319 p. $4.00.

National loyalty is apt to be the product of group loyalties, but the one may be in conflict with the other. Moreover, alienation of an individual from group or personal loyalties may make him susceptible to treason. Hence, the strength of democracy is to be democratic enough to accommodate many group loyalties, to mini-

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mize the need to choose between group and nation, and to cope with alienation. Around these propositions Mr. Grodzins has written an interesting if not altogether novel analysis.

DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP. By Zevedei Barbu. New York: Grove Press, 1956, 275 p. $3.50.

Although the author—a Rumanian by birth and now Lecturer in Social Psychology at the University of Glasgow—occasionally becomes enmeshed in his terminology, this is a serious and frequently illuminating effort to get at the roots of democracy, Nazism and Communism.

THE MEANING OF YALTA. By John L. Snell and Others. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956, 239 p. $3.75.

Four historians tackle the Yalta Conference. Stressing the historical context in which the agreements were made, the study concludes that "Yalta's historical significance has been confused, its decisions exaggerated, and its effect on the course of subsequent events distorted."

AIRMAN AT YALTA. By General Laurence S. Kuter. New York: Duell; and Boston: Little, Brown, 1955, 180 p. $3.00.

An account of the Yalta meeting by a U. S. Air Force general who sat in for General Arnold, who was ill at the time.

AMERICA'S SIBERIAN EXPEDITION, 1918–1920: A STUDY OF NATIONAL POLICY. By Betty Miller Unterberger. Durham: Duke University Press, 1956, 271 p. $7.50.

A monograph which interprets the intervention as a continuation of America's traditional "open door" policy in the Far East.

LES POUVOIRS DE L'ASSEMBLÉE GÉNÉRALE DES NATIONS UNIES EN MATIÈRE POLITIQUE ET DE SÉCURITÉ. By Pierre-F. Brugière. Paris: Pedone, 1955, 431 p. Fr. 2000.

An examination of the political and security powers of the U.N. General Assembly, both as defined in the Charter and as interpreted in practice.

NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. By P. Weis. London: Stevens (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1956, 338 p. 63/.

An extensive examination of the subject of nationality from the point of view of public international law as against municipal or private international law.

THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION. By D. P. O'Connell. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1956, 425 p. $8.50.

An inquiry into the legal principles governing the consequences of change of sovereignty, with particular reference to British practice. The author is Reader in Law at the University of Adelaide.

WE THE JUDGES. By William O. Douglas. Garden City: Doubleday, 1956, 480 p. $6.00.

An illuminating comparison of American and Indian constitutional law, based on lectures which Justice Douglas delivered in 1955 at the University of Calcutta.

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADITION IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Edited by Arnold Wolfers and Laurence W. Martin. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956, 286 p. $4.50.

A selection of readings on problems of international relations from More, Bacon and Hobbes to Mahan, Hobson and Wilson.

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I SISTEMI ELETTORALI. By Giovanni Schepis. Empoli (Italy): Caparrini, 1955, 356 p. L. 4000.

A massive theoretical and comparative study of electoral systems throughout the world.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

STERLING: ITS MEANING IN WORLD FINANCE. By Judd Polk. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1956, 286 p. $3.75.

This is the first full-length, analytical study of the sterling area from an American viewpoint. The author, a former Treasury official, has travelled to many parts of the sterling area in preparing the book. While he necessarily deals with some of the financial intricacies of this unique monetary system, major emphasis is on the broader economic and political relations and interests.

WORLD COMMERCE AND GOVERNMENTS: TRENDS AND OUTLOOK. By W. S. Woytinsky and E. S. Woytinsky. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1955, 907 p. $10.00.

This massive companion to the authors' "World Population and Production" (noted here April 1954) is informed by the same purpose, "to study world trends during the fateful era in which the mechanized economy originated on the two coasts of the North Atlantic is becoming the universal civilization of mankind." Comprising a survey of world trade, world transportation and systems of government, it is a most valuable work of reference.

ECONOMIC GROWTH: BRAZIL, INDIA, JAPAN. Edited by Simon Kuznets and Others. Durham: Duke University Press, 1955, 613 p. $12.50.

Papers dealing with the various factors relating to economic growth—agriculture, industries, populations, social structure and state organization. Brazil, India and Japan were selected as giving a wide range of relevant conditions.

CAPITAL FORMATION AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS. By Charles Wolf, Jr. and Sidney C. Sufrin. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1955, 134 p. $3.00.

A study of research accomplished or under way and of research requirements in this important field.

DÉVELOPPEMENT D'UNE CLASSE MOYENNE DANS LES PAYS TROPICAUX ET SUB-TROPICAUX. Brussels: Institut International des Civilisations Différentes, 1956, 467 p.

Reports read at a conference of the International Institute of Differing Civilizations in London in September 1955.

HANDS ACROSS FRONTIERS. Edited by Howard M. Teaf, Jr. and Peter G. Franck. Ithaca: Cornell University Press (for the Netherlands Universities Foundation for International Coöperation), 1956, 579 p. $5.50.

A series of case studies in technical assistance—village improvement projects in India, industrial development in Saudi Arabia, resettlement in Northern Nigeria, land reform in Taiwan, etc.

THE CRISIS IN WORLD POPULATION. By J. O. Hertzler. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1956, 279 p. $5.00.

A discussion, designed for the general reader, of the world population situation with particular attention paid to the underdeveloped areas. The author is Professor of Sociology at the University of Nebraska.

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THE BUSINESS CYCLE IN THE POST-WAR WORLD. Edited by Erik Lundberg, assisted by A. D. Knox. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1955, 366 p. $6.75.

A symposium of papers presented at the conference held by the International Economic Association in 1952: country studies followed by an analysis of trends.

ENERGY AND SOCIETY. By Fred Cottrell. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955, 330 p. $6.00.

A thoughtful study of the impact of forms of energy—especially high-yield forms such as steam power and electricity—upon social, economic and political developments.

FLIGHT AND RESETTLEMENT. By H. B. M. Murphy. Paris: UNESCO, 1955, 231 p. (New York: Columbia University Press, $2.50.)

A symposium dealing primarily with the psychological and mental tribulations of the uprooted refugee and D. P.

THE SANE SOCIETY. By Erich Fromm. New York: Rinehart, 1955, 370 p. $5.00.

Developing themes appearing in his earlier works, "Escape from Freedom" and "Man for Himself," a leading psychoanalytical writer continues his search for a form of society in which individual adjustment may promote sanity rather than insanity.

The Second World War

THE ATLANTIC BATTLE WON. By Samuel Eliot Morison. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1956, 399 p. $6.00.

In this tenth volume of his magistral History of United States Naval Operations in World War II Admiral Morison carries the battle of the Atlantic from the spring of 1943 through to victory when, as the announcement of May 28, 1945, put it, "Merchant ships by night will burn navigation lights at full brilliancy and need not darken ship."

MIRACLE OF WORLD WAR II. By Francis Walton. New York: Macmillan, 1956, 575 p. $7.50.

An effort to tell the story of the extraordinary success of American industry in meeting the unprecedented demands of the Second World War, more satisfactory, perhaps, in its able handling of particular achievements in engineering and output than in providing an organized picture of the whole undertaking.

SIX YEARS OF WAR. By Colonel C. P. Stacey. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1955, 629 p. $3.50.

This first volume of the Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War deals with events in Canada, the Army in Britain and the war against Japan. Detailed accounts of the defense of Hong Kong in December 1941 and the Dieppe raid of August 1942.

PANZER BATTLES. By Major General F. W. von Mellenthin. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956, 383 p. $5.00.

An excellent account and examination of armored warfare in the Second World War, as seen through the eyes of a German officer who offers interesting observations on British and Russian as well as German tactics.

L'ARMISTICE DE 1940 ET L'AFRIQUE DU NORD. By André Truchet. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1955, 424 p. Fr. 1200.

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A well-documented study concerned primarily with the much debated question whether it would have been feasible for France to have carried on the battle in North Africa after the German victory in May–June 1940. In the author's view effective resistance was possible.

GIDEON GOES TO WAR. By Leonard Mosley. New York: Scribner, 1956, 256 p. $3.50.

A lively and admiring biography of General Orde Wingate, of more interest as a character sketch than as a study of the type of warfare in which this very unorthodox warrior excelled.

THE GERMAN FIFTH COLUMN IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR. By Louis De Jong. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956, 308 p. $5.00.

An effort to estimate the real significance of the German fifth column in paving the way for German victories in the Second World War. On the whole the author, Executive Director of the Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation, finds its rôle was greatly exaggerated, a fact itself of considerable sociological and historical interest.

THERESIENSTADT 1941–1945. By H. G. Adler. Tübingen: Mohr, 1955, 773 p. DM. 38.

An extremely detailed study of the history, organization and operation of this concentration camp for Jews during the Second World War.

The United States

SOLDIER: THE MEMOIRS OF MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY. By General Matthew B. Ridgway, as told to Harold H. Martin. New York: Harper, 1956, 371 p. $5.00.

Apart from providing a real sense of the man, the principal interest of these memoirs, which add little to military history, is in the background they provide for General Ridgway's criticism, while Army Chief of Staff, of recent American defense planning and budgeting.

AFFAIRS OF STATE: THE EISENHOWER YEARS. By Richard H. Rovere. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1956, 390 p. $4.50.

Sharp-witted if somewhat uneven appraisals of the first three years of the Eisenhower Administration, by the Washington correspondent of *The New Yorker* magazine, in which most of these pieces first appeared. On the whole, and somewhat against the author's impulse, the judgment is more favorable than expected.

REVOLT OF THE MODERATES. By Samuel Lubell. New York: Harper, 1956, 308 p. $3.75.

The author of "The Future of American Politics," an indefatigable legman in seeking out evidence of the American state of mind, here examines the political scene in the years of the Eisenhower Administration. In Mr. Lubell's judgment "the balance of political power rests with those moderate voting elements who are in restless revolt against both parties."

THE POWER ELITE. By C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956, 423 p. $6.00.

In the author's view "the war lords, the corporation chieftains, the political directorate"—the choice of terms suggests the temper of the book—interlock to create the American power élite, a system of "organized irresponsibility." While Mr. Mills has his eye upon a number of real problems of American society, his

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analysis frequently succumbs to rhetorical outbursts and at the end fails to arrive at a convincing diagnosis.

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL DECISIONS. By Roger Hilsman. Glencoe (Ill.): Free Press, 1956, 187 p. $4.00.

Primarily an exposition and analysis of the various operating and theoretical doctrines concerning the function and organization of intelligence activities in the United States.

CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR. By Roland Young. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956, 281 p. $4.50.

An even-handed examination, by a professor of political science at Northwestern University, of the functioning of Congress and its relations with the Executive under the strains and pressures of the war.

WHAT I THINK. By Adlai E. Stevenson. New York: Harper, 1956, 240 p. $3.00.

A selection of Mr. Stevenson's speeches over the four years since the 1952 campaign.

COUSINS AND STRANGERS. Edited by S. Gorley Putt. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (for the Commonwealth Fund), 1956, 222 p. $3.50.

A composite picture of America and Americans as seen in the reports of Commonwealth Fund Fellows from Britain over the years 1946–1952.

THE CIVILIAN AND THE MILITARY. By Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956, 340 p. $6.50.

A history of the antimilitarist tradition in America, a tradition which the author sees imperiled by the recent drift toward the "garrison state."

AMERICAN MILITARY POLICY. By Major C. Joseph Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon. Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Co., 1955, 512 p. $5.00.

A history of military policy at the political and governmental level since the founding of the Republic.

Western Europe

THE TERMS OF TRADE: A EUROPEAN CASE STUDY. By Charles P. Kindleberger. Cambridge: Technology Press; and New York: Wiley, 1956, 382 p. $9.00.

An important if rather technical monograph which has the aim of testing theories concerning short- and long-run influences on the terms of trade against an amassed body of European statistical evidence.

L'UNIFICATION DE L'EUROPE. By Jacques Trempont. Amiens: Éditions Scientifiques, 1955, 418 p. Fr. 1500.

A vigorous argument for European unification, based largely on economic considerations.

THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY. By Henry L. Mason. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1955, 153 p. Guilders 8.50.

This is a good summary of some of the activities of the European Coal and Steel Community. Concisely written, it emphasizes constitutional and political matters and analyzes some controversial issues.

NATIONALIZATION IN FRANCE AND ITALY. By Mario Einaudi, Maurice Byé and Ernesto Rossi. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955, 260 p. $3.50.

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This fourth of a valuable series of studies relating to postwar France and Italy deals with the problems raised by nationalization policies in the two countries.

MODERN FRANCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH CIVILIZATION. By F. C. Roe. New York: Longmans, 1956, 288 p. $3.75.

An affectionate survey of France and French culture, indifferent in its political analysis, but at home in educational and literary matters.

L'OPIUM DES INTELLECTUELS. By Raymond Aron. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1955, 337 p. Fr. 750.

A French intellectual's dissection of French intellectuals to see why Marxism should continue to have its attractions for them.

THE NORWEGIANS: A STUDY IN NATIONAL CULTURE. By David Rodnick. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1955, 165 p. $3.25.

A sociological treatment on Norwegian culture, based on a year's field work with interviews, in which we learn, among other things, that Norwegians are "highly empathic" and "emotionally honest in interpersonal relationships."

A HISTORY OF SWEDEN. By Ingvar Andersson. New York: Praeger, 1956, 461 p. $7.50.

A translation of an able general history by a leading Swedish historian, Keeper of the National Archives in Stockholm. The last 50 pages deal with twentieth century developments.

SWEDEN: THE WELFARE STATE. By Wilfrid Fleisher. New York: Day, 1956, 255 p. $4.00.

A generally approving account of the accomplishments of Sweden's Social Democratic government.

THE EAST GERMAN RISING. By Stefan Brant. London: Thames and Hudson, 1955, 202 p. 18/.

A good, though not definitive, account of the uprising of June 17, 1953. The English version, while briefer, incorporates some improvements over the German original ("Der Aufstand," Stuttgart: Steingrüben, 1954, 324 p. DM. 11.80).

THE COLOSSUS AGAIN. By Alfred Grosser. New York: Praeger, 1955, 249 p. $4.75.

A French scholar's appraisal of postwar developments in Germany. A revised translation of "L'Allemagne de l'Occident" which appeared in 1953 (noted here January 1954).

RETURN TO POWER: A REPORT ON THE NEW GERMANY. By Alistair Horne. New York: Praeger, 1956, 415 p. $6.00.

An interesting account of Germany in 1952–1954, by a correspondent of the London *Daily Telegraph*. Adenauer is clearly the central figure of the narrative.

GERMAN DEMOCRACY AT WORK. By James K. Pollock and Others. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955, 208 p. $4.50.

A study, by four observers, of German politics at the time of the 1953 Bundestag elections. The authors find the general picture, reflected in the electoral behavior, most encouraging.

SCHICKSALSJAHRE ÖSTERREICHS 1908–1919: DAS POLITISCHE TAGEBUCH JOSEF REDLICHS. Edited by Fritz Fellner. Graz: Böhlau, 1953–1954, 2 v. Schillings 220.

The diary of a leading Austrian scholar and politician who died in 1936. An

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important source for the history of the Hapsburg Monarchy in the last decade of its existence.

VON DOLLFUSS ZU HITLER. By Ulrich Eichstädt. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1955, 558 p. DM. 28.

A very substantial and well-documented study of the background of the Anschluss and the climactic events of February and March 1938.

MISSION À ROME: MUSSOLINI. By Hubert Lagardelle. Paris: Plon, 1955, 307 p. Fr. 840.

The author, an old French syndicalist, friend and admirer of Mussolini, was for several years attached to the French Embassy in Rome. In this memoir-history he discusses French-Italian relations in the critical years 1933–1937. Has useful information and documentation on the Four-Power Pact, the Laval-Mussolini agreement, and the period of League sanctions.

CONTADINI DEL SUD. By Rocco Scotellaro. Bari: Laterza, 1954, 247 p. L. 900.

This uncompleted work by a young Lucanian poet and Socialist Mayor, who died in 1953, is a most sensitive and intimate depiction of peasant life in Southern Italy, in the form of autobiographies of a number of individuals.

ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER MUSSOLINI. By Luigi Villari. New York: Devin-Adair, 1956, 396 p. $6.00.

A singularly repellent defense of Mussolini's foreign policy.

MUSSOLINI: TWILIGHT AND FALL. By Roman Dombrowski. New York: Roy, 1956, 248 p. $3.75.

A reconstruction of the two strange last years of Mussolini's life, from his unexpected deposition in July 1943 to his violent death in April 1945.

IL CAUDILLO DI SPAGNA E LA SUA SUCCESSIONE. By Giovanni Mammucari. Rome: Ateneo, 1955, 118 p. L. 1000.

A brief monograph on the involved constitutional situation in Franco's Spain.

Eastern Europe

SIX KEYS TO THE SOVIET SYSTEM. By Bertram D. Wolfe. Boston: Beacon Press, 1956, 258 p. $3.75.

In these essays written over the years 1940 to 1955 and dealing with one or another facet of Soviet totalitarianism, Mr. Wolfe is constantly working, with much insight and knowledge, to get at the internal dynamics of this strange and sinister type of régime.

THE CHANGING WORLD OF SOVIET RUSSIA. By David J. Dallin. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956, 422 p. $5.00.

A reorganized revision, including a number of new sections, of the author's "The Real Soviet Russia" which first appeared in 1944.

LENIN: A BIOGRAPHY. London: Lawrence, 1955, 272 p. 7/6.

A translation of a 1955 revised Russian edition of an official biography. A perceptible down-playing of Stalin's rôle, but the banner of Lenin remains invincible.

THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE AND THE ECONOMY OF THE SOVIET NORTH. By Constantine Krypton. New York: Praeger (for the Research Program on the U.S.S.R.), 1956, 219 p. $5.00.

A study of the actual and potential economic rôle of the sea route along the Arctic

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coast between Novaya Zemlya and the Bering Strait. The author was formerly the head of the economic section of a Soviet research institute.

SOVIET PROFESSIONAL MANPOWER: ITS EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND SUPPLY. By Nicholas DeWitt. Washington: National Science Foundation, 1955, 400 p. $1.25.

An able study investigating the important topic of "the availability and growth of the specialized manpower resources of the U.S.S.R. in so far as they might be judged from the Soviet educational effort during the past 25 years."

THE HISTORY OF A SOVIET COLLECTIVE FARM. By Fedor Belov. New York: Praeger (for the Research Program on the U.S.S.R.), 1955, 237 p. $5.50.

Useful first-hand evidence by a former chairman of a collective farm in the Ukraine, who subsequently fled the Soviet Union.

THE SOVIET FILM INDUSTRY. By Paul Babitsky and John Rimberg. New York: Praeger (for the Research Program on the U.S.S.R.), 1955, 377 p. $5.50.

A well-documented history and analysis.

BELORUSSIA. By Nicholas P. Vakar. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956, 297 p. $6.50.

A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL GUIDE TO BELORUSSIA. By Nicholas P. Vakar. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956, 63 p. $2.00.

A most useful survey, with accompanying bibliography, of the background and history of Belorussia and Belorussian nationalism—a nationalism forged in opposition to Communism and to Russian, Polish, Lithuanian and Ukrainian territorial claims but still seeking its own identity.

AUS DEM LETZTEN KAPITEL DEUTSCH-BALTISCHER GESCHICHTE IN LETTLAND 1919–1939. By Wilhelm von Rüdiger. Meine (Germany): Kluge, 1954–1955, 2 parts, DM. 7.90.

Von Rüdiger, a leading personality of the German minority in Latvia in the inter-war period and for a while also member of the board of Henlein's "Verband der deutschen Volksgruppen in Europa," describes the activities and the pro-Reich aspirations of his compatriots after the establishment of the Latvian state. Interesting information on the representatives of the German government in Riga and on the growth of Nazism among the Baltic Germans.

LATVIJAS SOCIĀLDEMOKRATIJAS PIECDESMIT GADI. By Brūno Kalniņš. Stockholm: Lettlands Sap Utlandskommittén, 1956, 376 p.

A history of 50 years of the Latvian Social Democratic Party, stressing the activities of its Menshevik wing.

FINLAND BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. By Anatole G. Mazour. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1956, 298 p. $6.50.

Very largely a history of Finnish-Soviet relations, with particular emphasis on the years since 1939. Based in good part on materials gathered in Finnish libraries.

KUIN PIETARI HIILIVALKEALLA. SOTASYYLLISYYSASIAN VAIHEET 1944–1949. By Yrjö Soini. Helsinki: Otava, 1956, 382 p. Fmk. 800.

A well-written account of Finland's war trials, although its major thesis—that the Allied Control Commission would have been content to follow a hands-off

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policy and that intervention came belatedly only as a result of local Communist pressure—requires more proof than the writer provides.

ITSENÄISEN SUOMEN ARKEA. By VÄINÖ TANNER. Helsinki: Tammi, 1956, 364 p. Fmk. 920.

A collection of 45 speeches from the years 1918–1946 by Finland's leading Social Democrat.

CZECH TRAGEDY. By GLORNEY BOLTON. London: Watts, 1955, 240 p. 21/.

Recent Czech history as represented by the careers of Thomas Masaryk, Edward Beneš and Jan Masaryk.

THE BALKANS IN OUR TIME. By ROBERT LEE WOLFF. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956, 618 p. $8.00.

This addition to the American Foreign Policy Library series is easily the best single survey of the recent history of Jugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania. About a third of the volume is devoted to a review of the Balkans before 1939; the remainder leads us through the tortured war years and into the bleak era of Communist domination. The author is Professor of History at Harvard.

LUPESCU. By ALICE-LEONE MOATS. New York: Holt, 1955, 220 p. $3.50.

About the late King Carol of Rumania and Madame Lupescu. Similar in spirit to the well-known limerick on the same subject.

DOUZE INVASIONS RUSSES EN ROUMANIE. By NICOLAE I. ARNAUTU. Buenos Aires: Editions Cuget Romanesc, 1956, 190 p.

On the 12 Russian invasions of Rumania over the two centuries since 1711.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION OF 1955. By D. E. BUTLER. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1956, 236 p. $5.00.

The fourth in a useful series of studies of general elections sponsored by Nuffield College, Oxford. Earlier studies dealt with the elections of 1945, 1950 and 1951.

BEYOND NATIONALIZATION. By GEORGE B. BALDWIN. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955, 324 p. $6.00.

A study of the chronic ailments of Britain's coal industry, with particular emphasis on the relation between technology and labor.

MY FATHER: THE TRUE STORY. By A. W. BALDWIN. London: Allen and Unwin, 1955, 360 p. 25/. (Fair Lawn, N.J.: Essential Books, 1956, $4.00.)

A defense of his father, the late British Prime Minister, against the many attacks on his public career and policy. Aimed primarily at G. M. Young's official but critical biography, it is a helpful corrective.

WINSTON CHURCHILL IN TRIAL AND TRIUMPH. By ALAN MOOREHEAD. Boston: Houghton, 1955, 117 p. $2.50.

A brief, affectionate but discerning portrait.

ANTHONY EDEN. By LEWIS BROAD. New York: Crowell, 1955, 280 p. $5.00.

A popular sketch, designed for Americans.

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A useful survey of demography and migration in the Commonwealth with separate chapters on Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa.

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THE MYSTERIOUS NORTH. By Pierre Berton. New York: Knopf, 1956, 345 p. $5.00.
An interesting and informative report, by the managing editor of *Maclean's*, on the Canadian North.

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More than a dozen leading scholars have contributed to this valuable study of the origins and development of Islamic law. It is hoped that a second volume on modern legal systems in the Middle East will follow.

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A concise and informative history, primarily devoted to the development of the Turkish Republic.

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A history, by a professor at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, of the cultural and social contacts between Jews and Arabs over the centuries.

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A selection of literary pieces presenting the story of the creation of Israel.

KIBBUTZ: VENTURE IN UTOPIA. By Melford E. Spiro. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956, 266 p. $4.50.

A study, by an anthropologist and his wife, of one of the more radical kibbutzim—collective settlements—in Israel. The experiment appears to be passing through a state of some psychological tension and disillusionment.

South and Southeast Asia

THE COLOR CURTAIN. By Richard Wright. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1956, 221 p. $3.75.

A personal report, by an American Negro writer, on the 1955 Bandung Conference of Asian and African nations.

STRUGGLE FOR ASIA. By Sir Francis Low. New York: Praeger, 1956, 239 p. $3.50.

A useful background book on Asia's problems and progress. The author was for many years the editor of the *Times of India.*

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A stimulating brief survey of the differences in foreign policy that divide India and the United States and a prescription for overcoming some of them. Devoted largely to an explanation of the Indian point of view.

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A perceptive report on a visit to India in 1953. Lady Hartog, who died in 1954, had long experience in the subcontinent in the inter-war years.

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An informative report by an able *New York Times* correspondent, based on his seven-year tour of duty in India.

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The first in a monograph series published by the Indian Press Digests Project of the University of California at Berkeley, this volume presents a series of summaries of press opinion and discussion on various aspects of Sino-Indian relations as seen in the English-language Indian press. It also contains useful documentary appendixes. A chronology and a perceptive introduction add to its value.

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Reminiscences and reflections of a former Comintern emissary sent from Britain in the early twenties to assist in the development of the Indian Communist Party. The first section is interesting for the character sketch of the author that emerges. The second contains his criticism of what he considers to be Prime Minister Nehru's "pro-Communist" foreign policy.

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A summary of the highlights of Indian foreign policy from 1947 through 1954,

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BRIEF AUTHORITY. By Edwin F. Stanton. New York: Harper, 1956, 290 p. $4.00.

Diplomatic memoirs of a career spent largely in Southeast Asia and the Far East, by the former American Ambassador to Thailand.

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A vivid, personal account by a U.S. Navy doctor of the transport of the thousands of refugees from North to South Vietnam.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

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A useful general review of politics and international relations in China, Japan, Korea and Southeast Asia since 1945.

LAND OF THE 500 MILLION: A GEOGRAPHY OF CHINA. By George B. Cressey. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955, 387 p. $10.00.

A comprehensive physical, economic and regional geography.

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Revealing letters written by an American doctor in Shanghai between April 1949 and October 1952.

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The first published study on the national income of this Crown Colony.

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A sociological study of race relations in Hawaii, an area of extravagantly mixed population.

PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC HANDBOOK. By Urbano A. Zafra. Silver Spring (Md.): Westland Printing Co., 1955, 208 p. $7.50.

A useful handbook, designed for those with investment or commercial interests.

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Africa

THE PRINCE AND I. By Marvine Howe. New York: Day, 1955, 252 p. $3.50.
A lively story of an American woman's five-year stay in French Morocco, during which time she became well acquainted with the then Crown Prince and developed strongly pro-Nationalist sentiments.

NORTH AFRICAN JOURNEY. By Bernard Newman. London: Hale, 1955, 252 p. 18/.
A report on Tunis, Morocco and Algeria, by an extraordinarily prolific traveller-author.

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MAN AND LAND IN PERU. By Thomas R. Ford. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1955, 176 p. $4.00.

A sociological inquiry—using Peru as the "laboratory"—into the interrelation between social systems and the utilization of agricultural lands.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

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